The question is: OK, you account for risk, now what? You can manage risk by tempering an all-stock portfolio with bonds, lowering volatility. Why pick high-cost hedge funds over that option?
> Throw them all together in a pot and all the spice is gone.
Except if you look at the breakdown, any one of those sub-funds did poorly. None beat the S&P.
> Plenty of individual funds did beat the S&P
But how is an investor to know in advance? Also: winning funds tend to rotate around - can't use past performance as a reasonable guide to pick a fund going forward.
> You have to wonder how the bet would have fared had we not experienced the unprecedented reaction of central banks to the crisis.
You can always argue this time was different, but the reality is we had roughly 7% average returns on the S&P over the course of the bet, which is pretty typical. It wasn't just some short period, either - for nine out of the ten years the S&P won the bet against the group.
> You can find long periods in the past where the S&P was sideways.
Which is why a smart portfolio is three-fund, covering global stocks and bonds. A portfolio of that makeup does not tend to travel sideways for long periods like the US market can alone. Take for instance 2000 to 2010, in which US stocks did go sideways - bonds and international stocks compensated for that.
At the end of the day, instead of excuses/explanations (no offense intended) I'd like to see you make a case for who should be using hedge funds and why.
I think his point is that hedge funds may have higher risk-adjusted returns than the S&P 500, despite lower absolute returns. For (ridiculously unrealistic) example, say you have an average 7%/yr return on the S&P 500 with volatility of ~14% and a hedge fund with a 5%/yr return but volatility of ~1%. At the end of the time period, a fixed $1M investment is clearly going to come ahead on the S&P 500 but the hedge fund is clearly the better fund, as matched for volatility (through leverage) with the S&P 500, the returns would be 70%/yr.
You'd pick the hedge fund because matched for volatility (through leverage or bonds or what have you), the hedge fund performs better.
Meanwhile, though, a generic vanilla Total Bond market index fund over the past 10 years returned 4.3% annually. A $100,000 investment would have turned into over $150,000 over the course of the bet, higher than the hedge fund collection. So the hedge funds would have to have less volatility than a very steady intermediate-duration bond fund, which, incidentally, had far lower draw-downs in its worst years. So at the very least, in plain language, if 'big drops' are a measure of risk, then the hedge fund set was riskier than bonds and still lost to bonds.
- He made a bet with the manager of Hedge funds that picked 5 funds of funds. None of the picked fund of funds performed better than S&P. So it is 5 against 1. We can say that this manager picked the wrong one, but none other took the risk of the bet...
- Look at the first chart just at the top of the article. Hedge funds performed on average less than the S&P. It is based on 1,916 funds, all coming from Barclays hedge fund index. https://www.barclayhedge.com/research/indices/ghs/Hedge_Fund...
- You mention that plenty of individual funds did beat the S&P. This is straight an apocryphal anecdotal fallacy. Because Bill Gates dropped school and is rich, would you advice everybody to drop school to become rich?
I understand you are trying to defend your business. However, I was not convinced based on your arguments.
No, no it isn't. Individual funds have beaten the market for 20 - 30 years at a time. You won't even hear about most of them unless you really go digging, for a combination of reasons:
1. Funds that actually, consistently beat the market quickly find themselves in possession of more money than they know what to do with. They don't need to advertise themselves to the market, because they can find plenty of capital at the terms they want within their own network. Why inflate your fund to the size and publicity of Bridgewater if you can avoid it? The salesmanship of a given fund is typically inversely proportional to the return it achieves.
2. Per #1, when I say they have more money than they know what to do with, I mean that literally - they hit capacity constraints on their trading strategies and eventually cannot use more capital profitably even if they wanted to. They can spin off satellite funds to test out various strategies, but by and large the secret sauce engine will have to grow at a much slower rate from then on. This further compounds reason #1 - not only do they not need to seek out investor capital, they'll eventually stop being "on the market" for new investors at all, further reducing their publicity.
3. Finally, having investors is a logistical burden. The only reason to actually have outside capital is to pool risk so you - once you have enough capital and you've hit a capacity such that you can no longer scale up, you might as well return the investors' money and close the fund to outside investment. Why share the risk when you're already wealthy and have been doing this for 20 years?
Everyone has heard of Renaissance Technologies because they're legendary, but in my opinion we are lucky to even know about them to the extent that we do. Had James Simons not needed to pool risk and take outside investment in the initial days, we would likely not know about him beating the market with an average 70% return for three decades. There are many funds, like TGS Management, which are essentially comparable to RenTec but which far fewer people know about because they have no reason to be known.
I concede that this is not helpful information for an investor trying to figure out where to park money for legitimately superior returns, but that's a different matter than the fact that these funds do exist and that this bet is basically irrelevant for them.
You are saying there is a underground, invisible branch of investment that make a lot of money. But they can only condensate this money in small volumes to go under the radar. And that if people knew about it, it would loose its magic. It smells like a scenario from a movie your story!
I'm also not establishing a conspiracy here. There's nothing underground or invisible about this industry, and I've worked in it peripherally myself. It's only under the radar in the sense that most Americans can name the president but not most other high ranking members of the cabinet: the spotlight is not on them. If you go digging, you'll find them. They just don't typically attract the same attention firms like Bridgewater do because they don't typically seek more capital for its own sake just to spin off more funds.
> You mention that plenty of individual funds did beat the S&P. This is straight an apocryphal anecdotal fallacy.
No it isn't. If the guy was smart about what was being bet on he'd have picked RenTech and he'd have won.
