I mean, that's exactly what happened.
It's like if they were just old unmaintained programs in GNU coreutils. No one maintains them, no one uses them, but they keep getting included until a good argument is made to remove them.
Previous efforts to remove them were probably greeted with "well, someone might still use these tools." And placing them in ports is a little bit of work.
As you say, they were mostly harmless to keep.
The thing that should be deprecated is the server.
I think it has value for users to say, "Oh, so I need to go install a package in order to continue using this protocol." Maybe that'll trigger a change on the server-side.
Sidenote: ruby was updated from 2.0.0-pSomethingPastOfficialRubyReleases to 2.3.3-p222
Also, it's been ~15 years since I used an RS232 interface (for serial interfaces to servers/routers); it's been almost that long since you could buy a system with an RS232 interface at all (aside from maybe embedded systems that haven't been updated in years). And, I've never used a USB port for a terminal connection; I guess it is possible but is it ever done?
But, really, why have something that's so out of the ordinary in a default installation?
I don't know what kind of computers you are buying, but I've yet to see a retail, server-class, motherboard without a 9-pin serial port in the back.
But, maybe most servers do still have RS232.
Nonetheless, rlogin/rcp/etc. are not useful tools for a serial console. I don't even know how you'd use them in such a circumstance. Are you using rlogin/rsh/rcp/rwhatever over RS232 to your servers? How? Why?
As far as using any TCP/IP based protocols over the serial port, I suppose you could do something silly with SLIP or PPP, but honestly I don't know why. The whole point of the serial port is that it's damned simple and firmware can easily initialize it and use it for IO extremely early in the boot process.
It's been so long since I've worked with that kind of thing I didn't really even think through what an odd comment it is to suggest that serial consoles on routers are a good reason to keep rsh around in a default FreeBSD install. It makes no sense at all. I'm beginning to think nerds just like to argue.
But, I can see the logic behind your expectation. Bash behaves in POSIX compatibility mode (mostly) when called with 'sh', vim acts like vi when called with 'vi', etc. But, when security is the feature being completely removed to achieve compatibility, it'd be hard to argue it's a good idea.
It used to be stupidly annoying to get ssh up and running on Solaris machines. rcp was one of the few ways to get the appropriate bits into place so that you could bootstrap ssh and sshd.
Nonetheless, even if there is a cluster environment using these old commands for some perceived performance improvement, they're certainly running a bunch of custom software; it's not gonna be a stock OS install. So, there's not gonna be any harm in having to install an extra package to get the r commands.
Having it there by default to serve some tiny segment isn't really sensible.
I'm not saying eradicate these commands from the face of the earth. I just saying putting them into the default installation of any OS in 2017 is an unnecessary risk.
A "modern" network with ipv6+802.1x+ipsec - a situation where you trust the ip6-address just as much, or more than, a typical ssh host key (typical ssh is set up with trust-on-first use, not with expiring certificates).
Now, this is all balanced against the fact that you probably will use ssh anyway - and a hole in ssh(d) will likely be catastrophic - so in the balance, you might be better off managing one secure infrastructure.
On the other hand, if you've set up proper ipsec with client certificates, and the possibility to "dial-in" -- that still holds - why monitor and maintain two secure stacks, if you fundamentally need to trust each one?
As for Debian, it seems someone made the (poor IMNHO) choice of setting up "alternatives" for rsh to point to ssh (if rsh-client isn't installed):
$ update-alternatives --query rsh
Name: rsh
Link: /usr/bin/rsh
Slaves:
rsh.1.gz /usr/share/man/man1/rsh.1.gz
Status: auto
Best: /usr/bin/ssh
Value: /usr/bin/ssh
Alternative: /usr/bin/ssh
Priority: 20
Slaves:
rsh.1.gz /usr/share/man/man1/ssh.1.gz
As I understand it, part of Google's new approach is indeed moving to secure network links (with policy on top) - in such an environment, I'm not convinced there's much to be gained by layering TLS, ssh, HTTP2+SSL on top of end-to-end client/host authenticated networking/vpn.Google's approach (to anything) is irrelevant to supercomputing, where users' program execution is managed by schedulers and the supercomputer is treated as one unit, despite being made up of many potentially-autonomous nodes. Just about all of the tech you've namedropped is completely unrelated to the manner in which HPC code networks.
Having said that, nobody uses rsh for performance, because if you really want performance you have to skip TCP altogether. People in HPC who are using rsh are using it because of inertia: the same reason the Top500 is the world's largest repository of csh users.
It actually reminded me of this old OpenSSH poster: http://openbsd.appli.se/images/poster2.jpg
IIRC the "++" on the RSH tombstone is a reference to a config directive that would open RSH access to anybody from anywhere, effectively giving you a very simple and rather inconspicuous way to "trojan" any rsh install. With SSH the best you can do is install a public key in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, but it's not quite as convenient as simply adding a "++" in a file when nobody's looking.
See for instance https://www.mkssoftware.com/docs/man4/rhosts.4.asp
One of the (few) things I like about the BSDs over Linux is that there is a core system that is maintained by a unified team working closely together in the same repos and with the same communication channels and the like, and following the same standards for docs, interfaces, etc. I like that aspect because people with good judgement are in charge of the platform itself and you can just sort of assume the default installation is cohesive, secure, and has reasonable defaults. This is sort of an argument against that theory; there's nothing reasonable about having rsh/rcp/etc. on a modern system. I mean, it's mostly harmless, as long as you know enough to never use them and never allow any software you run to use them, but still...why leave a bomb just laying around?