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Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by Udo on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @09:53AM (#14445345)
> Now suppose that we construct the Gödel sentence for this formal system. Since the Gödel sentence cannot be proven in the system, the machine will be unable to produce this sentence as a truth of arithmetic. However, a human can look and see that the Gödel sentence is true. In other words, there is at least one thing that a human mind can do that no machine can. Therefore, “a machine cannot be a complete and adequate model of the mind” (Lucas 1961: 113). In short, the human mind is not a machine.

That is not a difference between human and machine. It's a rhetorical trick at best, and an unreasonable appeal to mysticism at worst.

A human mind looking at the Gödel sentence while strictly adhering to the same formal structure could also not see that the Gödel sentence is true. Conversely, a machine that is allowed to operate outside of this postulated formalism could perfectly well make an inference that the Gödel sentence is true.

The Lucas-Penrose argument boils down to a questionable attempt at a logic bomb. So by first tying the machine's hands, they argue that the machine's hand's are indeed tied, and therefore humans - who in this example have been given free rein - can do something that you explicitly disallowed machines from doing.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by forgotpwtomain on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @03:09PM (#14447639)
Thanks for this spark of a comment in an otherwise perturbed discussion. I cannot reply to all the child comments but hopefully I can help elucidate the misconception you are indicating.

> It's a rhetorical trick at best

This is precisely it. It works because 'true' is defined for the formal system but not for the human. It so happens that the humans in question say well 'of course we know what Godel's proposition means and what true is' but that's just because they are familiar with those words in an entirely unrelated sense to the system being described (akin to say the common speech use of 'energy').

Since you need a system at least as powerful to evaluate the propositions of an underlying system and in that more powerful system a similar proposition can be formed.

Anologous to this is Wittgenstein's problem on the irreducibility of rules: that one can always ask for the explanation of a rule, explanation of an explanation an so on ad infinitum. So it is essentially impossible to determine whether a rule is being applied correctly or not. It so happens that we (humans) can stop asking and 'apply'; but I'm not convinced this is something machines cannot do.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by fiatjaf on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @06:24PM (#14449048)
Wittgenstein's "problem on the irreducibility of rules" is brainfart at best. Any rule that can be actually _followed_ cannot be logically precise, and vice-versa. If you try to reduce anything from the real-world to pure logic you'll surely end up crazy.
Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by posterboy on Wednesday May 31, 2017 @06:12AM (#14451400)
there are abstract rules and practical laws, principles, whatchamacallit. Laws bind abstract rules to real thingies. The ground truth values are right and wrong en lieu of good and bad - basic emotions that are at the basis of experience. Trying to verbalize (the word logic is related to logos, old greek for tongue, language logic) every basic emotion you will surely go irrationaly crazy. Therefore, context is assumed and language is underspecific.
Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by gue5t on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @10:29AM (#14445606)
How does one create a machine with such untied hands? The problem I have here is that while you can run any formal system on a universal computer, you do so by embedding the semantics of your formal system into those of some machine, and you have to make changes from outside that embedding (writing a new interpreter) if you decide you want to shift formalisms. Meanwhile, humans can't step outside the computation their neurons run and reprogram their base method of thought (as far as we're aware, and distinguished from reprogramming one's set of premises), but can change the formal system they're simulating (as one does frequently in math and the sciences).

In short, I agree you entirely with except that I don't see how we can design a machine with hands as untied as ours. Given a mechanistic view of the brain one concludes that it must be possible, but I still don't understand what formal trick would enable this difference in power. It does seem to give up consistency somehow (humans make mistakes) but not entirely (humans can detect mistakes they've made). I'd love to hear more thoughts on this matter.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by manyoso on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @10:36AM (#14445657)
Lots of folks missing the forest for the trees. Objecting to Penrose' argument on the grounds that it assumes Humans are logically consistent when that is no the case misses the point.

