Host web
LogLevel QUIET
ForwardAgent yes
ProxyCommand setsid lxc-attach -q -n web01 --clear-env -- /usr/sbin/sshd -iThat design certainly lets lxc-attach permit only running sshd, though, which is a benefit. (And I forgot about sshd -i, which you could presumably point at a UNIX socket using socat or something.)
1. ping hasn't needed to be setuid since Linux 3.0 (and isn't on most distros), the kernel lets you call socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_ICMP) without privileges, which lets you send ping packets and nothing else. Looks like Mac OS X and FreeBSD, at least, also support the same interface. This approach has successfully been used to eliminate other setuid binaries like pt_chown, which fixes ownership of a tty (the kernel now just sets the ownership correctly when you call open).
2. Use something like ForceCommand to allow "ssh root@localhost /sbin/ping", and make /bin/ping a shell script that does that. This carries strictly less complexity than making a setuid binary; any attack that applies to it also applies to setuid binaries, but the execution environment for setuid binaries is more open to the attacker's control.
3. Make a little ping server that you can request to conduct pings for you. For ping in particular this is probably silly, but for things like updating utmp (traditionally you make every program setgid utmp, or you use a helper setgid binary called utempter), there's probably some existing daemon like logind that can grow some small APIs.
# chmod 0711 /bin/ping # setcap CAP_NET_RAW=eip /bin/ping
We would all be better off if we designed systems such that some helper process, already running with the right environment / config / privileges, spawns the process for you and proxies input/output to your terminal.
And (as I mentioned in the other thread) this helper process could be literally sshd. Instead of having sudo, ssh root@localhost. No weird process trees with confusing things like effective UIDs. Instead of having runc exec, ssh root@container. No file descriptors get passed that aren't explicitly forwarded over the SSH connection.
Patching sshd to run over UNIX sockets without encryption and to use getpeername() for authentication is left as an exercise to the reader.