Alas. Our actual elections are administered per precinct (say 0 - 1000 voters) and have complicated ballots (dozens of issues, races). Meaning your utterly unique ballot is unlikely to collide with any other cast ballot.
The blockchain-based schemes I briefly studied rely on fuzzing timestamps. A different kind of collision.
Here's the takeaway: Our elections administration is finely tuned to the Australian Ballot. Any new voting system has to specify the style of ballot, which circumstances are applicable, and how the laws, rules, and procedures will have to be modified to adopt it.
You're right. No hash collision (shuffle) in that arm waving proposal. So there's no attempt to anonymize the voter's identity.
Votes cast and recorded in order deanonymize the ballots. If the order is not recorded then the election cannot be audited.
As I hinted (elsewhere), the blockchain proposals fudge the timestamp (when the ballot is cast) in an attempt to anonymize the voter.
If you were to actually build something like this, you would use blind signature. But having this toy example shows that the two concepts aren't exclusif.