The claim is that you can not adequately model the Human mind with a Turing machine. Pointing out that Human's are not logical only strengthens this claim and does not refute it. Further, the claim at this non-Turing machine-like ability of Humans is valuable and allows us insight that Turing machine is fundamentally incapable of.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by Chronos on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @02:02PM (#14447179)
> The claim is that you can not adequately model the Human mind with a Turing machine. Pointing out that Human's are not logical only strengthens this claim and does not refute it.

False. "2+2=5" is not a true statement, but I can construct a computer program that purports to compute the sum of 2 and 2 yet produces 5 as an answer. You can object "you got the addition wrong!" but that's irrelevant. If there is a person who believes (falsely) that 2 plus 2 equals 5, then the computer program could be an accurate model of their thought processes. There's nothing about "computers consistently produce the same answer" that implies "computers always produce the correct answer". "Computers always produce the correct answer" is a much more powerful claim, so the onus is on those who make the claim to prove it.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by manyoso on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @03:01PM (#14447591)
Let's try this again...

Yes, you can make a computer spit out nonsense, but this is a far cry from the computer actually behaving in an illogical way. A Turing machine's entire operation is logical. It is built with logic. It is a logical machine.

Penrose claims the human mind is not a Turing machine. That it is not logical. That it is not built with logic. That it is not a logical machine.

Pointing out that the human mind is not logical is thus restating Penrose' point and not refuting it.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by Chronos on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @07:31PM (#14449421)
I can put it another way:

It's easy to write a computer program that outputs every statement provable from the Peano axioms: start with the most primitive possible statements, then progressively output more complex ones. This is because the Peano axiom system is "recursively enumerable", to use Computer Science terminology. The program never terminates, but any provable statement you name will be output at some finite time.

Additionally, it's easy to write a computer program that outputs every possible combination of symbols. Most of the combinations aren't statements at all. Of the ones that are statements, most of them are not consistent with the Peano axioms. Of the ones that are consistent with the Peano axioms, most of them are unprovable. But if the set of truths is countable, this scheme guarantees that the program will output every true statement that exists.

It is possible to write a computer program that checks if a statement is provable from the Peano axioms. The naïve way is to run the program that outputs every statement as a subroutine, then halt if the subroutine prints out the statement which we wish to verify. This program will halt iff the statement is provable.

It is NOT possible to write a computer program that checks if a statement is unprovable from the Peano axioms. Such a program may be able to detect a subset of unprovable statements. The subset it can detect may even be countably infinite. But there are some statements which will cause the program to run forever.

Let statement X represent a formulation of "the Goldbach conjecture is true" written in the language of Peano arithmetic. Does the program run forever if asked whether X is provable? If you are a non-Gödelian being, you will be able to answer that question with no error, because Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem only applies to formal systems which can prove all true statements.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by Chronos on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @05:12PM (#14448588)
Penrose is not arguing that the human mind is illogical. He is arguing that it is uncomputable, which is a big difference.

In particular, he's saying that the human mind is capable of outputting true statements that cannot be proven to be true via any bounded number of proof steps. I don't disagree with that.

However, given that the human mind is capable of outputting false statements -- witness this conversation, wherein at least one of us is outputting false statements -- Penrose has failed to prove that the human mind is non-Gödelian, i.e. can output all the true statements that exist, while outputting no false ones.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by mcguire on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @11:06AM (#14445856)
If you are inconsistent, you believe false statements. In fact you could be convinced to believe any statement.

I'm unclear on how that is valuable.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by manyoso on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @11:39AM (#14446079)
See Penrose argument. He argues that the fact that our minds are not Turing machines allows us knowledge above and beyond what Turing machines are capable of. I don't think this necessarily entails inconsistency, but replying to his argument that humans are inconsistent does not refute his argument. That is what I was trying to point out.
Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by bordercases on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @12:58PM (#14446676)
> A human mind looking at the Gödel sentence while strictly adhering to the same formal structure could also not see that the Gödel sentence is true. Conversely, a machine that is allowed to operate outside of this postulated formalism could perfectly well make an inference that the Gödel sentence is true.

