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Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by Techbrunch on Monday July 31, 2017 @10:07AM (#14892090)
Anyone interested in electronic voting, I would suggest reading the article: Internet Voting: A Requiem for the Dream in the last issue of Phrack. It was eye opening for me. http://phrack.org/issues/69/11.html#article

Conclusion:

    1. Internet voting is not compatible with democracy
    2. No amount of technology can change this
    3. Whom you voted for ought to be secret
    4. Who voted should not be secret -- it should be known as widely
       as possible
    5. And who counts the votes, and how, certainly ought not be secret
Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by andrepd on Monday July 31, 2017 @07:47PM (#14896824)
Electronic voting != internet voting. Remote voting has irresolvable problems in regards to voter secrecy: you can't preserve that with remote voting, and it's indispensable to ensure you don't sell your vote.

But that is not synonym with electronic voting. You can go into a polling station and vote on machines; a well designed system shares all vital properties of paper systems while adding many useful features, including ways to reliably count votes algorithmically in an independently verifiable way (any citizen can do the math and check the results, and check that each person only voted once, even though they can't tell who voted for whom).

Don't say it's impossible, with a bit of ingenuity and a bit of mathematics it can be done. :P

EDIT: For more info read https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End-to-end_auditable_voting_sy.... It's fascinating.

Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by specialist on Monday July 31, 2017 @08:43PM (#14897071)
It's impossible to have an electronically mediated voting system that both protects the secret ballot and ensures the public count. Because there is no digital equivalent to the one-way hash of dropping a ballot into a ballot box.

Chaum, Rivest, Pret a Whatever... Fine. Prove it. With a real world election (simulated). Burden of proof lies with the technophiles, not with the proud defenders of Democracy.

Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by DaiPlusPlus on Monday July 31, 2017 @10:02PM (#14897363)
People used to say the same thing about digital currencies (think: Beenz.com https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beenz.com ) - because digital information can be copied freely, therefore a digital currency would need a central arbiter and a distributed digital currency would be impossible. And then BitCoin and the blockchain happened.

To say Internet voting is impossible is to admit a failure of imagination and ingenuity - I'm confident that some novel application of cryptographic and distributed-computing techniques could come up with a secure system.

But I'm wary of how complicated it would necessarily be to the average voter, or even someone with an advanced knowledge of computing - concepts like hashing and the blockchain are almost impossible to correctly explain to a layperson, let alone do they have the way to be confident of the results themselves - it would immediately cast doubt on the system because you cannot trust something that you cannot understand.

Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by specialist on Monday July 31, 2017 @10:27PM (#14897468)
Ah, thank you for the reminder.

Moratorium on blockchain-based voting system proposals.

Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by amenghra on Tuesday August 01, 2017 @01:11AM (#14898041)
https://www.quaxio.com/simple_auditable_anonymous_voting_sch... explains how to create a toy voting system which both preserves privacy and where everyone can tally the votes.

If you were to actually build something like this, you would use blind signature. But having this toy example shows that the two concepts aren't exclusif.

Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by specialist on Tuesday August 01, 2017 @11:12AM (#14901492)
All crypto schemes I studied rely on hash collisions. Meaning your ballot is hidden within a herd of ballots. This works for hypothetical elections where there are lots of voters and simple ballots.

Alas. Our actual elections are administered per precinct (say 0 - 1000 voters) and have complicated ballots (dozens of issues, races). Meaning your utterly unique ballot is unlikely to collide with any other cast ballot.

The blockchain-based schemes I briefly studied rely on fuzzing timestamps. A different kind of collision.

Here's the takeaway: Our elections administration is finely tuned to the Australian Ballot. Any new voting system has to specify the style of ballot, which circumstances are applicable, and how the laws, rules, and procedures will have to be modified to adopt it.

Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by amenghra on Tuesday August 01, 2017 @01:36PM (#14903241)
Did you even read the link I posted? It's a voting scheme which is anonymous and auditable. It can be turned into a usable system using blind signatures. Nowhere does it mention hash collisions.
Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by specialist on Tuesday August 01, 2017 @03:58PM (#14904715)
You're right. I didn't bother. I just now went back and parsed it.

You're right. No hash collision (shuffle) in that arm waving proposal. So there's no attempt to anonymize the voter's identity.

