As a good corporate drone, this arrangement is kind of forced on me, but a lot of small company / startup folks totally mix the two. Might be a good thing to not do.
Sure it doesn't protect you from e.g. a tool you need for work being compromised, but it reduces the attack surface - this guy probably wouldn't have installed handbrake on his work machine.
Another thing we do specifically because medical data is, a lot of the time I'm forced to work inside a non internet connected network that I vpn and then remote desktop to. Firewall rules mean the only thing getting in from my laptop is vnc. Some systems also require plugging into a specific physical network. Overkill for most uses but it makes losing laptops fat less scary if you can keep a lot of your stuff on a more secure remote system.
Try out Qubes: http://qubes-os.org
Something like this could be good if you wanted to rapidly switch between different compartments on a single device. It would be great for e.g. keeping a 'sensitive data' compartment seperate from a 'emails and paperwork' compartment on a work laptop.
Doing something like this is certainly better than using a single device with no seperation or just user accounts.
Psychologically, I still think that training people to use different devices for different things is more likely to stick than (account seperation on steroids). This extends to physical security - not leaving a work laptop in your backpack in a nightclub cloakroom like you might a personal device. But in the end with that reason, at a small comapany where you can avoid hiring idiots, it's up to each person to decide what psychological tricks they need to get themselves to do things.
I wouldn't trust something like this to keep high security information seperate. When some exploit that escapes Xen or (for a corp) accesses windows systems otherwise securely configured, there is nothing like isolated networks to keep your blood pressure low. For most software a service dev type people you already have this - your data lives in a data center on carefully configured production servers. But for data science type users, you see a lot of people (especially in accademida) doing work with potentially scary datasets on local laptops they probably also watch pirate TV on at home, which is a bit concerning. I guess at least if they were using qubes it would be a bit better though.
Because we can always not care about those others in the context of what we should do.
Technology can only do so much to "protect" users from themselves, and from miscreants. Couple this with an indifference to privacy on most of the connected population, and you've got a recipe for a world where nothing is safe.
I would both prefer and hate this setup. I use my personal laptop for work and having all my apps, data, settings, etc available in one place is amazing. I could get past using different computers but the sad reality is my provided work computer is underpowered compared to my 3.5 year old macbook. I can run circles around my coworker's machines on the simple fact I have an SSD. IDEA opens in seconds for me while they go get a cup of coffee. Our desktops haven't been updated in probably 4+ years and I strongly believe they'd be more productive on macOS than on whatever flavor of linux they are using (Most use Linux because they'd rather die than use Windows and they can eek a little more performance out). A number of them have older macbooks they use for meetings but they aren't powerful enough to actually develop on.
Do not install unsigned software is a good start. Does that dialog need a secondary 'Are you really really sure?' absolutely .. but the basic defence in this specific case was in place.
pacman -S foo
Or sometimes maybe: yaourt -S foo
tl;dr Use your operating-system's package manager.See for example:
* Kivy: https://aur.archlinux.org/cgit/aur.git/tree/PKGBUILD?h=pytho...
* Chrome: https://aur.archlinux.org/cgit/aur.git/tree/PKGBUILD?h=googl...
* Vivaldi: https://aur.archlinux.org/cgit/aur.git/tree/PKGBUILD?h=vival...
* Plymouth (over HTTP too!): https://aur.archlinux.org/cgit/aur.git/tree/PKGBUILD?h=plymo...
* Oracle JDK (also plaintext HTTP!): https://aur.archlinux.org/cgit/aur.git/tree/PKGBUILD?h=jdk
Note the included hashes — if the file on the server gets replaced, the building process will complain. (Sure the package maintainer will probably just replace the hash :D But if the file changed but the version number didn't change, or there was no release announcement, that's suspicious…)
I don't remember how Arch does it, but in FreeBSD Ports you need to actively replace the hash in the text file, there's no easy ignore option. (FreeBSD also mirrors the files on the project's servers, which is pretty cool)
It isn't on the Windows store either as far as I can tell.
Why, I don't know - maybe nobody involved wants to pay the fees to become an Authorized Developer, maybe there's a Free Software religious argument going on, maybe Apple doesn't want a program whose original function was "ripping DVDs" to be on there because of the many deals they have with the entertainment industry.
tl;dr: the program in question ain't in the operating system's package manager.
cough Arch cough
In the end its all about trust. If you trust some web domain you can also trust their software. If that software is compromised you're out of luck. No package manager or walled apple garden can help you with that.
The solution, of course, was to add a fourth question...
1) Don't install random crap off of the internet: only use the Mac App Store, with sandboxed apps and "System integrity protection" turned on.
2) If you absolutely need to have some non-MAS app, check the checksum, download the DMG, but let it rest, and only install it a month or so later, if no news of breach, malware etc has been announced.
3) Don't give a third party program root privileges -- don't give your credentials when a random program you've downloaded asks for them.
4) Have any sensitive data (e.g. work stuff, etc) on an encrypted .DMG volume or similar, that you only decrypt when you need to check something. Even if your mac is infected, they'll either get just an encrypted image of those, or wont be able to read it at all.
5) Install an application firewall, like Little Snitch.
6) Keep backups.
> 99% of the time these hash changes are innocent
That's actually not very good at all and proves they shouldn't just trust hash changes! Very odd
EDIT: But in this case, the software in question is signed, so the (fallback) technique described above is not necessary. The download page [0] contains a GPG signature along with a link to the author's GPG public key. Checking the signature would have prevented the attack.
[0] https://handbrake.fr/rotation.php?file=HandBrake-1.0.7.dmg
Yes, it will take alot of effort to setup, and some effort to maintain, but it helps.
Most computers are always connected to the internet when they're on, even if they don't necessarily need to be. Airgapping isn't really used outside of very sensitive networks, but I'm starting to think we need to head towards a model of connecting machines only when really needed.
Of course the cloud based world doesn't allow for that, and perhaps I'm a luddite, but I increasingly find myself disabling the network connection when I'm working on my PC. Kind of like the dial-up days.