To see why this matters imagine: Are we looking for 70% out of 5 questions? or 70% of 10 questions we have? If you think you only need to answer 5 questions before making a decision and answer 4. That's 80% and you would go...But if there are 10 questions to ideally check off before deciding and you only answer 4, that's way too low and dangerous. This is dangerous in the military and in startup land. Knowing the full list of questions to ask is more important than knowing the answers.
Lastly, both Amazon and the military have huge structures, plans and support teams in place to encourage 70% as an OK threshold. Imagine if you have air support you can call in the marines should things go wrong, or you have your parents couch to crash on if your startup fails, those things would help a person be comfortable going on only 70% of the information.
I would extend this to say that 50% of the knowledge needed for making a decision is understanding the downsides / risks of moving forward. For example, if you know you'll be OK if your fail, it is much easier to say yes to a big choice. However, if you're risking homelessnes, then it's probably better to find a different option.
Even in less extreme scenarios, minor decisions I make are often based on understanding the risks, more than understanding the upsides. Maybe it is too conservative of an approach, but it is (unfortunately) based on experience.
Unless the time required to answer those 6 questions is enough time for a competitor to take your place...?
Which is the better move? Do you gamble by waiting and hope they guess wrong, thus giving you more information that might help answer your 6 questions? Or do you roll the dice and make the best decision you can given everything you know?
The best summation of their framework is "Make a decision when the probability of new information changing your mind is minimal."
Of course, we need to quantify "new information" and "minimal", but it's a good framework to consider what new data points would change your existing course.
[1] http://lesswrong.com/lw/85x/value_of_information_four_exampl...
"A good plan, violently executed now, is better than a perfect plan next week."
I'm a big fan of Clausewitz and of strategy discussions in general, but I think that we tend to focus too much on providential men who, naturally, can only take providential decisions (like Bezos, or Napoleon), and we tend to ignore the "longue durée", as the French historians called it (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Longue_dur%C3%A9e), the long course of history which should have informed Hitler that his country did not have the necessary resources (logistical, military etc) to defeat both the Soviets and the English (and the Americans after the Pearl Harbour attack).
It may sound deterministic, but IMHO most of the battles (either in war, finance, in politics) have been won before the two sides started engaging in conflict. Some of those involved just didn't know it yet.
The strategic importance of the city was hundred-fold different. The Napoleonic wars was a time where the modern states first started engaging in national fights with significant casualty, but still continue the war effort. In this sense it was quite the first "modern" warfare, but the telecommunication technology was still in its infancy; scout messengers were still used and reconnaissance was still relatively rudimentary. Gathered information was a fraction of what the Wehrmacht could gather, and it meant the control center relied on smaller Staff office. Combine it with Napoleon's providential talent, you could essentially have a mobile command center and the army could still function. In 1940s the sheer amount of intel and volume of telecommunication wouldn't be handled by no other place than central capital. Imagine if Napoleon couldn't dispatch orders in time and get the intels that he needed. Moscow needed to be taken specifically because taking it would have damaged Russian effort more than it did in Napoleonic times.
Note that in Napoleonic invasion Russian army set Moscow ablaze and left them to an empty city; in the Barbarossa they were willing to defend it to last man. Even Stalin refused to move away. Production prowess of modern city Moscow wasn't also nothing to scoff at, too.
Von Clausewitz did write that war is a political means(I remember this from first few chapters from On War, though I forgot which translation I read) and one of the primary goals must be to 1) preserve one's own strength, while 2) deteriorate the opponent's fighting capability. Taking Moscow would have done exactly that. It also would have yielded a political gain, as Soviet army at the time was heavily dependent on a few personnel, especially after the Great Purge. Once you take Moscow and demean Stalin's infallibility, you also damage Soviet morale.
I too believe that most of the battles are determined before the engagements. We know of the contrarian ones because they are rare. German generals(Model, Manstein, Rundstedt, Guderian to name a few) were perhaps the most competent ones in the second world war, but they hardly get mentions. (Perhaps deservingly for the ends they were aiming at)
Analysis paralysis happens frequently with analytic types of people.
If Bezos didn't develop this heuristic himself - through his own risk taking - I wouldn't be surprised if he got it from something like the Marine Corps.
Not always possible, of course, but once you start thinking in those terms, you can get good mileage out of that habit.
This is a great guiding philosophy!
This is ironic.
Taken as an entire group, people who go to fight for their respective countries are routinely lied to, rarely have the full picture of the motives of those who are sending them out to fight, and end up causing destruction which is completely disproportional to the amount of knowledge they possess.
As the saying goes, the first casualty of every war is the truth. Besides, is the 21st century war, where one side drops bombs on a technologically hapless group of people via UAVs, actually a level playing field from which you want to learn business principles?
Well, to be fair, there are all sorts of sub-level scenarios within the larger political decision to go to war that call for independent decision making.
Officers cannot be blamed for political decisions
"Most decisions should probably be made with somewhere around 70% of the information you wish you had. If you wait for 90%, in most cases, you’re probably being slow"
At what point is the information you have available for a key decision enough? You always want more.
This exactly mirrors a MAJOR decision-making framework taught in the Marine Corps--we actually call it the "70% solution."
All of our warfighting doctrine is built around the principle of rapid and decisive action, but the problem is you're in an uncertain, rapidly changing world where there are opposing actors operating around you and you never have all the answers. They emphasize in officer training that a key limiter is being paralyzed with uncertainty and wanting to wait until more information is available, and that you must actively counter this feeling. Indecision is a decision (and often the worst one).
I have personally found this one of the most difficult and perpetual factors I've encountered in both military and civilian careers. It's interesting that Bezos espouses this principle.