Votes cast and recorded in order deanonymize the ballots. If the order is not recorded then the election cannot be audited.

As I hinted (elsewhere), the blockchain proposals fudge the timestamp (when the ballot is cast) in an attempt to anonymize the voter.

Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by bo1024 on Monday July 31, 2017 @10:03PM (#14897367)
There's a big difference between claiming there is no current technology to do this (which I agree with), and claiming it is impossible for there to ever be any in the future.
Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by DaiPlusPlus on Tuesday August 01, 2017 @12:30AM (#14897881)
> Because there is no digital equivalent to the one-way hash of dropping a ballot into a ballot box.

This is equivalent to preventing double-spending in the blockchain analogy - a solved problem. There are already companies trying to exploit this to develop electronic-voting systems: https://followmyvote.com/.

I imagine it working like this:

1. Government announces an election. Registered voters are asked to submit the public addresses of their 'vote wallets'. The public addresses of the wallets are derived from the registered voter's public information (e.g. their name). This information need not be secret. The public blockchain would ensure that everyone who is registered received their votes to cast: the equivalent of receiving an empty ballot paper.

2. A Monero-like system (confession: I don't fully understand it yet) acting as a blackbox or Bitcoin-tumbler system then distributes empty-ballots from the public wallets into new private wallets that each registered-voter will have created in an anonymous fashion.

3. Registered voters then cast their votes by 'spending' their ballots (coins) by sending them to the public wallets of electoral candidates. These transactions may be cryptographically signed by a private key derived from the registered-voter's public wallet. This allows a voter to verify that their vote was correctly cast, without allowing others to see whom they actually voted for.

4. There is a problem in that the results of the election cannot be kept secret until the election is over, as the blockchain must be distributed publicly, so observers will see the votes going towards a particular candidate as-they-happen, which will necessarily change voters' votes in cases of tactical-voting; though possible solutions exist, such as having blockchain network nodes agree to only allow final vote transactions during a tiny time window of only a few seconds - or a Proof-of-Work system that will necessarily take more computation time to verify a vote was for a particular candidate the more in-advance of the polls-closing deadline the vote was made.

Because votes cannot be 'mined', and all originate from a single 'government wallet' it means that votes cannot be manufactured - as far as I can tell the only weakness is that false voter-registrations could exist and be used to cast votes, but then we have that situation with postal-voting now any way. If a tumbler approach is used to distribute ballots from public wallets to private wallets it's possible for participants to create more than one private wallet, and claim more ballots for themselves - but this can be detected by:

1. As part of step 1 above, voters create a private secret K.

2. Each voter then creates a hash of K, known as K'.

3. The blockchain would also contain a Bloom-filter, or equivalent implementation of a "Set contains a member" test that does not reveal the actual set contents. Then a strictly sequential process begins, where the Bloom-filter is publicly modified by each registered voter to add their own K' values - this necessarily means that the K' values of the first voters will be publicly known entirely, but as the table becomes more populated it will be impossible to fully know what the entire values of each K' value is. This can be mitigated by having the system create known 'sacrificial' / dummy voters to provide some initial protection for the first actual voters.

4. When the private wallets are created by each voter (in step 2 above) they must be tagged with the K values each voter created as Kp. A private wallet will only be able to participate in the ballot distribution process if the hash of its Kp value (Kp') appears in the Bloom filter populated in the previous step) - thus restricting each voter to only 1 private ballot wallet.

Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by specialist on Tuesday August 01, 2017 @11:04AM (#14901386)
re #4,

Right to voter privacy (secret ballot) is in my state's constitution.

I'm open to relaxing absolute privacy with something like temporary time boxed privacy. Like until an election is certified.

Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by simpss on Wednesday August 02, 2017 @10:22AM (#14910764)
This has been solved, and it's really simple actually.

I wrote about it in another comment, but I'll quickly go over the technology here as well.

When a citizen votes, the vote is encrypted with the government public key. The vote is then put into a container and is signed with the citizens private key.

The vote gets sent to the voting-system servers and is then stored until counting day.

Once the voting period has ended the encrypted votes are pulled out of the signed containers and the signed containers themselves are destroyed, this anonymizes the votes. Only then are the encrypted votes decrypted with the government private key.

We keep the signed containers around the encrypted vote to make sure no-one can be forced to e-vote. Every citizen can vote as many times as they want during the e-voting period and only the last vote counts.

