When you're talking about universe-scale simulations, I wouldn't be so confident in asserting what is or isn't possible.
Using our present level of scientific knowledge as if it somehow informs us as to the feasibility of universe simulation would be like paleolithic humans discussing the finer points of modern microprocessor architecture.
It's likely that time and space are both infinite, which would equate to infinite computational power. It's also possible that other universes may exist with physical laws completely alien to our own. I fail to see why our reality being a computer simulation is somehow far-fetched.
Obvious ways to cheat:
- Only the things you are directly experiencing and seeing is simulated to a high degree.
- If you ever came close to discovering the true state of the universe, the game might simply erase those thoughts or twists things to make them fit again.
- People who really study physics and have access to detecting whether the universe is a simulation are all NPCs :)
Its theoretically infinitely big, as it starts with a seed number and biomes are generated when you interact with them, in a similar way to how this universe acts on quantum levels, kind of.
2) you can at any state check the difference between the simulated state and historical record
3) if your simulation converges, that is the closer to present day, the less the uncertainty, then you are on a right track.
4) if you simulation diverges you go to step 1 and tweak the initial conditions
5) you don't run a single simulation - you run many in parallel and select the best match at each step.
In "Consciousness Explained" Dennet postulates that a conscious mind perceiving a thing-in-the-world need not have perfect rich input data but merely a neuron that responds yes to the question: Am I seeing that thing ?
[1] Consciousness Explained, Daniel Dennet, page 8, [ Prelude, Hard Hallucination Problem ]:
"...intervene somewhere along the chain (anywhere on the optic nerve, ...between the eyeball and consciousness), tugging just right on the nerves would produce exactly the chain of events that would be caused by a normal veridical perception of something, ...producing, at the receiving end in the mind, exactly the effect of such a conscious perception."
However, I think the main problem with Bostrom's argument is an epistemological one: It supposes an entire outer world, about which we have no evidence and know nothing. It's like opening Sagan's garage[1], but instead of asserting an invisible dragon, you're asserting an entire universe. It is the least parsimonious hypothesis you could make, because it doubles the complexity of the universe!
For example a bit contrived example: if we try to find the next Mersenne prime (or something similar, computationally hard but easy to check thing (e.g. anything NP complete)), and we use millions of computers to do that, and the simulators do not have it precomputed already - then the simulators either have to compute it too to provide the proper sensory input (the mersenne prime found) or alter our mind not to do this...
If we are inside a simulation, there are too many variables that are beyond our control. What are 'we'? are 'we' 'humans'? Or are 'we' 'programmed' to 'think' so? what is a 'thought'? What is 'mind'? What does it 'mean' by 'fool' 'your' 'human' 'mind'?
Not that we're currently being replicated by our actual descendants, but by our higher level's descendents.
Eventually ofc hitting the base case where the simulation cannot support further simulation (which might be us, if we never manage to successfully simulate our own universe, with whatever hacks and approximation we can find).
And ofc, if we are a simulation of a higher level's history, and the simulation is correct (to all necessary degrees), then we must be heading towards the sane point where we would render a simulation (unless the approximation fails to support it).
So if level 1 managed to simulate, then all further levels (until base) should also simulate.
And if level 1 can simulate, then it probably will.
Even if a universe-scale simulation is physically possible, why should we expect it to faithfully repeat the same sequence of events that happened in the "outer" universe?
Leaving aside the question of why a civilization would want to try to simulate its own history, it seems very unlikely that it would be possible to reconstruct the initial conditions to get such a simulation started. The current physical state of the universe is the result of billions of years of thermodynamically irreversible processes. Furthermore, there are vast regions of the universe that interacted in the past, but are now permanently beyond each others' cosmological horizons due to the expansion of the universe. A faithful historical simulation would require precisely reconstructing staggering amounts of information, and even with the physicist's concept of "infinitely advanced technology", it's hard to imagine how such a thing could be done.
As for verifying the accuracy of the simulation, you only need information about the initial state of the universe (think CMB radiation) and partial information about past states of the universe to reproduce a selected region of universe with certain level of precision.
