Re:How to defeat Ed25519 and EdDSA using faults
by bascule on Friday October 06, 2017 @01:02PM
(#15418341)
It's not a good defense, because a double fault injection attack could bypass the signature verification as well.
The only software defense that actually works reliably is preventing duplicate r-values from being generated in the first place. This can be accomplished by augmenting the fully deterministic r with some additional randomness, producing a synthetic r which is still guaranteed to be unique-per-message even if we have an RNG failure. See:
The only software defense that actually works reliably is preventing duplicate r-values from being generated in the first place. This can be accomplished by augmenting the fully deterministic r with some additional randomness, producing a synthetic r which is still guaranteed to be unique-per-message even if we have an RNG failure. See:
https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/curves/2017/000925.htm...
Note this is quite different from the k-value in ECDSA, which is not synthesized from the message contents at all.