Your "summary" leaves out the key points. The SeaDaddy, X-Agent, and X-Tunnel tools used in these attacks have only been used by two groups, using the same control servers each time, on European, American, and World Anti-Doping Agency targets that the Russians had strong motive to attack, with some of the attacks being attributed to Russia by multiple other means.

If it turned out that Russia was not behind these attacks, the scale of the bad publicity for Crowdstrike, Fidelis, Palo Alto Networks, etc. would nearly put them out of business. Unlike you, they have skin in the game and don't make these claims lightly.

The problem with relying upon motive and established MO exclusively is that anyone is therefore capable of framing whomever they like.

This is the next generation of warfare, attribution is simply impossible. Even if there existed actual forensic evidence it could not be relied upon.

Reacting to purported attacks at face value will leave you like a 1-layer chess player, potentially acting on behalf of your adversary.

As I said above, the attribution does not rely solely on motive. All private security firms that analyzed the attack have attributed it to Russia, and they would not stake their reputations on such a flimsy argument.

all private security firms ? name one, please

I named three in my first comment above. There are also Mandiant (FireEye) and SecureWorks. Previous attacks with the same malware were attributed to Russia by Threatconnect and Microsoft, who calls the "Fancy Bear" group "Strontium."

> X-Tunnel

That one is more likely to be used by the Chinese: https://www.invincea.com/2016/07/tunnel-of-gov-dnc-hack-and-...

That document is yet another example of laughably poor security analysis.

The Chinese implementation of the XTunnel protocol is in Java (the GitHub project is written in Java, and you can see an embedded JRE in your blog post's link to the Chinese tool in the strings here: https://cynomix.invincea.com/sample/e2101519714f8a4056a9de18...). The FancyBear implementation is not (no embedded JRE here: https://cynomix.invincea.com/sample/f09780ba9eb7f7426f93126b...).

If you want to see how professionals do it, take a look at https://www.eset.com/int/about/newsroom/research/dissection-....

I have personally written that exact tool while learning Python. A RAT using Twitter for C & C. Uses PGP for encryption and verification. The twitter handles for the C & C change based on a hash of Googles lastest Doodle so you can access it without fear of account deletion.

TIL I'm as good as a state level intelligence team.

Hey CIA/NSA we know you are reading this, my contact info is in my profile. Hire me.

Tomorrow: "Cyberhacker admits to Russian hacker tools"

> Yesterday, an Internet cyber hacker using the alias "cmdrfred" claimed on "HackerNews", an elite underground hacker site, that he or she personally built the hacking tools used by Russia to breach the DNC email servers and change the outcome of the recent election.

> "I have personally written that exact tool [it] uses ... encryption ... so you can access [the DNC] without fear."

> "I'm as good as a state level intelligence team."

> cmdrfred went on to taunt American intelligence agencies while admitting that he was aware that elite anti-cyberhacking teams from the NSA and CIA were monitoring his operations.

> The owner of HackerNews Paul Graham -- venture capitalist, flamboyant playboy, and known Russian sympathizer -- could not be reached for comment.

> TIL I'm as good as a state level intelligence team.

Not to totally ignore the pithiness, but I feel like your comment touches on something I see a ton here (and elsewhere): an offhand dismissal of the 'state level' intelligence capacity.

At the end of the day, the systems were exploited. That more sophisticated methods went unused should be a measure of efficiency and not necessarily execution. Why break out the trick play if your opponent can't keep from you running it up the middle?

True. But the absence of sophistication constitutes evidence neither in favor nor against the "State Actor" hypothesis.

Until a Russian name or IP address is provided, the accusations fail to hold water. An incomplete proof is equivalent to "'cause we said so"

If you are targeting a US political entity, using a staging server in Russia probably isn't the worst idea, so unless the IP address directly ties to the Russian government/intelligence services, it's still only weak evidence of Russia's involvement.

Spoofing ips is absurdly easy.

I agree that IP addresses aren't good evidence but it isn't really possible to spoof TCP in practice.

http://security.stackexchange.com/questions/55279/how-easy-i...

>hat more sophisticated methods went unused should be a measure of efficiency and not necessarily execution. Why break out the trick play if your opponent can't keep from you running it up the middle?

I question how efficient it is to get caught red handed in the cookie jar of the worlds only super power.

Sure Vladimir Putin could invite President Obama to a state dinner and then proceed to blow his head off with an AK-47 but that would lack the subterfuge I expect from "state level actors". If this is indeed the Russians, they are as laughably incompetent as our elected officials in regards to infosec and thus a threat to no one.

Publicly assassinating the president of a country is slightly different then pilfering clumsily guarded emails of campaigning politicians. One starts world wars. The other doesn't.

I'd like to believe that it won't.