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Re:Milestone: 100M Certificates Issued by philliphaydon on Thursday June 29, 2017 @11:36AM (#14664118)
Why is providing wildcard certs not secure???? Amazon seems to do it?
Re:Milestone: 100M Certificates Issued by eropple on Thursday June 29, 2017 @11:41AM (#14664143)
Because once your wildcard certificate is compromised--and you must design systems with the assumption that your certificates will be compromised--it becomes a very achievable exercise to use that wildcard certificate to compromise users going to any of your subdomains. With each domain governed under its own TLS certificate, you install firebreaks between systems to contain the damage an attacker can do.

There are vanishingly few reasons to ever share private keys across multiple automated systems. This is not one of them. (Are your systems not automated? Fix that.)

Re:Milestone: 100M Certificates Issued by philliphaydon on Sunday July 02, 2017 @11:05PM (#14685601)
So the Low risk of compromise for most people is more important than the ability to easily maintain a system? If a certificate is going to be compromised it's most likely going to be the most important cert to the system anyway. A hacker isn't going to go after the meaningless ones. But by your logic I should increase the maintainability of the system for no benefit.

Obviously this is highly dependent on the usage of the certs to begin with.

Re:Milestone: 100M Certificates Issued by tokenizerrr on Thursday June 29, 2017 @01:49PM (#14665329)
Meanwhile SAN is fine? The alternative to wildcards is that you get a single cert with tons of subdomains as alternative name. Exact same risks, yet much more hassle to add subdomains. I don't see it.
Re:Milestone: 100M Certificates Issued by eropple on Thursday June 29, 2017 @01:55PM (#14665385)
That's a fine point, if you're using SANs. With Let's Encrypt, you don't need to use a SAN so long as each of your endpoints is distinct. (If they're not, I'm uneasy with your architecture in the first place, y'know?)

However, I would also point out that wildcards allow people who aren't you to create domains that you didn't create and represent them as being from you, which is an attack vector that even SAN enumeration doesn't allow. We're talking whitelists over blacklists.

Re:Milestone: 100M Certificates Issued by tokenizerrr on Thursday June 29, 2017 @02:02PM (#14665449)
SNI is not yet always an option if you have to support older clients.

It's not about if I'm using SANs anyway. It's that LE is fine with that, but not with wildcard certs.

> However, I would also point out that wildcards allow people who aren't you to create domains that you didn't create and represent them as being from you, which is an attack vector that even SAN enumeration doesn't allow. We're talking whitelists over blacklists.

Can you elaborate what you mean here?

Re:Milestone: 100M Certificates Issued by eropple on Thursday June 29, 2017 @02:13PM (#14665571)
If you have to support older clients--definitely, SAN is your only option if you have to run on the same host. (And I sympathize, because that sucks.) At that point, though, my inclination becomes to attach a bunch more public IPs and wire up my DNS correctly to match.

> Can you elaborate what you mean here?

Me saying "this cert is valid for example.com, foo.example.com, and bar.example.com" is an incrementally better security posture than saying "this cert is valid for *.example.com". It constrains an attacker from running a phishing attack from, say, "private.example.com" or "secure.example.com". You're whitelisting what you're covering by explicitly declaring all of them.

It is incremental, but it's a thing.

Re:Milestone: 100M Certificates Issued by tokenizerrr on Thursday June 29, 2017 @02:18PM (#14665616)
IPv4 addresses are relatively expensive. I encounter it quite often where a wildcard gets pointed to a single server (with single IP) which hosts multiple services. There are no security issues compared to a large SAN that I can see in such a situation.
Re:Milestone: 100M Certificates Issued by eropple on Thursday June 29, 2017 @03:32PM (#14666186)
I would submit, respectfully, that you're not being creative enough.

When it comes to security, including phishing, it behooves all of us to not assume that permissiveness is a de facto positive.

Re:Milestone: 100M Certificates Issued by tokenizerrr on Thursday June 29, 2017 @03:40PM (#14666243)
Very helpful. Thanks.
Re:Milestone: 100M Certificates Issued by cyphar on Thursday June 29, 2017 @12:14PM (#14664425)
Yes, many services "seem to do it". The problem is how do you safely verify that a wildcard certificate is actually being given to the owner of that domain space? It's "trivial" to provide a certificate for a particular domain is owned by someone, but the same techniques don't work for wildcard certificates because now you're verifying only a single domain and providing certificates for an entire class of domains.

If you work through all of the ways ACME verification works (/.well-known/, DNS, and so on) you can come up with several plausible setups that become insecure if you allow wildcard certificates.

Here's a stack exchange question about it: https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/157972/why-cant....

Re:Milestone: 100M Certificates Issued by tokenizerrr on Thursday June 29, 2017 @01:57PM (#14665402)
That SO post makes no sense to me. It claims:

> The authentication test can't merely back down one level to mysub.example.com because that isn't covered by the cert requested, and may not be under the control of the requesting agent either.

This just seems wrong. Performing the check like that seems to be a sane way to do it. If people can't control the base domain they have no business requesting a wildcard cert.

Re:Milestone: 100M Certificates Issued by cyphar on Thursday June 29, 2017 @02:21PM (#14665638)
But *.a.com doesn't cover a.com, so it's not very clear that the inverse ownership relationship should hold. Yes, it's true on a DNS level but that's one argument I would imagine against doing it that way.
Re:Milestone: 100M Certificates Issued by tokenizerrr on Thursday June 29, 2017 @02:34PM (#14665750)
No, but ownership of a.com heavily implies ownership of (wildcard).a.com (HN is being weird with the asterisk)

Alternatively they could just do a DNS check. If you can configure DNS for a.com, you control *.a.com.

Re:Milestone: 100M Certificates Issued by cyphar on Friday June 30, 2017 @06:54AM (#14669810)
> heavily implies ownership

"heavily implies" is too low of a bar to make it safe for a CA to provide wildcard certificates through an entirely automated process. While they could do it, they care enough about security to make the decision not to.

> If you can configure DNS for a.com, you control *.a.com.

This assumes that if you can create a TXT record for a.com that you must also have access to the ability to create other records for a.com.

While it is a stretch, I would say that the only bar sufficiently high would be fulfilled is forcing an administrator to prove that they can change the NS records for a domain. Which I don't believe would be a practical thing to test, and might run into problems with things like cloudflare.

Re:Milestone: 100M Certificates Issued by tokenizerrr on Friday June 30, 2017 @09:14AM (#14670467)
> This assumes that if you can create a TXT record for a.com that you must also have access to the ability to create other records for a.com.

Yup! And LE is totally fine with this! Have you read the ACME DNS verification spec?

Re:Milestone: 100M Certificates Issued by eropple on Thursday June 29, 2017 @03:33PM (#14666196)
I regularly have subdomain zones delegated to AWS for Route 53 use without having direct control over the root domain. The idea that I must have direct control to assert control over a subdomain is pretty questionable.
Re:Milestone: 100M Certificates Issued by tokenizerrr on Thursday June 29, 2017 @03:43PM (#14666275)
If you don't have access, fine. You can't make use of this functionality. Stick with what is available today. Nothing lost. If you do have access, like 99% of the domains out there, you now get access to more functionality. Win-win.