So would I be right in thinking you don't think that any of the Offsec certs (OSCP/OCSE), CREST certs (CCT etc) or SANS certs are usful?
Also, and I'd be genuinely interested to hear your thoughts here, why do you think that IT/Info Sec will take a different path than other professions (medicine, law, accountancy, engineering etc) which fairly universally have evolved into a certified professional model?
Those professions have rules, and are backed by either legislation or science. All participants are bound by said rules. For a lawyer, certain things are legal, certain things are not.
Security is a game where the whole objective is to either break the rules (and often the law) or to defend against someone who is.
How are you going to tell me that person A is qualified for the job based on his exam results, and person B is not, when person B got a root shell on your server and stole your data?
It's like the 1989 draft when the Giants tried to make Dion Sanders write an exam to see if he was qualified to play in the NFL.
"“They sat me down and gave me a thick book,” Sanders recalled. “I mean, this thing was thicker than a phone book. I said, ‘What’s this?’ They said, ‘This is our test that we give all the players.’ I said, ‘Excuse me, what pick do you have in the draft?’ They said, I think, 10th [actually 18th]. I said, ‘I’ll be gone before then. I’ll see y’all later. I ain’t got time for this.’ That’s a true story."
But that's not the reality for most companies, they're not trying to hire the absolute brightest and best, realistcally not everyone can. They're looking for some measurable indications that a candidate has a baseline level of knowledge in a given field.
Now I feel that a good certifiation can be part of that. So a valuable activity for the industry is to try and create better certifications to help companies who aren't in a position to judge for themselves whether someone is great at something or not, that there's a level of knowledge and understanding there.
If current certifications are poor, then it should be possible to articulate why they are poor, and describe what would make them better.
My references to other professions were designed to reference the fact that those professions have had to face similar issues as they've grown and in science, engineering, law, medicine, accountancy, etc etc they've pretty much all decided that some forms of professional certifications are the right way to go.
Not to say that they're perfect, but that they could be better than the alternatives.
Understanding how those rules interact, how to trigger certain interactions others didn't intend, and the best practices to not get bit by those interactions is what security is all about. It's much like law or medicine in that you are looking at unexpected consequences of multiple complex systems interfering with one another and looking for compromises and best practices to keep the most disastrous interactions the least likely to happen.
The individual NAND, AND, NOR, OR, and/or XOR logic? Rules - tabular even. The base IA? Rules. The microcode? Rules. The VMM? Rules. The TLB? Rules. The assembly? Rules. The OS kernel? Rules. The C library? Rules. The ABI calling convention? Rules. The application language? Rules - syntax and semantics. The libraries under the application - rules. The application itself is a list of rules for how data is processed. If it's Turing complete it's basically equivalent to the lamda calculus.
Every security issue is some misapplication of these rules due to someone not understanding the implications of the interactions of the rules. Every single one. Smashing the stack? It's applying a set a rules in a way the code author didn't anticipate. Overflowing a buffer? The code author didn't anticipate more data being stuffed in than the buffer was made to hold. Rowhammer? There are rules of semiconductor electronics interacting with the programming language, the IA, and the logic layout. SQL injection? Someone's applying the wrong rules to sanitize the input and someone else is giving input that takes advantage of the underlying rules of the programming language and the RDBMS that they were allowed to invoke because proper sanitization wasn't in place.
The rules under discussion are policy, and the question is how to define policy for evaluating people's skill at running roughshod over policy. The fact that there are underlying "hard" rules is literally universal and therefore uninteresting in this context.
Lawyers and doctors deal in interacting complex systems of rules. So do information security people.
If you can make a certification that works for one expert in dealing with interacting complex systems of rules, you absolutely can make a certification for another expert in dealing with interacting complex systems of rules.
The details of what you test are different, but the fact that it's been done for law, medicine, medical specialties, dentistry, mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, civil engineering, and many other fact and rule based fields means it can most likely be done in general for people looking at how different systems of rules intersect.
On the defense side, they simply do not work. Everybody gets hacked. The best companies with the biggest security budgets employing people at the cutting edge of security research still get hacked. Security experts get hacked. If the best in the industry still haven't solved this problem, you can't even begin to make the framework that you're proposing.
The discipline cannot be described as experts dealing with interacting complex systems of rules.
In computers, as in some parts of law, we have ample opportunity to address underlying rules as well as the rules around how we adjust, prepare, and react.
Of course one problem is "how does a certification become recognized", I mean in IT security it's going to have to start somewhere...
In the UK the IISP are perhaps closest to the "traditional profession" certifications, but they're struggling a bit to get traction.
Unfortunately the industry is growing far faster than perhaps happened for previous emergent professions, so the time needed to slowly grow professional bodies isn't available.
If it's not commercial organisations that start providing those services, the only other options I can see are some form of union, or some government mandated body. Those are options, but both have their challenges.
Both those options have their downsides.
Regardless, none of the certificates you've mentioned --- OSCP, CREST, or SANS --- will define information security. None of them have any meaningful credibility to experts.
When a lawyer is admitted to the bar, that is generally taken as proof that they have some idea of what they are doing. Bar exams are hard.
And the bar also provides a forum for dealing with shady lawyers. If a lawyer treats you badly, you can file a complaint with their bar association and they might get disbarred. This is an area where cyber training and certs is not as good yet, I think: as a forum for resolving disputes.
For example Certified accountants, Lawyers etc.
Without some common baseline, how do people looking to hire security types who don't have the experience to assess their skills and knowledge avoid getting bad people?
Also the article's argument that "it's experience that counts" really doesn't help get new people into the industry, where do they get the experience in the first place, it's a catch-22