So if someone is standing behind you and telling you to vote somehow, you can do as they say and just vote again afterwards.

As an extra backup, if you do cast your vote on paper as well, then the paper vote is counted and the e-vote is discarded.

The system has a prerequisite though, each citizen must have a private key. We do, as it's stored on our id-cards(equivalent to passports within the EU).

Procedures are in place to protect the Government private key during the voting period and just like with paper-voting observers are involved in every step of the process.

The English documentation is scarce, but the software itself is open source: https://github.com/vvk-ehk/evalimine

Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by specialist on Wednesday August 02, 2017 @11:57PM (#14916858)
Ah. Opened that link. Stopped once I saw "Estonia internet voting"

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_voting_in_Estonia#C...

Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by simpss on Thursday August 03, 2017 @08:41AM (#14919003)
That one, yes :)

Their whole analysis is based on this claim: "claiming they could be able to breach the system, change votes and vote totals, and erase any evidence of their actions if they could install malware on the election servers."

That is true for all server based software.

Procedures have been set up to mitigate this risk. All software, servers and anything else running in the network is audited before, during and after the election. The whole process is public and anyone can become an observer, just like with paper ballots. There really are many eyeballs making sure the election servers are running the software they are supposed to.

AFAIK everything else they pointed out was purely procedural and the guidelines there have been updated. There really weren't any reproducible technical issues and some of the procedural ones are outright misrepresentations.

The full sources for these two are sadly in Estonian, but the main response to that research can be seen here in English: http://www.vvk.ee/uudised/vabariigi-valimiskomisjoni-vastula...

""" Posted Wi-Fi credentials — The official video of the pre-election process reveals credentials for the election officials’ Wi-Fi network, which are posted on the wall. """

The credentials were actually just for a separate public guest network, that has nothing to do with the "election officials network" or the network where the voting servers are.

or: """ Keystrokes reveal root passwords — Videos posted by officials during the election show operators typing, inadvertently revealing root passwords for election servers. """

Although this was recognized as a possible attack vector and the procedures for filming have been updated, the "operator" typing a password was actually one of the observers typing a password in their own computer.

Obviously any hints to compromised processes are taken with 100% seriousness and if needed processes and guidelines are changed to protect the integrity of the system.

Any technical reports are also (publicly) analyzed and if an issue is indeed found, they're fixed. The thing is, "https://estoniaevoting.org" said everything is bad, and the system should not be used, but never published/provided any re-producible test-cases that could be verified.

OSCE has audited all of our elections, they've given some procedural pointers that have been implemented, but OSCE observers have not deemed our elections compromised.

This is their 2011 audit: http://www.osce.org/odihr/77557?download=true, the pointers given to improve our system have been implemented by now.

And here is their 2015 audit: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/estonia/160131?download=..., which has some new pointers, but again has not deemed the system to be insecure.

We're having another parlamentary election in 2019 and again, the system will be improved for that(more verification methods are being implemented), but so far, all of our elections have been deemed acceptable and work is being done to keep the track record.

Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by peterwwillis on Thursday August 03, 2017 @01:32PM (#14921693)
The Estonian method is too complex to be easily proved to be secure. You have to play a cat-and-mouse game ad infinitum to keep up its integrity. Simpler systems are less costly over the short and long term, and more secure by default.
Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by simpss on Friday August 04, 2017 @06:01AM (#14927515)
Could you give me an example of what makes it too complex and maybe an example of a system that is simpler?
Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by simpss on Wednesday August 02, 2017 @12:47AM (#14907993)
Estonian reporting in.

Our internet voting system has solved this problem. The votes secrecy is guaranteed by allowing citizens to vote multiple times and only the last vote is counted. No-one is obligated to vote on the internet and a paper system works in parallel. If you cast your vote on the internet AND with a paper ballot as well, the paper ballot is counted.

This guarantees no-one can be forced to vote, as they can simply vote again in the 7 day e-voting period.

Each vote is encrypted and signed, but in two different containers. The goverment public key is used to encrypt the vote. That container is then wrapped into another that is signed with the citizens private key. Before counting, the double-casts are filtered out and the votes are anonymized by removing the signed wrapper.

