Ubuntu 16.04 LTS: https://usn.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-3522-1/
Ubuntu 14.04 LTS: https://usn.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-3522-2/
Ubuntu 17.10: https://usn.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-3523-1/
EDIT: thanks for the update (or did I misread earlier?).
Why is that? In theory, on a generic CPU, the microcode changes to stop Meltdown are drastically simpler than the mitigations for Spectre. Are Intel chips incapable of implementing them?
(And I'll laugh pretty hard if it's confirmed that these super-complex branch buffer adjustments are possible, but simple prefetch filters are just not possible on current Intel hardware.)
By now, we're sure most everyone have heard of the Meltdown and Spectre attacks. If not, head over to https://meltdownattack.com/ and get an overview. Additional technical details are available from Google Project Zero. https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privi...
The FreeBSD Security Team was notified of the issue in late December and received a briefing under NDA with the original embargo date of January 9th. Since we received relatively late notice of the issue, our ability to provide fixes is delayed.
Meltdown (CVE-2017-5754) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ In terms of priority, the first step is to mitigate against the Meltdown attack (CVE-2017-5754, cited as variant 3 by Project Zero). Work for this is ongoing, but due to the relatively large changes needed, this is going to take a little while. We are currently targeting patches for amd64 being dev complete this week with testing probably running into next week. From there, we hope to give it a short bake time before pushing it into the 11.1-RELEASE branch. Additional work will be required to bring the mitigation to 10.3-RELEASE and 10.4-RELEASE.
The code will be selectable via a tunable which will automatically turn on for modern Intel processors and off for AMD processors (since they are reportedly not vulnerable). Since the fix for Meltdown does incur a performance hit for any transition between user space and kernel space, this could be rather impactful depending on the workload. As such, the tunable can also be overridden by the end-user if they are willing to accept the risk.
Initial work can be tracked at https://reviews.freebsd.org/D13797. Please note this is a work in progress and some stuff is likely to be broken.
Spectre (CVE-2017-5753 and CVE-2017-5715) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ When it comes to the Spectre vulnerabilities, it is much harder to sort these out. Variant 1 (CVE-2017-5753) is going to require some static analysis to determine vulnerable use cases that will require barriers to stop speculation from disclosing information it shouldn't. While we haven't done the analysis to determine where we are vulnerable, the number of cases here are supposed to be pretty small. Apparently there have been some Coverity rules developed to help look for these, but we are still evaluating what can be done here.
The other half of Spectre, variant 2 (CVE-2017-5715) is a bit trickier as it affects both normal processes and bhyve. There is a proposed patch for LLVM (https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723) that introduces a concept called 'retpoline' which mitigates this issue. We are likely to pull this into HEAD and 11-STABLE once it hits the LLVM tree. Unfortunately, the currently supported FreeBSD releases are using older versions of LLVM for which we are not sure the LLVM project will produce patches. We will be looking at the feasibility to backport these patches to these earlier versions.
There are CPU microcode fixes coming out when in concert with OS changes would also help, but that's a bit down the road at the moment.
If anything significantly changes I will make additional posts to clarify as the information becomes available.
Best regards, Gordon Tetlow with security-officer hat on
Anyone else thinks this was kind of a slap in the face to the smaller communities and companies or is it just me?
They were notified in late December, right before the holidays, so that's basically only 2-3 weeks of work. Obviously nobody _had_ to notify anyone, could have just released it right away, so it was a professional courtesy, but why not extend it to a few more projects?
Before anyone says "but OpenBSD broke an embargo before", this is a different project and besides having BSD in the name don't see why they were excluded.
Indeed. There seems to be a security oligarchy now consisting of Google, FB, Apple, Amazon et al. and Intel.
Intel and Google don't have a leg to stand on: I'm super glad they found the bugs, but their disclosure has been nothing but a shitshow.
AFAIK they all share the same brand name BSD and they are all closely affiliated.
This is a gross falsehood.
They all variously diverged from a parent project, called BSD, in the 90s. Since then they are wholly independent. Because of the common license and heritage, code sharing is often easy and legally unrestricted. But their leaders, policies, and philosophies are very distinct.
FreeBSD secteam does not leak NDAed or embargoed information to other BSDs.
As for Spectre, these are just the microcode updates that have the additional MSRs that allow system software to mitigate certain variants of Spectre attack against the system software itself. They are necessary, but emphatically not sufficient -- and it would disingenuous for Intel to pretend that this in any way means that 90% of systems are protected from Meltdown and Spectre.