News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Equifax website hacked again, this time to redirect to fa... by g051051 on Thursday October 12, 2017 @09:40AM (#15457827)
Equifax was loading this script: https://aa.econsumer.equifax.com/aad/uib/js/fireclick.js

This script, from Fireclick Web Analytics, then loaded a script via Akami CDN that was hosted for a Fireclick domain, netflame.cc: a248.e.akamai.net/f/248/5462/3h/hints.netflame.cc/service/script/www.annualcreditreport.com

So this package was not coming from Equifax, but was being injected by a compromised analytics provider.

Re:Equifax website hacked again, this time to redirect to fa... by politician on Thursday October 12, 2017 @10:19AM (#15458097)
That's exactly the threat that Monday's post about Circle CI was about! Literally 3 days to a concrete example!
Re:Equifax website hacked again, this time to redirect to fa... by bkovacev on Thursday October 12, 2017 @10:41AM (#15458294)
Could you please give me a link to that? Are users in danger of a possible hack?
Re:Equifax website hacked again, this time to redirect to fa... by lstamour on Thursday October 12, 2017 @10:56AM (#15458417)
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15442636 - No more a danger than on most sites, it's just something to consider
Re:Equifax website hacked again, this time to redirect to fa... by wlesieutre on Thursday October 12, 2017 @11:17AM (#15458593)
The difference pointed out in the headline being that when NYT, Amazon, Wikipedia, etc, have compromised scripts they can serve fake flash updates. If CircleCI has them they can compromise my source code and API keys.

The vulnerability might be the same, but the danger to users is not.

Excerpt for reference:

This is a problem because the CircleCI browser context has full access to the CircleCI API, which is hosted on the same domain, so all eight of those companies' scripts can make requests to CircleCI API endpoints. Furthermore CircleCI customers frequently either include credentials in source code or as environment variables in CircleCI. Set these, and you are trusting that CircleCI won't get compromised, or at least, your application is at most as secure as CircleCI is.

Re:Equifax website hacked again, this time to redirect to fa... by nikolay on Thursday October 12, 2017 @10:57AM (#15458431)
Potentially, yes! Here's the post about CircleCI: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15442636
Re:Equifax website hacked again, this time to redirect to fa... by ceejayoz on Thursday October 12, 2017 @10:04AM (#15457961)
We were just talking about the potential dangers of these third-party analytics scripts the other day.

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=15442636

Re:Equifax website hacked again, this time to redirect to fa... by Bartweiss on Thursday October 12, 2017 @10:24AM (#15458140)
This is only reinforcing my conviction that blocking scripts and advertising isn't a consumer decision but a security one. I'm not unwilling to be advertised to (or analyzed), but I'm completely unwilling to expand my vulnerability from "the site I opened" to "every external service they can think to load".
Re:Equifax website hacked again, this time to redirect to fa... by feelin_googley on Thursday October 12, 2017 @12:30PM (#15459141)
"... I'm completely unwilling to expand my vulnerability from the 'site I opened' to 'every external service they can think to load'."

I think that is a reasonable decision.

What would be the most effective way to protect against this vulnerability?

1. Ask the authors of the major browser you use to please change their software to your benefit instead of the advertisers who pay millions every quarter and finance the authors' salary.

Right now, all major browsers load scripts automatically. No user input required.

What gets loaded is determined by the website, not the user.

2. Turn off Javascript.

3. Use a browser that does not load scripts automatically.

Or use one program to retrieve the stuff you want from the web, e.g., an http client, and another program or programs to read/view/play it, offline. Only the http client needs an internet conection.

4. Stop using the web. (Not meant to be flippant.) The web is but one part of the internet. Alas, it has been largely "taken over" by the lure of the sale of personal information about consumers and advertising.

Look for existing or new internet protocols that do not use the web but which can provide the same things that the web does.

The software to access these protocols does not have to be written by organizations with interests in data collection and advertising.

It may be possible to have a segment of the network that is noncommercial. Free from ad delivery.

Re:Equifax website hacked again, this time to redirect to fa... by ceejayoz on Thursday October 12, 2017 @12:33PM (#15459169)
What meaningful capability would the general public have of evaluating which JS requests to permit?
Re:Equifax website hacked again, this time to redirect to fa... by notyourwork on Thursday October 12, 2017 @10:49AM (#15458358)
And the problem is the general population doesn't understand this.
Re:Equifax website hacked again, this time to redirect to fa... by FilterSweep on Thursday October 12, 2017 @09:50AM (#15457886)
That's Internet 2.0 in it's purest form, no?
Re:Equifax website hacked again, this time to redirect to fa... by tyingq on Thursday October 12, 2017 @01:19PM (#15459552)
After poking around a bit, the "netflame.cc" domain may be where this was compromised.

It used to be a Fireclick owned domain, but the current ownership might not be Fireclick.

Try: whois -h whois.dynadot.com netflame.cc | grep Registrant

The results don't really look like what they would be if Fireclick owned it. It's registered to a Thailand national using a personal gmail account.

Can't prove it, but I have a suspicion Fireclick let the domain lapse/expire, and some bad actor registered it, then figured out what content to post where, or got hacked themselves.

Re:Equifax website hacked again, this time to redirect to fa... by shallot_router on Thursday October 12, 2017 @02:00PM (#15459855)
WHOIS history on that domain shows the registration changed hands on November 15, 2016. Before that, it was owned by "Digital River, Inc.":

    Registrant Name: Digital River, Inc.
    Registrant Organization: Digital River, Inc.
    Registrant Street: 10380 Bren Road West
    Registrant City: Minnetonka
    Registrant State/Province: MN
    Registrant Postal Code: 55343
    Registrant Country: US
    Registrant Phone: +1.9522531234
    Registrant Email: [email protected]
Digital River appears to be an online commerce company: https://www.digitalriver.com/cloud-based-ecommerce-solutions...

They were probably the legitimate owners. The domain registration expiration date at that time was set for 2017, so it doesn't look like a registration lapse. It's unclear how and why the ownership was transferred.

Re:Equifax website hacked again, this time to redirect to fa... by tyingq on Thursday October 12, 2017 @02:55PM (#15460346)
Digital river was the parent company of fireclick.

> It's unclear how and why the ownership was transferred

Yes, it's curious.

Re:Equifax website hacked again, this time to redirect to fa... by easytiger on Thursday October 12, 2017 @09:52AM (#15457907)
Just got this same thing on some other site.