And, it's open source: https://github.com/vvk-ehk/evalimine

Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by peterwwillis on Thursday August 03, 2017 @01:34PM (#14921721)
If you can vote online, and on paper, and the paper one always trumps the electronic one, then a fraudulent party would just fake the paper ballots and send them in for everyone in the country. Everyone who depended on the electronic vote would then no longer control their vote.
Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by simpss on Friday August 04, 2017 @06:06AM (#14927534)
the same can be said for the paper ballots that are never used. Voter turnout is never 100%.

As an example faking even 10% of the abstained votes would have swayed the brexit results.

I don't see how this makes online voting insecure, fake paper ballot risk has always been there and has been deemed to be a mitigated risk.

Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by GrumpyNl on Monday July 31, 2017 @10:45AM (#14892434)
Here the etherum approach with transactions would solve that. All votes would be public but still anonymous.
Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by Balgair on Monday July 31, 2017 @11:02AM (#14892624)
Look, I'm not going to say you are wrong, but... not every conversation needs to descend into ham-fisting bitcoins into it. Nowadays, it's like a Godwins' Law type thing, but instead of everything devolving into Nazis, now everything devolves into 'the blockchain will fix it'. I miss Dogecoin, at least they were in on the joke.
Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by tenaciousDaniel on Monday July 31, 2017 @03:56PM (#14895374)
I get the crypto fatigue because I feel it as well, but it really does apply here. Trustless voting is one of the more interesting possible applications of blockchain tech, and if properly implemented it could very well do away with voter fraud.
Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by pedrocr on Monday July 31, 2017 @05:26PM (#14896026)
Only by introducing hundreds of extra failure modes. If you implement this I can now destroy your democracy by:

- Bribing voters because you've implemented voting over the network

- Once you figure out you need to switch to voting booths I'll do timing attacks to deanonymize the vote

- As soon as you have a count I'll seed distrust in the count as only a very small percentage of the population actually understands the blockchain and cause a riot or two

Electronic voting is the reverse FizzBuzz. FizzBuzz tests if you know the absolute basics about technology to implement something extremely simple. Electronic voting tests if you are able to reject the use of technology when it doesn't add any advantage and instead creates very hard to solve failure modes. Voting benefits from the use of the extremely simple ballot and box. It benefits from it not being programmable and from the counting method being something that almost all the population is able to carry out let alone understand.

Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by jsymolon on Monday July 31, 2017 @04:37PM (#14895690)
> voter fraud.

Red Herring. Not counting voter registration fraud, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/12/01/0-... Washington Post only found 4 cases in the 2016 election.

Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by andrepd on Monday July 31, 2017 @08:19PM (#14896977)
In case you haven't noticed, there are some other countries in this planet beside the United States :P. Voter fraud is a major problem in many developing countries, and electronic voting (if properly implemented) could help tremendously in making elections a great deal more transparent.
Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by jsymolon on Tuesday August 01, 2017 @05:57AM (#14899135)
That's the point. it can't be properly implemented.
Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by andrepd on Tuesday August 01, 2017 @09:16AM (#14900281)
Why do you say that? Is there a proof of non satisfiability for a set of criteria? Or you just decided it can't be done?
Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by tenaciousDaniel on Monday July 31, 2017 @05:00PM (#14895857)
Ha, yeah I was going back and forth between adding "to the extent that it exists". Nonetheless, we can't predict whether fraud/hacking is something we'll need to really worry about in the future. If a good solution exists, we should strive for it I think.
Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by Balgair on Monday July 31, 2017 @05:00PM (#14895855)
Like I said, it isn't wrong, and I kinda agree. Democracy is awesome but slow, we know that. It's also old, and we may have better versions out there now, maybe a Git-Democracy thingy, where it's mostly automated and we have 'code comments' in the laws to help with the judges. I dunno.

That said, bit-coins and their ilk are obvious tulip bubbles now, their hope is gone under the greed. Yes, the ideas are interesting and may have applications that are unseen. But as communism was great in theory and genocides in practice (mostly), I think the relentless blockchain spam is missing the point as well: Theory ain't shit because humans are assholes. And no, the blockchain is not going to solve that too.

Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by tenaciousDaniel on Monday July 31, 2017 @05:07PM (#14895905)
No, it's not going to solve people being assholes. But a shared, write-only and unalterable database of voting transactions created by pseudonymous entities could be an extremely useful tool if we really want to safeguard against this kind of thing.