I think the key move you're making here is dictated by this. There isn't a largest model that will be able to capture all such truths (hence Gödel's incompleteness theorem) and what you would need is a system that is able to constantly build further systems else handle the ambiguity and do model-switching.

Not that it's impossible to do, but have we proven that such a system is theoretically possible yet within conventional frameworks?

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by scandox on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @10:04AM (#14445422)
What formalism, if any, is the human mind subject to? Isn't our current conception of a machine that it will bound to some formalism in terms of reasoning? Are we so bound?
Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by Udo on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @10:17AM (#14445520)
That's a loaded argument.

Human biology, and by extension human minds, follow a myriad of rules that are a result of biological processes being played out. Likewise "machines" also follow the rules laid out by their physical design. There is no fundamental difference in this regard, there is no new set of information-theoretical rules that comes into play when you switch to a carbon-based machinery.

> What formalism, if any, is the human mind subject to?

In the context of this argument, the mind of the human mathematician would be subject to the rules of the formal system. Since Gödel we know that such a formal system cannot be proven true inside the system itself. However, an entity that views the system from the outside can potentially see it's true. There is no fundamental difference between a human mind and a hypothetical machine mind as far as the capability to come to the same conclusion is concerned. That's why Lucas took special care to specify upfront that the machine mind is prohibited from coming to that conclusion, by confining it to live within the formal system only. Yes, their argument is really that circular.

> Isn't our current conception of a machine that it will bound to some formalism in terms of reasoning? Are we so bound?

We are not, and neither would a generally intelligent machine. The burden of proof is on Lucas/Penrose to show that a generally intelligent machine would still be bound to that formalism, at which point it would cease to be considered generally intelligent. They seem to argue that their postulate is true because the individual components of such a machine are bound by those rules, but then again so are the individual components of our brains.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by tlb on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @01:36PM (#14446969)
Also, humans often believe things that aren't provable in any formal system S because they're not true. Even good mathematicians believe (hopefully temporarily) false propositions. So the argument "some true things are not provable by formal logic in S, therefore if a human can believe something not provable in S, they must not be a formal system" is valid, but does not imply "no machine can be constructed that believes something not provable in S" since a little sprinkling of randomization can make anything possible. A machine that can prove any true proposition with p>2/3 and only believes false propositions with p<1/3 would be pretty useful.
Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by manyoso on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @10:38AM (#14445667)
So your claim is that the Human mind is a physical machine and that computers are also physical machines and thus both are bound to physical laws... and this negates Penrose how?

Do you think Penrose disagrees that the Human mind is bound by physical laws??

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by Analemma_ on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @10:50AM (#14445749)
I think Penrose is handwaving to try and have it both ways: he's saying the brain obeys physical laws, but that it does not embed a formal computational model. But that's impossible: the second is a logical consequence of the first.
Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by manyoso on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @11:37AM (#14446064)
"But that's impossible: the second is a logical consequence of the first."

No, it is not. It is far from proven that universal physical law can everywhere be simulated by a Turing machine. If you had proof of that you'd be up for a Nobel. So publish your paper or perhaps consider that Roger Penrose is not an idiot and you might not know what you are talking about.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by gpderetta on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @12:06PM (#14446275)
It is not proven and possibly it can never be proven. But it can be disproven, and given the success of the Church-Turing thesis, I would say that the burden of proof rest on those that claim that a system more powerful than a Turing machine exist.
Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by manyoso on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @01:33PM (#14446950)
Fair enough, but that is a far cry from 'logically impossible' which the parent comment explicitly stated.
Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by Udo on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @10:51AM (#14445762)
I'm not making a claim, I argue based on what we already know. Penrose is the one claiming something here.

> Do you think Penrose disagrees that the Human mind is bound by physical laws??

