This is an integrated hardware/software problem, right?
I think my comment is being read to suggest that fault attacks are generally unimportant, which is not my point. I think if there's a subtextual reaction to anything in my comment, it's the notion that crypto library developers should be implementing and marketing fault attack countermeasures. If you need defenses against fault attacks, as a general class of attacks, you need something no crypto library is likely to provide you.
The only software defense that actually works reliably is preventing duplicate r-values from being generated in the first place. This can be accomplished by augmenting the fully deterministic r with some additional randomness, producing a synthetic r which is still guaranteed to be unique-per-message even if we have an RNG failure. See:
https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/curves/2017/000925.htm...
Note this is quite different from the k-value in ECDSA, which is not synthesized from the message contents at all.
Checking a signature is twice as expensive as generating one. Yes, a 3X cost is significant, but it's not "unworkably slow". It's just a tradeoff of performance vs security. And for some applications, like bitcoin wallets, it might well be a price worth paying.