NeuG USB True Random Number Generator

Re:NeuG USB True Random Number Generator by pvg on Friday January 05, 2018 @02:50PM (#16081110)

How does reseeding the CSPRNG create forward secrecy? I thought that if someone lifts your CSPRNG internal state (after it's been seeded and the seed tossed), they wouldn't be able to play it backwards to get previous output you've used as session keys or whatever.

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Re:NeuG USB True Random Number Generator by tptacek on Friday January 05, 2018 @03:21PM (#16081333)

I'm abusing the term, I know. But the idea is simple, right? Even a minuscule update to the kernel entropy pool makes a previously compromised state unusable. So you don't want your CSPRNG to just be a bit generator, like HMAC or CTR.

(Zvi Gutterman refers to the property I'm talking about as "backwards security", so my abuse of the term is particularly egregious).

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Re:NeuG USB True Random Number Generator by pvg on Saturday January 06, 2018 @09:24PM (#16088728)

Hah, I was really asking what you meant, not trying to chide you about about terminology. Makes sense, thanks.

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