Isn't this sort of a "solved" question, in the sense that we know there's only so much a computer can do? The practical answers are, of course, reputation systems and incentivization systems like escrow. Both of those are areas of active research.
I thought the point of crypto-contracts was to make enforcement as automatic as possible...if that is not fully true, are there any neutral verifications services that can hold things in escrow?
You are right. This is why these things will not go anywhere. Ultimately they need some kind of "back up"... For example, the system we currently have flows like so: Nation state Military > Federal Police > Local Police > Physical Intimidation via face to face meeting. At every step, stop when lawyers and/or politicians get involved.
We already have well-established mechanisms to arbitrate these kind of disagreements, e.g. courts. Adding blockchains to the process just makes it more complicated for no gain.
However when I tried some Ethereum development my impression was that most cryptocurrency people I met just hope that the value of their bitcoins goes up, or that they can sell related products or services. Many things seem to be financed by cryptocoin-money (not necessarily bad in itself) to keep the hype going, but it doesn't feel like a movement that wants to change things.
It's not like with open source where Stallman, Linus and many many other dreamt a dream but also built a lot of really high quality and important software. I don't see that kind of movement going on with Ethereum.
If an arbitration clause isn't held up, it's not because of unpredictability of the court it's because the clause runs afoul of the actual law/code the court applies which is predictable. Moreover, smart contracts are not going to permit parties to circumvent law, in other words a smart contract arbitration clause would not be enforceable in a jurisdiction they are not otherwise enforceable.
Has no one addressed the basic need of a justice system with these crypto currencies?
> that brings on a whole new level of reputation-economy things you have to think about.
We already have an inscrutable, unaccountable, super-intelligent system that can do that - the courts, the police...
Of course, this is entirely insufficient to do something like "put your corporation on the blockchain".
No reason an arbitration clause couldn't be included in the contract.
Ethereum contracts are turing complete. The payout function can be contingent on either the buyer or arbitrators releasing the funds. The arbitrators can be determined before hand or rely on an external contract that offers arbitration services. The possibilities are truly endless.
How long is the discovery period? What about "returns"? What if the arbitrator is working with the seller and scams me? When does "I have a big gun and I am not afraid to use it" come into the function?
> The arbitrators can be determined before hand or rely on an external contract that offers arbitration services.
And how much will those services cost? Who vets the arbitrator? What is my recourse if arbitration fails?
> The possibilities are truly endless.
Yes, I agree. This is just built for a place that does not yet exist.
It might help if 'contracts' and payment amounts were small. In the Antifragile (book) sense: the fairness of any individual contract is fragile, rife with risk. However, in aggregation the system is antifragile (better than robust) as long as occasional bad deals are acceptable.
Sovereign sanctioning and alot of capital
SEC hasn't challenged it yet though but I mean, you can be rich and bring your project to the world.
As enthusiastic as I remain about the overall premise of equity replacements issued on cryptographically secure ledgers (including Etheruem, which I started with by running the educational channel Ethercasts), I don't see anything in this presentation that indicates that the massive challenges regarding nation-state regulation have been solved.
Even were one to go on the premise that one can effectively run this in a sandbox away from standard nation-state regulation, one has the more general problem of enforceability of contracts, etc. If I hire you via a crypto-contract but then you don't deliver the associated goods, what recourse do I have?
This and related effects caused ~2 years of delays in my own implementation.
I'll note I remain optimistic and positive about all related efforts in this field.