Yes. Having read his work in the past, I know that he disagrees the human mind is bound by physical laws. This is the whole reason behind the argument they're putting forth to begin with: they postulate that humans are capable of making an inference that could not possibly be made by a machine intelligence.

However, it has never been shown that we are not a machine intelligence.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by manyoso on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @11:33AM (#14446038)
Then I am sorry to say you have no idea what you are talking about. Penrose nowhere claims the human mind is not bound by physical laws.

Cite one place where he says anything like this or go home.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by simonh on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @12:17PM (#14446358)
He argues that quantum magic enables human minds to do things that formal computer systems cannot do. I'm not sure what his position is on computers that incorporate quantum magic though.
Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by Udo on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @12:39PM (#14446530)
I suspect the argument manyoso is setting up here is based on sophistry around the concept of "physical laws". His stance is most likely that quantum woo is part of the physical laws, in the same way a fundamentalist religious person would assert that the content of a holy book is part of the physical laws.

What I - and I hope most people - mean by the phrase is different though, it's the body of actual physical laws that have been shown scientifically.

> I'm not sure what his position is on computers that incorporate quantum magic though.

Interesting thought experiment. I suspect he would be fine with those in theory, however since he already declared this special connection to the supernatural for humans it'd be interesting what computer components he would consider equivalent. But the beauty of his position is that, in the event of a generally intelligent computer emerging, he could always claim that any given nanoscale computing component is the silicon analogue of "quantum microtubules" (which was his woo-related organelle of choice in neurons). It's not like he ever has to prove his claims in order to be taken seriously.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by manyoso on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @01:32PM (#14446939)
It is not quantum woo and it is not quantum magic. Objective collapse theories are the complete opposite of what you are disparaging. Objective collapse theories are more physical than what we currently have.

Few people have made more contributions in the twentieth century to actual physics than Penrose. He is one of the world's leading experts on general relativity and his objective collapse theory is nothing more that when quantum gravity is understood that gravity will play a role in the collapse of the wavefunction.

To describe Penrose as engaging in 'quantum woo' or 'quantum magic' is grossly inappropriate. It just gives evidence that you don't understand what he is proposing. See Scott Aaronson for what an rebuttal to Penrose looks like not the ham fisted straw man takedowns from the likes of people in this comment section.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by Chronos on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @01:54PM (#14447109)
Penrose is not just arguing for objective collapse. Penrose is arguing for something computationally more powerful than objective collapse.
Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by manyoso on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @02:50PM (#14447483)
If gravity plays a role in wave function collapse that will pose serious questions for the Church-Turing hypothesis. It might very well make it impossible for non-Quantum computers to accurately model quantum gravity.

Penrose does not argue for "something computationally more powerful than objective collapse" rather, he argues that the physical Church-Turing thesis is false due to quantum gravity. Something he is an expert on, btw.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by Chronos on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @05:15PM (#14448609)
"gravity plays a role in wave function collapse that will pose serious questions for the Church-Turing hypothesis"

Says who? Penrose is blacklisted, cite someone else.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by dang on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @02:20PM (#14447290)
> I suspect the argument manyoso is setting up here is based on sophistry around the concept of "physical laws". His stance is most likely that quantum woo is part of the physical laws, in the same way a fundamentalist religious person would assert that the content of a holy book is part of the physical laws.

That falls far below the standard of discussion we ask users to abide by here. Please make your points directly and without such cheap insinuations.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by Udo on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @04:31PM (#14448298)
It's not an incorrect summary of his position. I agree it may not look like a totally objective characterization on my part, but you're saying this in a discussion where I was literally told to "go home", by the same user you're protecting here.

If you think my comments in their entirety detracted from the discussion, I'd like you to tell me. Otherwise I'm asking you to consider this statement in the context of both manyoso's and my comments as a whole.