A single human body contains on the order of 10^27 atoms. If you just wanted to record the state of someone's mind, with sufficient fidelity to be worthy of the term "resurrection", you could probably get away with a coarser granularity. But you're talking about accurately simulating a chaotic system, which means you need extreme precision to prevent the simulation from diverging.
More to the point, it's unlikely that the information you're seeking still exists, even in principle. Think about Conway's Game of Life; the rules are injective, meaning many different initial states can lead to the same final state. An being who lived in the Game of Life would never be able to precisely reconstruct its history with any level of technology, because there would be an astronomical number of equally possible predecessor states. (As far as we know, our universe is continuous, not discrete, but the laws of thermodynamics have a similar effect.)
Furthermore, in a strict sense my question would be 'Is it possible to extract additional information with any degree of certainty about the past state of some region of the universe, using simulation algorithms and partial information about past states of this region?'
This assumption doesn't need to go to the atomic level on the first try. If you can replicate distribution of mass on the scale of galaxy clusters as compared to the present day using the above approach, it would certainly prompt further research in this area.
Unless the purpose of the simulation is to observe a civilization which never achieves simulator capability or chooses not to use such for political reasons but still attains other technologies comparable to theirs in power.
"But it is impossible to completely simulate a system from inside that system" - This is true, so if we WERE in a simulation you would expect some kind of 'fuzziness' to exist in most of the universe, perhaps collapsing into more exact points when important, a kind of 'uncertainty principal' :O.
The protagonists use a powerful laser to bounce a pulse of energy off an exoplanet. This forces the entities who (it emerges) are simulating the universe (or maybe just our local portion of it) to massively increase the accuracy and extent of the simulation, so that the returned pulse behaves as physically expected. Previously they had been simulating the remote star system in a low resolution way due to the lack of observers there. The sudden need to increase the simulation's extent and resolution overwhelms their computational resources and the simulation crashes. A resource exhaustion attack on "reality", in other words.
Then you go back and iterate again, eventually improving the accuracy of simulation until there is no distinguishable difference between simulated state and real past state.
The simulation might end up being not a perfect copy, but it would reach the point where it will be impossible to find any discrepancies.
I don't buy it. Even simulating just the earth and its environs would probably require a computer as big as a galaxy worth of matter. There's just no conceivable payback that could ever be worth the costs.
Yes, simulating Earth to sufficient precision might require resources of the Type III civilization. However, if something can be done, why shouldn't it be done?
The payback is twofold, actually:
First, you can get provide the meaningful afterlife to your ancestors.
Secondly, once you have hardware and software to simulate a virtual universe, you can create a multitude of them, with different properties and qualities. Think of the same logic behind splitting the physical computer into virtual machines.
I haven't heard quite that argument before. Couldn't it just be simulated slower than real-time? Or is memory the issue?
But to be completely accurate, a simulation must include all the energy expenditures and entropy of the system being simulated. So the math can never add up.
The "real time" in simulation is not affected by how long a single time step takes to evaluate in the real world.
Moreover, there's a difference between "the universe is a simulation" in the sense used in the article and "my conscious experiences are a simulation." The latter is unconstrained by "number of qubits in the universe." The apparent complexity of this universe you think you're inhabiting isn't real, and neither is Scott Aaronson.
It doesn't follow that all of these possibilities are equally likely, so I do not buy this line of reasoning
The simulation argument, going back to Bostrom, relies on two flaws.
1) It leverages our optimism to corrupt our understanding of statistics and logic. It essentially says that if you think humanity doesn't destroy itself, then our descendants will probably try to simulate us. But of course if you just take a statistical view of the potential future ordered states of the universe, there are FAR more potential future states in which we don't exist, than states in which we do. The chances we are living in a simulation now are equally as small.
2) Bostrom hypothesizes that our descendants will try to simulate us. But it is impossible to completely simulate a system from inside that system--that's basic thermodynamics. So simulation proponents argue that our simulated reality is running in a more complex universe than we experience. But if that is the case, then the beings running the simulation are not our descendants! They're the descendants of whatever more complex beings came before them. Once again the central logic of the argument fails.