The only way to stop font-based side-channels is to limit the web to a fixed set of fonts: and that will horribly break the web in some linguistic communities where there's a fair amount of web content that relies on specific fonts (that typically map old Windows codespaces to other characters for support for their language, often before Unicode covered those characters).
You also need identical fonts for a given user agent, and that's very hard to guarantee short of shipping your own fonts (e.g., consider an OS update that changes a font!), and that becomes expensive fast.
So, yeah, to disable that you'd have to entirely disable the CSSOM, which would cause ridiculous amounts of breakage.
I agree that implementing this first in Tor is probably not a good idea, but if Firefox were to do it first, then I don't see the problem. "They're a Firefox user" isn't nearly as specific information.
I'd bet that Chrome would follow quickly, which would put pressure on Apple to do the same. If that happened, we'd have a minor victory.
All I'm trying to do is reduce information that is needlessly leaked out by a browser. True privacy still requires more.
There's no reason for browsers to make a large number of fonts available if websites aren't able to use them because not all browsers make them available.
However, there may be an issue with internationalisation.
Based on that alone, it seems that just replying back with either a blank font list or the minimal standard font list (e.g. only Times & Arial) would solve most of this problem.
I'd love to see the Firefox team fix that first.