Because of the rhetoric surrounding blockchain spam, it's easy to make the comparison to marxist theory. But I think it's really just a technology, not some grand scheme to alter our economic system. It's more realistic to simply say that it's a tool that could provide some very useful real world applications.

Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by Balgair on Monday July 31, 2017 @06:35PM (#14896476)
Look, I know, it's cool, and like, it has the potential to help. But trying to tech/math your way into a better democracy isn't very likely because people are assholes; you have to make incentives for the assholery to fight itself, it's not easy. Hofstader in Godel Escher Bach goes WAY into why that is from a math/physics/art/music point of view, you should read it (maybe you have already), it's like 6 bucks. https://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listing/0465026567/ref=tmm_p...

I'm not confounding bitcoins with marxism and that mess of history. I'm just saying that there are things out there that were good in theory, but the applications of the theory are just plain terrible, marxism is a famous example of that.

Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by andrepd on Monday July 31, 2017 @08:10PM (#14896942)
>But trying to tech/math your way into a better democracy isn't very likely because people are assholes

That's ridiculous. So we can't do anything, whatsoever, to improve our society and our systems, because eh people are assholes or whatever? That's nonsense. Of course we can improve our systems, our laws, our government, and of course mathematics and technology can help. For example, our voting systems are woeful because they are holdovers from a time when nobody thought about these things from a mathematical point of view (and nobody still does: "let's just vote for people and let the person with the most votes win" sounds perfectly simple and correct for 99% of the population). But we can do much better, and it can objectively improve our democracy a whole lot.

Will applying mathematics and technology to democracy fundamentally change and transcend human nature? Duh, of course not, but nobody claimed it will. There's plenty between implementing an utopia and going nothing at all.

Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by Balgair on Tuesday August 01, 2017 @11:34AM (#14901792)
> So we can't do anything, whatsoever, to improve our society and our systems, because eh people are assholes or whatever?

Yes, that is correct. Also, me and Mr. Strawman could use some more hay, do you have any?

> ...and nobody still does...

This is what I'm talking about. Trying to force math/tech onto a democracy/republic where the voting population doesn't understand it cannot end well. The voter will be suspicious, and rightfully so, of the process if they do not understand it. This is especially true if there is any corruption in the system at all. Since we know men are not angels, then the vast majority of voters must have belief in the processes as we all know men do become devils. Democracy demands this faith to work. Yes, we can make the system mathematically better, but if that comes at the cost of the faith in democracy, then it's mute. Even with the system we have now, simple as it is, there is already a large lack of faith in it by a lot of the US, and this is already a threat to idea of self-determination.

Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by pm24601 on Monday July 31, 2017 @09:25PM (#14897230)
Big barrier: Convince voters that the system is reliable in theory and perfectly implemented.

Paper works fine.

Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by andrepd on Monday July 31, 2017 @07:16PM (#14896685)
But... if he's not wrong and it is actually relevant to the discussion why are you upset about it? Is he supposed to refrain from mentioning it because... it's been popular for the past few weeks and so you're tired of hearing about it?
Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by Balgair on Tuesday August 01, 2017 @11:22AM (#14901638)
I dunno. The constant barrage of: "BlockChains, but for Cancer!" just seems ... derivative now. Like the 'Uber, but for dogs' was this time last year. Everyone knows these hacker-coins are a scam, the last one with them looses their shirt. Yeah, the ideas are kinda cool, but, nah man. Like, from Mean Girls: "Gretchen, stop trying to make 'Fetch' happen, it's not gonna happen"

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pubd-spHN-0

Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by artofcode on Monday July 31, 2017 @11:10AM (#14892707)
Such elections, much votes, wow.
Re:Hacking Voting Machines at Defcon by e12e on Monday July 31, 2017 @06:13PM (#14896343)
Wouldn't most current block-chains tie a rather fine (say 5-minute, accounting for drift) timestamp to each vote? So in small voting districts, if you had a way to know approximately when people voted, you could go a long way towards de-anonymizing votes (say, you managed to track someone's device, that they used for voting, or track their location, if using dedicated voting machines)?

I don't know if it would be inherit to making a secure voting system on a block-chain that you had such (unnecessary for voting) fine-grained timestamps, but just a thought.