Alternatively they could just do a DNS check. If you can configure DNS for a.com, you control *.a.com.
"heavily implies" is too low of a bar to make it safe for a CA to provide wildcard certificates through an entirely automated process. While they could do it, they care enough about security to make the decision not to.
> If you can configure DNS for a.com, you control *.a.com.
This assumes that if you can create a TXT record for a.com that you must also have access to the ability to create other records for a.com.
While it is a stretch, I would say that the only bar sufficiently high would be fulfilled is forcing an administrator to prove that they can change the NS records for a domain. Which I don't believe would be a practical thing to test, and might run into problems with things like cloudflare.
Yup! And LE is totally fine with this! Have you read the ACME DNS verification spec?
> The authentication test can't merely back down one level to mysub.example.com because that isn't covered by the cert requested, and may not be under the control of the requesting agent either.
This just seems wrong. Performing the check like that seems to be a sane way to do it. If people can't control the base domain they have no business requesting a wildcard cert.