However, I would also point out that wildcards allow people who aren't you to create domains that you didn't create and represent them as being from you, which is an attack vector that even SAN enumeration doesn't allow. We're talking whitelists over blacklists.
It's not about if I'm using SANs anyway. It's that LE is fine with that, but not with wildcard certs.
> However, I would also point out that wildcards allow people who aren't you to create domains that you didn't create and represent them as being from you, which is an attack vector that even SAN enumeration doesn't allow. We're talking whitelists over blacklists.
Can you elaborate what you mean here?
> Can you elaborate what you mean here?
Me saying "this cert is valid for example.com, foo.example.com, and bar.example.com" is an incrementally better security posture than saying "this cert is valid for *.example.com". It constrains an attacker from running a phishing attack from, say, "private.example.com" or "secure.example.com". You're whitelisting what you're covering by explicitly declaring all of them.
It is incremental, but it's a thing.
When it comes to security, including phishing, it behooves all of us to not assume that permissiveness is a de facto positive.