f2n

Well yes but if you use their trash mobile site then the lack of NSFW content is the least of your concerns.

What's wrong with marking content NSFW? Its not censoring it, simply providing a warning to those who may be in a place where their screen is visible and that might not be appropriate.

>I'm not familiar with monero, but aren't all transactions in cryptocurrency public and permanent?

Not with monero (and possibly other cryptocurrencies)

I had the Tor Project's repos added, but I guess no auto updates.

Thanks for posting, turns out one of these was mine. I forgot that it existed. 1213 days of uptime, still running Debian Wheezy (don't worry, i'm bringing it up to date now)

No, it would get customers used to ignoring the LEDs on it.

> It wont let you vefiry by entering a code

That's odd because I've absolutely verified numerous Signal clients by entering a code, without granting access to my SMS (I use Google Voice so my SMS database is basically empty except for random spam from my shitty carrier)

Do you have a source for that? I assumed the lessons learned from SPDY and QUIC eventually went into HTTP 2

I used to use something called UTM Mangler that would replace the referral links with shock sites. I felt that was much better than simply removing them.

Here's the github, it looks like the chrome extension linked in the README is no longer there: https://github.com/huntwelch/UTM-Mangler

I don't understand how any of those are remotely related to whois being removed. It's not like it represented anyone that could feasibly be sued before, just a whoisguard service, usually

Also using Firefox 60, demo is a blank page.

You've linked that thread a couple of times here, never really elaborating on the nature of your concerns, nor do you elaborate on the specific nature of your concerns in the ticket. Have you considered elaborating on the nature of your concerns? Is there a specific vulnerability in chromium you feel could be exploited here?

So let's say I'm able to run HTML in Signal Desktop. How do I include an arbitrary script without getting the user to download the script first?

It'll be interesting to see how this works, given that the Signal Desktop client's main page (background.html) includes a CSP that restricts it from running inline or external scripts. It can only run JS that's already in the Signal Desktop package (in theory).

The fact that this isn't being described as an issue with CSPs or electron makes me wonder how it could possibly work.

My traffic is coming from a Digital Ocean NYC, in the US

The owner of this website (through-the-interface.typepad.com) has banned your IP address

Whelp, I guess I didn't care that much.

These look really nifty. I'm hoping GitLab will add similar. I particularly like that the build can be failed due to a specific line. I've noticed that all of the CI output can be confusing for some, and it becomes difficult to suss out the specific error messages amid all the other output.

The only API they don't support that I know of that somewhat bothers me is that notifications can't have buttons or actions. The bugzilla issue[0] has been sitting without much updates for a while.

[0] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1190681

Native apps have led to slow, bloatware-, spyware-, and malware-infested mobile devices. The browser is a much better sandbox, giving much less permissions to the untrusted code.

It does not help for that scenario, but it forces the attackers to jump through another hoop, and publish that a new cert was issued for the domain.

>HSTS wouldn't help users clicking through warning

Actually it would have! Chrome and possible other browsers do not allow clicking throw certificate validation issues on sites with HSTS. For example, try to get to https://badssl.finn.io in Chrome.

...yes, as I said, as long as you aren't fucking shit up for others. I thought I was very clear about that.

They will say that, despite it having no bearing in reality. The only time the FCC cares is if you're fucking shit up for others.

Why is is_anonymous = true for a tor relay? Why are relays and exit nodes given the same flag? As a tor relay operator, I anticipate this being misused, like so many before it, to arbitrarily block all tor relays by people who don't know or care how tor works.

At least they used the correct numbers of w's in the URL.