It also hides the a service provider's physical location (well, their IP address and hence location in the network graph) from even a user that knows their identity. You might know that I am an investigative journalist you're trying to send information to - or, given the origin or Tor, maybe you're a spy and you know I'm your handler - but I don't want to give away my location.
There are also a lot of use cases where the user doesn't care that much about knowing who the service provider is, and the service provider cares a lot about hiding their identity (enough so that they would not provide the service if they could not be anonymous).
For the example of, say, political commentary - often what you care about there is less the real-world identity of a person, and more their persistent identity and reputation. On the other side of the equation, though, in some environments people might not feel safe expressing their opinions at all if those opinions could be traced back to them.
https://github.com/n8fr8/talks/blob/master/onion_things/Inte...
Obviously, Tor is not the only solution to this problem, but it is one that has the nice property that you don't need to register any accounts, you don't need to pay for anything, the availability of the Tor network is pretty good ...
Also I am not so sure I would call it a side effect, for two reasons:
1. Any application that grows the anonymity set of Tor is useful for the goals of the Tor network. Even if your SSH session does not have any use for the anonymity that Tor provides, it still is good for the Tor network that you add cover traffic to the network for those who need it.
2. Decentralization has a lot of overlap with anonymity, and as such I would consider this use actually to be well within the use cases that Tor is intended for: ISPs build networks that increaslingly make it difficult to use your own devices for anything more than consuming content that is delivered from the network, thus contributing to the growth of the kind of centralized services that don't provide any anonymity at all. Using Tor to access your own machines and thus enabling you to build infrastructure that is not inspected by third parties is very much aligned with the goals of the Tor project.
IPFS or Keybase seem like better approaches towards those goals. And, yes, Tor makes sense if you need to hide your IP address. But beyond that I don't see much further use.
And in doing so you contribute to the usefulness of Tor, since it relies on people using it to create an anonymity set.
So now I have a private channel to that address and I don't have to worry about the exit nodes (unlike when I use Tor for clearnet sites).
But now how do I know that I can trust the owner of that onion?
How can you trust anyone?
That's a deep philosophical question but doesn't really have anything to do with the technology you are using?
Personally I trust something more when someone puts their reputation on the line for it.
You see it with the drug marketplaces - users self-organize a distributed reputation system that tells other users which sites can be trusted with bitcoin and drug transactions and which cannot.
It's a remarkably well functioning and resilient system - and its hosted across reddit, forums, blogs, etc.
It's not just hidden, it's also decentralized. You can:
* Register and publish a site in seconds ...
* ... without a central registar (just generate a key) ...
* ... from just about any Internet connection.
* Get a secure transport without the clusterfuck of backdoors that is HTTPS.
* All for a concentrated audience that likes a different, simpler, smaller, homier Web.
What I don't understand is what any of that has to do with any sort of "correctness"?!
How do you find out the correct name of James Miller? How do you find out the correct domain of google.com? That just seems like a set of nonsensical questions to me.
An other use case would be access to a server IPMI/Online KVM switch, which has a tendency to not get updated regularly.
In general any situation where you in the past had to go through a third-party hub could be replaced with a hidden service for a end-to-end solution, as long latency isn't a major requirement.
But what's the end result of hidden services?
I want to be anonymous sometimes but I can't think of a time when I want the host of a service I use to be anonymous.
In most situations their identity is actually important to me. I want to know the source of news, to trust that I'm sending a message to the right person, to trust that I'm not relying on a site run by some kid in her parents basement.
And I know that legitimate sites can get certs for onions these days (like facebook)... But doesn't that defeat the original purpose of running a hidden service if the purpose is to hide the owner?