This is a discussion about quantum quackery, and you're stepping in on behalf of the pro-quackery side that has no problem telling me personally that I "have no idea what" I'm "talking about", and other dismissive discourse.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by dang on Wednesday May 31, 2017 @03:30AM (#14450934)
I chided manyoso elsewhere. The problem with your comment was not that it incorrectly summarized anything, it's that it broke the HN guidelines by calling names ("quackery", "sophistry", "woo", "fundamentalist"). That matters far more to HN than whether Penrose is wrong about Gödel.

Commenting here requires being scrupulously civil, even when others are not. Any lower standard would lead to an unstable system.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by Udo on Wednesday May 31, 2017 @09:01AM (#14452105)
In a discussion where one side freely makes stuff up as they go along and attempts to put the burden of proof on everybody else, I stand by these characterizations.

When someone asserts in an authoritative tone that quantum gravity is the key to unlocking consciousness at the heart of the universe, that is utter hogwash and deserves to be called out as such. You may personally not like my pointing this out, but the entire "field" of quantum consciousness is a religious movement that makes unsubstantiated claims about the nature of reality.

It actually is quackery. Redefining the term 'physical laws' to include magic in order to shield an opinion from criticism is actually sophistry. Insisting that spiritual convictions are factual statements about the universe is actual fundamentalism. These aren't bad words wielded to hurt someone, they are supposed to convey meaning.

I never meant to denigrate anyone personally. I strongly feel that opinions must be fair game though when it comes to criticism. In doing so suppose I must come across more harshly than I intended or maybe I'm just exceptionally bad at articulating myself. Whatever my intent, it's clearly not working out all that well. It's probably a good idea for me to take a break from HN for a while.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by manyoso on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @09:41PM (#14449920)
It is incorrect. Penrose emphatically says the human brain is governed by physical law. To assert otherwise is just factually incorrect. Read his books or read his papers. If you disagree, please provide one quote that shows otherwise.

I am sorry to have said "go home" and will refrain in the future. Still, you have lodged what I consider factually incorrect assertions about Penrose's argument. When asked for evidence you have provided none.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by Udo on Wednesday May 31, 2017 @01:53AM (#14450650)
You misunderstand what I'm talking about. What dang criticized me for is a correct summary of your position. Let me elaborate:

> "We proposed [...] that consciousness depends on biologically ‘orchestrated’ coherent quantum processes in collections of microtubules within brain neurons, that these quantum processes correlate with, and regulate, neuronal synaptic and membrane activity [...] This orchestrated OR activity (‘Orch OR’) is taken to result in moments of conscious awareness and/or choice. [...] We conclude that consciousness plays an intrinsic role in the universe." ( Stuart Hameroff, Roger Penrose; Consciousness in the universe; Physics of Life Reviews, Volume 11, Issue 1, March 2014, Pages 39-78 )

and

> "If gravity plays a role in wave function collapse that will pose serious questions for the Church-Turing hypothesis. It might very well make it impossible for non-Quantum computers to accurately model quantum gravity. Penrose does not argue for "something computationally more powerful than objective collapse" rather, he argues that the physical Church-Turing thesis is false due to quantum gravity. Something he is an expert on, btw." ( manyoso, Hacker News, discussion id 14444443 )

None of these statements, while they are using the language of science, bears any discernable relationship to physical reality in a scientific sense. The postulate that any consciousness-related activity of neurons happens in structural elements like microtubules is a collection of unproven hypotheses divorced from both empirical and theoretical experience. The same goes for this preposterous claim about quantum gravity: there is currently no workable theoretical framework for quantum gravity, but this doesn't stop Penrose from confabulating properties onto the term so it can become a new go-to locus for his ideas on quantum consciousness.

An observer will notice a pattern here: mystical truth claims about a hypothesis with no basis in either experimentation nor theory are being "supported" by hiding their supposed mechanisms of action inside yet-unexplored regions of the map. It's a god of the gaps argument.

Now, you know this, as does Penrose. Both of you are trying to preempt this criticism by professing quantum consciousness is a fundamental part of the laws of nature, and hence it should not be categorized as woo. You are essentially rejecting the accusation of mysticism by asserting that magic is not metaphysical. Which was the observation dang chided (and apparently penalized) me for.

