Each commit that went into trusty required a team to submit and a team to approve. That costs money. ;-)
Stable/lts/enterprise distributions have other concerns like preventing regressions and configuration or behavior changes during lifetime of release.
Rolling distributions like Arch and OpenSuse Tumbleweed on the other hand can move a lot faster but still provide basic vetting wrt security and sanity of new/updated packages.
Distro repositories are a great example of 'secure for ideal users'. They give you security if you can put up with a small selection of software and older versions. In practice, we end up working around distro repositories by installing stuff with pip, or PPAs, or downloaded from websites.
Yet Amazon and other big tech companies have a very similar process of packaging open source software for internal use and relying on "outdated" libraries.
> I sincerely doubt that Debian can provide adequate security to its almost 50,000 packages.
There's a security tracker where you can see how quickly packages are assigned CVEs and patched - sometimes even before the upstream patch is ready.
On the contrary, on distributions that perform security updates the level of security of a package can only increase over time.
It might sound obvious but vulnerabilities are created in new releases, while vulns in existing packages can be only be found and fixed, not created.
(Of course I'm talking only about vulnerabilities here and excluding removal of obsoleted crypto or addition of new security features)
For popular packages perhaps, but for many more obscure and niche python packages Ubuntu is often a several releases behind, and that is if there even exists a package to begin with
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/05/random_number...
A.K.A., the Debian openssl Fiasco.
Just one example of distros fucking up the packages from upstream and causing major havoc.
Also the project pioneered reproducible builds and implemented build hardening for most packages.
Arguably. The issue with typosquatting on PyPi has been known and demonstrated for a long time, but nothing has been done about it. Considering there are ways of closing this attack vector, even though it would require some serious work, I'd consider this a bug. It's just a bug that's being exploited now.
Not really, PPAs (and equivalents like copr or obs or aur etc etc) are mostly vulnerable to similar problems. People do want to install upstream software for various reasons, blaming language package managers for the reduced security of that is imho disingenuous.
Language package managers solve the problem that we don't have neither an universal package format that works across all programming language requirements and all sort of OSes, nor the time to create an OS specific package for all sort of OSes.
There is nothing wrong with inventing their own solution if they're solving other problems, what is wrong is not learning from previous examples and fucking up creating problems that have been already solved in the process.
They solved the issue 2 decades ago by heavily vetting packages before accepting them into repositories. Users are allowed to add and use packages from 3rd party repositories.
Maybe solution to this is creating curated repositories based on publicly open ones and using them by default (and requiring opt-in for using other repositories). Conda for Python and Stackage for Haskell seems like relevant solutions.