[1] It didn't help my perception of the report when it screamed that "ICMP echo was enabled and nefarious scalawags might be able to do unspeakable acts against our computers, best cut the network cable" type of advice [2] (yes, I know port 443 is open! WE'RE A WEB HOSTING COMPANY SERVING UP COMMERCIAL WEBSITES! ARE YOU PCI AUDITORS STUPID?)
[2] Okay, the ICMP echo thing was reported, but did not need to be disabled to pass the audit. If so, why even bring it up?
I personally organized my report into three sections, which seemed to work well. Clients seemed to enjoy the formatting:
1. Executive - Summarize everything in one page at a high level. You could skim it fast if you chose to. Highlight potential negative business impact of each finding.
2. Management - A little more detailed. 2-3 pages max. Most severe findings at the top and recommended action for remediation.
3. Narrative - This is the bulk 80-90% of the report detailing your step by step process including screenshots so that if someone wanted to duplicate your findings they could.
This was for using citrix boxes to provide saas to a client
As much as I admire people who show the courtesy to the trash bin that will eat their report, before any human reading it, of not feeding it "bad" reports: The OPs point of "sense of false security" unfortunately already sets in once someone is hired to "take care of security". This anecdote from about 2000 illustrates that:
A friend was hired to do black box penetration testing on the DMZ and internal network of one of the largest travel agencies in Europe. He, of course, found a lot of problems. He wrote a nice report. Like really nice. Point for point "this is your problem, this is what you have to do right now and this is a user-friendly policy you could implement to prevent such issues in the future." It was very pleasant to read, he knows how to handle language. And somewhere on page hundred-something "the first one to claim it, will get a bottle of champagne!".
The bottle was claimed a few months later by someone 3 levels above his position. By some high-level manager who did not know anything about IT. But he was the only one to read it (and he only claimed the bottle to figure out whether anyone below him had actually read the report). Two years later company politics allowed those 2 illiterates between my friend and the one manager who could read to be removed from the company. My friend was hired as their chief of security. His first task: work through his own report to fix the 90% that had not been fixed since he wrote it 2.5 years before (the report listed passwords to core routers in plain text as examples for "very stupid passwords" - they all still worked).