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Re:How to defeat Ed25519 and EdDSA using faults by lisper on Friday October 06, 2017 @12:05PM (#15417880)
> EdDSA is unworkably slow with the most obvious workaround of checking the signatures you yourself generate

Checking a signature is twice as expensive as generating one. Yes, a 3X cost is significant, but it's not "unworkably slow". It's just a tradeoff of performance vs security. And for some applications, like bitcoin wallets, it might well be a price worth paying.

Re:How to defeat Ed25519 and EdDSA using faults by tptacek on Friday October 06, 2017 @12:08PM (#15417901)
Are you going to check with a different implementation? Where does this rabbit hole end?

This is an integrated hardware/software problem, right?

I think my comment is being read to suggest that fault attacks are generally unimportant, which is not my point. I think if there's a subtextual reaction to anything in my comment, it's the notion that crypto library developers should be implementing and marketing fault attack countermeasures. If you need defenses against fault attacks, as a general class of attacks, you need something no crypto library is likely to provide you.

Re:How to defeat Ed25519 and EdDSA using faults by lisper on Friday October 06, 2017 @12:21PM (#15417991)
The security rabbit hole never ends. I did not mean to imply that an internal check is a panacea, only that it might be a cost that some not-entirely-unreasonable person might be willing to pay in certain applications. I was just pushing back against the glib dismissal of this countermeasure as "unworkably slow."
Re:How to defeat Ed25519 and EdDSA using faults by bascule on Friday October 06, 2017 @01:02PM (#15418341)
It's not a good defense, because a double fault injection attack could bypass the signature verification as well.

The only software defense that actually works reliably is preventing duplicate r-values from being generated in the first place. This can be accomplished by augmenting the fully deterministic r with some additional randomness, producing a synthetic r which is still guaranteed to be unique-per-message even if we have an RNG failure. See:

https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/curves/2017/000925.htm...

Note this is quite different from the k-value in ECDSA, which is not synthesized from the message contents at all.

Re:How to defeat Ed25519 and EdDSA using faults by jedisct1 on Saturday October 07, 2017 @06:52PM (#15426112)
libsodium can be compiled with ED25519_NONDETERMINISTIC defined in order to compute r as recommended in the generalized eddsa proposal.

libhydrogen always worked that way.

Re:How to defeat Ed25519 and EdDSA using faults by lisper on Friday October 06, 2017 @01:43PM (#15418694)
Yep, that looks like a good approach.