Re:NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Round 1 Submissions
by CiPHPerCoder on Wednesday December 27, 2017 @04:05PM
(#16018027)
> Passwords are PSKs and are the overwhelming default authentication mechanism for Internet scale systems.
Not for HTTPS, which is what we're talking about.
For WPA2-PSK, okay, you have a small n, it might work.
For user authentication against a local database, you're not encrypting, you're using validating against a password hash and then elevating the user's privilege for the duration of their session. That's far removed from what we mean when we say PSK (pre-shared keys), where encryption is implied.
Re:NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Round 1 Submissions
by late2part on Thursday December 28, 2017 @03:34PM
(#16024691)
To be fair, that’s what you’re talking about. I am mostly talking about SSH access.
Re:NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Round 1 Submissions
by tscs37 on Wednesday December 27, 2017 @04:30PM
(#16018198)
Passwords are largely stored in servers with enough storage to deal with the users of them.
However, distributing a PSK to every device is not friendly. 10 Million Passwords will at minimum take about 80 MB, some phones and IoT devices have only ten times of that as permanent storage or less.
Passwords work mostly because the other side has the storage and cpu capacity to operate with them
Storing, distributing, and synchronizing billions of small blobs is actually a solved problem and not that big a deal. I wouldn't be so quick to write it off, because it has a real, working, easily understood invalidation and revocation story, which PKI does not.
A system that combines asymmetric crypto public-private key pairs with the distributed-whitelist properties of simple passwords, by treating the public keys as PSKs, has a lot of compelling benefits.