So until taxicab operators in major cities get a nifty app with guaranteed pricing most of people would just limit the price comparison to Uber vs Lyft.
Not true -- Uber has a permanent moat, which is their steadfast, solitary willingness to be a no-tipping oasis, which others equally refuse to replicate.
Meanwhile I like not being a dick to drivers. What's the big deal?
More generally, the way tipping works, there is no clear, consistent, compatible expectation, so I'm forced into a position of either a) overpaying, b) committing a silent faux pas, or c) having negative feedback misinterpreted as stinginess or ignorance.
Would you not consider that a big deal? Are you really surprised about the existence of people who don't like the tipping system, or who don't consider "just stiff them" a valid workaround?
Lyft may have similar issues, but in cities without real taxi companies (e.g. Sf) there's no real alternative to being a part of this terrible "entrepeneurship". Tipping will put uber back on my phone.
Tipping is entirely about being able to advertise a lower price than the actual customer cost. Unfortunately that is extremely effective, so if one company in a market accepts tips all the others basically have to.
And also Uber (more than Lyft) it's by far the major player, it's entrenched in people's imagination as the representative of the very service it provides, and it just works.
"Call an Uber" is as idiomatic today as "Google something".
However whomever has a fleet of automated vehicles could easily divert resources into an uber-like ride sharing app.
it's an opinion piece with a bunch of facts thrown around but no reasoning to thread it together. i wouldn't bother putting any weight on it's conclusions (or wasting your time reading it, if you haven't).
Uber’s real problem is that it is a staggeringly unprofitable company with fundamentally uncompetitive economics. It lost $2 billion in 2015, $3 billion in 2016, and another billion in China. It is a higher cost, less efficient producer of taxi service than traditional operators; all of its growth is explained by these multi-billion dollar subsidies as it has flooded markets with additional capacity offering unprofitably low fares.
It has none of the scale or network economies that allowed other startups to quickly grow into profitability. In its fifth year of operation Facebook had achieved 25% profit margins; in Uber’s fifth year its profit margins were negative 149%. Absolute Uber losses have continued to worsen with recent growth. Margins improved somewhat in 2016, but only because Uber unilaterally reduced driver compensation by $1 billion, leading to news reports of drivers sleeping in the cars in order to make ends meet. Uber never had any hope of profitability in a competitive market, even at its present scale.
That's Uber's big problem.
The WayMo lawsuit, in which Google appears to have a pretty airtight case, has destroyed that hope. It's the Carpathia radioing that they're 4 hours away. There's no help coming and the Titanic is going down.
Now all these shifts are likely still going to happen. A seemingly cogent analysis I came across recently [1] breaks down the costs and strongly argues for a future where individual vehicle ownership is the departure from the norm rather than the default that it is today. But it just won't be Uber that cashes in on it. Or, more accurately, it won't be the current Uber. If Uber goes down in flames, their carcass will be plucked and someone, perhaps Google in the lawsuit settlement, will come away with Uber's brand and logistics platform that can be paired with self-driving technology to achieve Uber's vision.
[1] https://shift.newco.co/this-is-how-big-oil-will-die-38b843bd...
It's still going: http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2017/06/can-uber-ever-deliver...
even in your article, it's not obvious that the economics of uber is doomed. it doesn't talk about the economics of the taxi industry, but simply makes a big assumption that it's an efficient market (just considering medallions should make you skeptical of that claim), so uber must get it's economics in line with the taxi industry. that's not obvious. (maybe it's explained in the 10 parts, but 10 parts?!?! seems like an editor might be warranted).
to be clear, i'm not defending uber, just that the arguments presented aren't so convincing once you dig into them a bit (and appeals to authority make me even more skeptical. it's like saying "trust me"... it sets the alarm bells off).
It is true that former CEO personality was important for uber and different dude or lady could not achieve the same, but achievement here is losing tons of money on business that does not seem to be profitable ever. That is odd definition of winning.
Combine that seemingly solid market reasoning with them being opposed often and them fucking up almost as often and it seems surprising they are still functioning now. Their are missing leadership, their investors are unlikely to assemble a stellar team, there are existing internal and external problems. This seems overwhelming for all but the most profitable companies, and that is just what was in this short article. Even if it is wrong the reasoning seems solid. News facts or or astounding leadership at Uber are required to pull out of such a deep hole.
Their master stroke was supposed to be a self driving taxi, but they are no closer than anyone else and their bill is due. They appear to have an existential need to have that desperation move work for them for at least a few years before anyone else gets in on it. If they succeed then likely Google and Telsa will succeed within a few months of them. There appears to be no situations where they can recoup losses at a reasonable rate.
I could be totally wrong, but it looks suspicious as hell. If I had money to invest at a scale that mattered to Uber, I sure wouldn't go with them.
given what i know (which is admittedly not much), i probably wouldn't invest in uber at this point either, but i remain skeptical that the taxi industry is a mature and efficient market, such that uber has no path to profitability (setting aside all their other asinine self-inflicted wounds).
The OP argues that Uber will never be able to charge prices in excess of the level required by a traditional taxi/limo operator to be profitable for long enough to recoup the billions of dollars the company has burned by subsidizing the price of rides. Put another way, even if Uber drives every competing taxi/limo operator out of business, as soon as the company raises prices to cover costs -- vehicle, insurance, maintenance, fuel, credit card processing, license fees, and (at least for now) labor -- new entrants (and revived old entrants) would quickly come into the market, preventing Uber from keeping prices up.
If the OP is right, Uber is truly in a precarious situation, because, as Brad Feld recently wrote: "the markets reward growth until they don’t. Then they reward profitability. The trick is to be in a position to make the switch when you need to. Lots of CEOs and boards fantasize about this, but don’t actually have a plan in place to do this as they expect the future – where the switch from growth to profitability – will never come. Or, they hope the exit will happen before this moment."[1]
Uber doesn't seem to have a plan to make the switch. If the markets start demanding profitability (or at least a convincing plan for reaching profitability), Uber's wheels could indeed come off very quickly.
[1] https://www.feld.com/archives/2017/06/lessons-internet-bubbl...