> I understand you are trying to defend your business.
Nope. Just providing some colour so they don't think it's as simple as it sounds.
Yeah, I don't really understand this. People give me flak for saying it, but I can think of five or so funds off the top of my head (Renaissance included) that I would have happily picked and handily beaten Buffett. I'd make the bet again, today. But like I also always say - Buffett wouldn't have taken that bet up with me, because Buffett doesn't believe in efficient market hypothesis either and is almost certainly aware that individually chosen hedge funds could beat an index fund.
He lost the bet because he chose a fund of funds reflecting the aggregate hedge fund industry; anyone who is even casually familiar with hedge fund returns as an industry wouldn't be surprised at all by the outcome. His choice doesn't even reflect the decision that most rational investors have to make: given a diversified index fund tracking the market and an index composed of the (much smaller) hedge fund market, choosing the latter is silly. A more coherent (and successful) strategy would have been to choose a single fund, or a small basket of funds, known for beating the market for decades at a time. An index fund is a curated portfolio of companies with criteria that make them attractive investments by definition; the fund of hedge funds, in contrast, tracks an industry that mostly doesn't beat the market except for a few outliers.
In other words, the bet didn't really prove anything other than that the hedge fund industry overall is less attractive than the broader market. But I really don't think that was ever up for serious debate among the informed, and now this bet has been modified as a talking point for something it doesn't prove whatsoever: that individual hedge funds are incapable of beating index funds (which is trivially and demonstrably false).
The context of the original challenge suggests that this was the intention. I actually think that it proved something a little stronger.
If some moderately savvy investor were deciding whether to invest her $1m in index funds or hedge funds, she would actually have to choose which hedge fund to invest in. Presumably Ted Seides knows more than our example investor would about hedge funds (and has access to more of them she would). So Ted is an (optimistic) stand-in for how well she would actually have done, which is frankly the more relevant question.
On a related note, Ted probably didn't invest in RenTec, or at least not the Medallion Fund, because he can't. Most funds. like Medallion, that can consistently beat the market will either stop taking additional investments or straight up return capital to investors and trade their own money. Buffett doesn't actually go so far as to claim that no one can beat the market (after all, he did); his claim is merely that our average investor can't really take advantage of it to beat the market themselves.
I think one of the fundamental problems is, that it is even more difficult to pick a winning fund than a winning index. So, what's my advantage as an amateur investor here.
https://portfoliosolutions.com/latest-learnings/blog/1-20-fu...
maybe you mean that over most 10 year periods you think he wouldn't have won the bet. that point is defensible. but this reads a little bit like "its not my fault an uncertain outcome happened"... well, that is how gambling works my friend.
Second point not related to parent post: it seems that picking the experts is every bit as hard as directly picking great investments. There are so many investors who were portrayed in the financial press as "The next Buffett" but went on to have poor returns. I can think of four or five of these guys off the top of my head. And then beyond that there must be literally tens of thousands of full-time mutual fund salesmen who fail to pick mutual funds for their clients that beat the market. So in addition to the underperformance of the funds, there's very often another layer of scraping on the transaction.
- You have to consider risk. Perhaps use volatility as a proxy. Were the funds more or less volatile than the S&P? There are funds that are more and funds that are less. The bet ought to be adjusted for that, ie some form of risk adjusted return.
- It's a rigged bet. A fund of 5 funds of funds is going to be the market, minus fees. Yes there are funds that aren't just long the market but quite a lot will be. Many managers find it a sensible bet to add some beta, because the market often goes up and you will often be judged vs the market, not absolute returns. Throw them all together in a pot and all the spice is gone. Now take out fees.
- Plenty of individual funds did beat the S&P (I'll toot my own horn here), but to beat the average someone's gotta be under average, typically other hedge funds.
- You have to wonder how the bet would have fared had we not experienced the unprecedented reaction of central banks to the crisis. I don't know if Buffett had considered that, he's a smart guy, but it didn't seem like that was what the bet was about. If the market had been allowed to take a "more natural" course perhaps the funds would have looked better.
- You can find long periods in the past where the S&P was sideways. The constant advice to index is simplistic. Think about your own situation before you do that, there's at least a lot of interesting things to learn before you give up.
------Edit------
Seems to be a lot of response to this. Now I'm not saying it was particularly smart to bet against the market. In fact if you read closely you can see why. Which side of the bet would I have taken? Well, if I wasn't running a fund, I'd have taken Warren's side, for the same reason. As it happens you have very little credibility as a fund manager if you're not invested in your own fund, so I ended up backing myself. (Which is not quite the same as the bet.)
For your average guy, I don't think there's a smart way for you to pick a fund to beat the market. You have to spend time actually investigating each strategy. An example of a fund who I think will provide a risk-adjusted market beating return is a guy I met once. He knows a bunch of stuff in detail about the valuation of exchange traded funds, and has infrastructure (technical and legal) in place to exploit discrepancies. It's quite far away from what people normally talk about when they talk about "investment". Most managers do not do this; they will just give you a variant of "I'm good at guessing and I can handle risk".
Regarding central bank intervention, of course it's a manager's job to think about what might happen. I'm merely saying that most of them probably didn't see it coming, and that that is the major component of the underperformance. Consider that the HF marketing is basically "we'll think about the future for you". Now if what ends up happening is basically that you should buy everything and hold it, then why would you expect a guy who can predict turns to do any better than the market? Keep in mind you're paying fees for him to sell and buy as things go up and down. Note that several managers did in fact close down, not because of catastrophic losses, but because they got fed up with the game.