For what it's worth: you decisively won the argument, both by popular opinion and the support of the site's admin. Accept a victory when it presents itself.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by simonh on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @02:42PM (#14447427)
Er, I have met and talked to religious people who have said exactly this.
Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by Crito on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @11:52AM (#14446173)
> I know that he disagrees the human mind is bound by physical laws.

Last I heard, Penrose appeals to quantum woo to claim that the human mind isn't strictly algorithmic. But sources of quantum randomness isn't enough to push you into dualism, quantum shit is part of our physical universe and while there is no proof that the human mind critically exploits quantum phenomena for it's computation, we can certainly build machines that have RNGs exploiting quantum randomness.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by cbennett on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @01:46PM (#14447045)
> Penrose appeals to quantum woo to claim that the human mind isn't strictly algorithmic.

Penrose doesn't appeal to quantum woo, he has a quite well articulated set of assumptions and arguments , related to loop quantum gravity [1], about how objective collapse of the wave function may occur at bio-physically feasible decoherence times.

Now, whether you think his biophysical theories of consciousness are valid, or even required (whether you buy the microtubules argument/hypothesis), is one thing. But stating that Penrose- arguably the 20th century's foremost mathematical physicist- is a practicioner and/or a spreader of 'quantum woo'-- that belies a level of mis-informantion so catastrophically high that it renders your quoted statement indistinguishable from a pure ad-hominem.

[1] https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Loop_quantum_gravity

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by cbennett on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @02:13PM (#14447234)
@Chronos (can't reply for some reason, so I'm just replying to my own post and tagging you)

Its true that LQG is not known a natural schema to implement hyper-computation. However, since we don't well understand the time-dynamics of twistors ( how these operators may interact non-linearly through time), i don't see any a-priori reason why it is not a possible scheme for super-computation (you could make a good counter- response based on occam's razor, which I'd grant).

Look, lots of thereotical CS folks get disturbed by the idea of hyper-computation/super-turing machines, but in truth Turing machines are a toy model in comparison to true physics; as such, it doesn't take a whole lot more to get something more powerful; Siegelmann and colleagues have shown that real weighted, analog recurrent nets have super-turing abilities [1] [2]. While Aaronson and other raise good questions about physical realizability of such systems, a good thing to keep in mind is that these discussions often take place at computational 'limit' cases, eg solving intractable PSPACE problems, which may not be as relevant to more pedestrian problems solvable by biological systems. Central point: dynamically evolving systems iteratively exploring through (from) in-consistent systems towards more and more consistent ones have many of the same compelling qualities we would call 'super-turing'. Also see the lit on evolving turning machines.

Finally, while I don't agree with the magnitude your Pauling analogy, I certainly agree with you statement that Penrose is out of his depth here. While I do not , presently, buy his argument that quantum effects are necessary to realize consciousness, I remain open to the idea until we know more about BOTH physics and computation.

[1] http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/NECO_a_00263 [2] http://www.kurzweilai.net/super-turing-machine-learns-and-ev...

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by Chronos on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @01:56PM (#14447134)
LQG is not believed to allow hypercomputation, i.e. the solving of Turing-uncomputable problems. Penrose's entire argument is based on the idea that the human brain is a hypercomputer, which is why it cannot in principle be simulated by a computer (or any other machine).

It's worth noting that Penrose's field of expertise is General Relativity, not quantum physics, and definitely not Computer Science / philosophy of computation. I see the situation with Penrose as equivalent to Linus Pauling's unfortunate foray into Vitamin C pseudoscience late in his life.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by manyoso on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @02:54PM (#14447531)
Penrose' claim is much simpler. He thinks that gravity playing a role in wave function collapse will show that non-quantum computers are incapable of accurately modeling quantum gravity. IOW, he thinks gravity will end up showing the physical Church-Turing thesis to be false.

