News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Equifax security freeze PINs are the timestamp of when yo... by buildbot on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:53PM (#15208581)
I am curious what programmer would make such a choice vs. calling random or asking the user.

However, while undeniably stupid, hopefully they have rate limiting in place so guessing the PIN would not be feasible even if you know the day the credit freeze was put into place.

Re:Equifax security freeze PINs are the timestamp of when yo... by pkulak on Saturday September 09, 2017 @02:56PM (#15208591)
Do you really think a company that has visibly demonstrated this much incompetence thus far would be making smart decisions where you can't see them?
Re:Equifax security freeze PINs are the timestamp of when yo... by khazhoux on Saturday September 09, 2017 @04:01PM (#15208907)
Someone probably read an article about how RNGs aren't truly random, and so decided timestamp (which never repeats!) was the right alternative.
Re:Equifax security freeze PINs are the timestamp of when yo... by roywiggins on Saturday September 09, 2017 @04:08PM (#15208933)
Of course, two people who happen to request at the same time will get the same key anyway, so it doesn't even solve that problem.
Re:Equifax security freeze PINs are the timestamp of when yo... by khazhoux on Saturday September 09, 2017 @05:49PM (#15209333)
Right, of course not. They're idiots.
Re:Equifax security freeze PINs are the timestamp of when yo... by raverbashing on Saturday September 09, 2017 @03:35PM (#15208795)
They don't want to migrate their db to add an extra field?
Re:Equifax security freeze PINs are the timestamp of when yo... by rbanffy on Saturday September 09, 2017 @03:57PM (#15208891)
Or add a new table with this field.
Re:Equifax security freeze PINs are the timestamp of when yo... by noway421 on Saturday September 09, 2017 @03:13PM (#15208671)
maybe there was no way to save and transfer the pin from one place of the system to another, and the only way to do it is to guess on the other side by timestamp.

pretty hacky implementation but oh well

Re:Equifax security freeze PINs are the timestamp of when yo... by rocqua on Saturday September 09, 2017 @03:45PM (#15208845)
Hash with a secret key (a pepper) solves that. Heck, hashing with a salt or even just plain hashing would be miles better than this.
Re:Equifax security freeze PINs are the timestamp of when yo... by scentoni on Saturday September 09, 2017 @04:11PM (#15208950)
Hash? I wouldn't trust the folks at Equifax to know the difference between a one-way function, a cannabis concentrate, and a fried potato dish.
Re:Equifax security freeze PINs are the timestamp of when yo... by MichaelApproved on Saturday September 09, 2017 @04:42PM (#15209068)
Carrying around the password wasn't a problem.

There's an option to pick your own password during the previous step but having an automated one is the default option, so a lot of people miss it.

Re:Equifax security freeze PINs are the timestamp of when yo... by foota on Saturday September 09, 2017 @03:02PM (#15208620)
If you have a 1 in 60*24 chance of guessing correctly then after 1000 guesses (potentially against different people) you have a 50 chance of being correct on one.
Re:Equifax security freeze PINs are the timestamp of when yo... by y0ghur7_xxx on Saturday September 09, 2017 @03:13PM (#15208668)
It's probably even less that 1 in 60 * 24, because usually a freezes is requested during business hours? So 1 in 60 * 8?
Re:Equifax security freeze PINs are the timestamp of when yo... by skj on Saturday September 09, 2017 @03:16PM (#15208680)
Could you explain your math here? Is there something you learn about the other digits when you make a wrong guess?
Re:Equifax security freeze PINs are the timestamp of when yo... by jon_richards on Saturday September 09, 2017 @05:22PM (#15209216)
Your chance of being wrong in a guess is 1-1/(60* 24)

Your chance of being wrong in all 1000 guesses, assuming you guess randomly (not ensuring you never make the same guess twice) is (1-1/(60* 24))^1000

That's about .5

This is based on the assumption that you are guessing for a different person each time, so you can't increase your odds by eliminating any guesses you've already made. If you're guessing for the same person every time, you just need to guess half the possibilities. You can confirm this by realizing:

Your chance of being wrong in a guess is 1-1/(60* 24-x) where x is the number of guesses you have already made.

The product of 1-1/(60* 24-x) from x=0 to x=60* 24/2-1 is .5

Edit: hackernews formatting is weird

Re:Equifax security freeze PINs are the timestamp of when yo... by foota on Saturday September 09, 2017 @07:02PM (#15209583)
You could probably increase your odds significantly over time by analyzing the distribution of pins (and as others note, by making common sense observations you can also increase your odds)
Re:Equifax security freeze PINs are the timestamp of when yo... by jooke on Saturday September 09, 2017 @03:20PM (#15208707)
60*24 = 1440 possibilities. If you guess half these numbers you would expect to crack half the pins.