https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/12/nope-...
For ~$170 apparently you can get an EV cert for "Stripe, Inc" (by forming a company with that name).
Even aside from that fact, users are very bad at knowing what a secure site looks like. I would wager that if most users clicked "login" and didn't see an EV cert, but instead saw "<padlock> Secure" (i.e. a non-EV HTTPS connection), they would not notice the difference.
Troy is right to kick up a fuss about this; this is a significant attack vector (anyone on a wifi network can MITM your banking login URL), and it's more egregious because of how easy it is to set up HTTPS.
For one tenth that cost, you can register stripeinc.net and get an SSL cert. Yay!
Domain registration is available instantly for anyone, anytime, and it can be phished at least as easily as anything else. https://www.xn--80ak6aa92e.com/ looks pretty legit in Firefox.
Also, it may not be apparent to users whether "The Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc [GB]" would be affiliated with NatWest. Companies often have different names they do business under.
If the name is unrecognizable for users, _that_ is the user security concern that you should be posting about.
That handles the widest array of security vulnerabilities on http://personal.natwest.com/, whether MITM, compromised site, misspelled domain, etc.
This was on the topic of an EV cert being issued to a different 'Stripe, Inc'.
But also, I observed that for top sites, "people trust their website by fiat, simply by mental associations about their domain names (...)". This is why HTTPS on a landing page is so important: to safeguard the trust chain that most users use to arrive at the login page -- first, the name of their bank, then the bank's URL from memory, then the bank's login page from the homepage's URL.
The case is not overstated in any way, serving a major trust-building page like a bank homepage over HTTP is crazy. Redirecting to a spoofed webpage is obviously the simple hijack but there's no reason some attacker couldn't drop some custom-built HTML and JS to drop a faux-login form right on the page that's filled with copy about how trustworthy the bank is.
Sidenote: several years ago my bank started POSTing their login form to a completely separate domain to login to my account. So I fill in the username field on the homepage and it sends me to "totallysecurebankloginsite.com" to enter my password. After a few calls to the bank they insist that this is the design they intended and that it's just fine.
The issue is that most non-technical users would not even think about checking. They went to their "secure" bank website and clicked login, why should they have to worry?
You want them to continuously keep verifying it’s the correct domain/cert just because this company is too lazy/cheap to buy a cert?
You want to know if the login page is NatWest?
Click on the Login link and look at the browsers security bar.
If it says "The Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc [GB]" and that then entity with which you do business, great.
It seems as if Troy would be just fine with HTTPS rather than HTTP, but DV validated certs aren't what you want anyway with a financial institution.
It seems far more likely that you care about the entity you are working with (Royal Bank of Scotland), than the domain of the referring page (personal.natwest.com).