Say what you will about Penrose, but can you seriously deny that he is one of the world's foremost experts on gravity?? You might not like his conclusion, but to say that he is out of his element here is ridiculous. Are you in your element when discussing gravity causing wave function collapse? Who do you think would be more in their element on this subject than Penrose??

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by Chronos on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @05:14PM (#14448606)
Call me back when Penrose convinces a well-regarded quantum physics expert. At that point we can call up Scott Aaronson and ask him his opinion, as Aaronson is an expert on the intersection of quantum physics and computing.
Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by manyoso on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @09:36PM (#14449906)
Scott is a friend of mine. I've talked with him face to face about this very subject. He disagrees with Penrose, but his objections are far more nuanced and respectful than anything I have seen here. He would be horrified to see Penrose belittled and his arguments not given a fair reading. Penrose is an intellectual hero to Scott and someone to be admired.
Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by cbennett on Wednesday May 31, 2017 @06:27AM (#14451450)
That's good to know. I read his post on his 'debate' with Roger and really enjoyed it. Also of interest may be the discussion between him and Hameroff in the comments section. Meta-comment: It a sad sort of situation when intellectual communities, whether they be HN or another, tend to idolize a set of individuals and demonize others. Thanks @manyosos for your comments in this thread, you really helped elevate the discourse.
Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by scandox on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @10:25AM (#14445586)
Well I wasn't intending it as an argument. I was actually just interested to see what someone who had actually thought about it would say.
Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by mcguire on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @10:31AM (#14445623)
> What formalism, if any, is the human mind subject to?

Neurobiology. Chemistry. Physics. Of course, any machine will also be subject to the same formalism, so....

To start with, no physical entity has an unbounded memory available.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by danielam on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @10:39AM (#14445678)
Indeed. To make such a claim demonstrates a misunderstanding of what formalism is. When human beings develop formalisms, they do so on the basis of semantics. If I wish to formalize something, I must first have a relevant understanding of the nature of the thing, or things involved and the relations between them. The development of formalism is a translation of semantics into syntactic rules devoid of meaning. Doing so allows us to mechanize reasoning. Algebra is an example of an early move in this direction. Something we learn in mathematics is that two theories concerning different objects can be formally equivalent.

Computers are strictly devoid of semantics. They are, at best, purely syntactic machines. There is no amount of syntax than can ever lead to semantics. Strictly speaking, computers don't even compute.

Further reading: http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2013/10/do-machines-compute-...

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by simonh on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @12:35PM (#14446513)
> Something we learn in mathematics is that two theories concerning different objects can be formally equivalent.

Can be, but do not have to be. A distinction through which a host of mistakes have fallen, including Donald Hoffman's 'disproof' of functionalism.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by jamesrcole on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @11:06AM (#14445863)
For a bit of context on Feser and his views, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Feser
Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by burkaman on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @10:17AM (#14445528)
> Isn't our current conception of a machine that it will bound to some formalism in terms of reasoning?

No, that's just a current limitation of the kind of machines we know how to make.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by naasking on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @10:15AM (#14445501)
> What formalism, if any, is the human mind subject to?

There could be many that could answer some such questions, paraconsistent and inconsistent for example.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by fiatjaf on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @06:18PM (#14449004)
> A human mind looking at the Gödel sentence while strictly adhering to the same formal structure could also not see that the Gödel sentence is true.

To say that you assume a human mind is a machine. Why isn't that begging the question?

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by Udo on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @06:26PM (#14449059)
No, it means I think a human mathematician is capable of working within a formal structure by following the rules of that formalism. It's a way of saying that humans can do formal math.

Of course you are correct in suspecting I do assume the human mind is a machine, because we have seen zero evidence that it's not the case, but that's not in any way part of the sentence you quoted.

Re:The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem (2012) by fiatjaf on Tuesday May 30, 2017 @07:02PM (#14449280)
Ok, I get it. I had misunderstood your argument.