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Re:CHVote: Open-source e-voting system from Switzerland by geofft on Wednesday December 14, 2016 @04:02PM (#13179630)
> public cryptographically verifiable ledger

This is a thing you actively don't want. You don't want to be able to prove to anyone else how you voted. Otherwise it would be absolutely trivial for your boss to say, "So, you voted for that anti-union candidate, right?" (Or your boss to not say that, but just happen to give promotions to people who show proof of voting the way the boss wants.)

The right to a secret ballot is demanded by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Yes, this renders the electronic voting problem - and honestly the voting problem in general - very close to impossible. That's why it's hard.

Re:CHVote: Open-source e-voting system from Switzerland by smokeyj on Wednesday December 14, 2016 @04:21PM (#13179771)
>> Put a thousand pre-known keys in a hat, one thousand people draw keys from a hat, the key is activated on the blockchain and points to a user-defined voting wallet. Now you have anonymous cryptographically verifiable voting with double spend protection

I just invented a scheme to anonymize votes in 5 minutes. I'm sure if smarter people tried we could definitively solve this. I'm not convinced this is hard as much as people are saying it's hard.

Re:CHVote: Open-source e-voting system from Switzerland by geofft on Wednesday December 14, 2016 @07:24PM (#13181118)
1. As others said, the private key proves how you voted. If you can verify it with the private key, you can show the proof to someone else. And if it's a single-use private key, there's no reason for me not to share the private key once I voted.

You need to have deniability; I need to be able to revoke my ability to prove how I voted, and moreover I need to be required to revoke it (otherwise I can be compelled not to revoke it). Right now, I am unable to leave the voting booth with any receipt of how I voted, even if I wanted to (i.e, even if someone else wanted me to). I can see my vote, and election monitors prevent anyone else from seeing it until it leaves my hands. In most places in the US, I can't even take a cell phone photo of my votes, and that's a good thing because nobody can ask me to take a cell phone photo of my votes.

2. If they're pre-known, anonymous, single-use keys, nothing prevents a corrupt election official from keeping a copy of the key and voting before the voter gets home. The voter has no way to prove that they didn't vote and that someone stole their key.

Re:CHVote: Open-source e-voting system from Switzerland by patmorgan235 on Wednesday December 14, 2016 @09:23PM (#13181834)
a solution to 1 would be ring signatures as used by many crypto note base currency. They group unrelated input and outputs to give all the parties involved plausible deniability to who paid what to who. So your vote would be mixed with a group of others so no one can tell exactly who vote for just that the right number of votes were cast.
Re:CHVote: Open-source e-voting system from Switzerland by tangent128 on Wednesday December 14, 2016 @04:39PM (#13179899)
To prevent coercion, it's not sufficient to allow anonymity; you have to disallow means by which a person can prove how they voted.
Re:CHVote: Open-source e-voting system from Switzerland by smokeyj on Wednesday December 14, 2016 @08:03PM (#13181388)
How true is this? Somebody could just take a picture of their ballot (under the threat of violence presumably). Sure they're not supposed to, but at this point we're relying on legislation - where the legislation could say employers aren't allowed to ask for employees voting wallets. Maybe I'm missing something.
Re:CHVote: Open-source e-voting system from Switzerland by vertex-four on Wednesday December 14, 2016 @08:32PM (#13181564)
If you mess up your ballot sheet, you can ask for a replacement - at least in the UK. Your original ballot sheet gets recorded specially as having been replaced, and you get a new one which gets counted. The result is that you can discreetly take a photo of your ballot sheet and then go ask for a new one if you're being threatened.
Re:CHVote: Open-source e-voting system from Switzerland by geofft on Wednesday December 14, 2016 @08:55PM (#13181692)
The penalty for taking a picture of your ballot is on you, not the person asking for the picture, and it's at the time the record is created, not when someone asks for it. So, it's perfectly plausible and defensible for me to say "There was a poll monitor, I couldn't take a ballot selfie, sorry." That is much simpler than saying "Hey, 911, my boss just asked me for my ballot proof."

(The other thing is that photos of ballots have only become a serious threat in the last few years, and at the moment there's not really voter coercion through those photos, as far as we know. If it becomes a problem, I expect a bigger crackdown on it.)

Re:CHVote: Open-source e-voting system from Switzerland by vertex-four on Wednesday December 14, 2016 @04:34PM (#13179860)
So how does this stand up to "show me the private key you used"?
Re:CHVote: Open-source e-voting system from Switzerland by specialist on Wednesday December 14, 2016 @06:57PM (#13180963)
I just invented a scheme to anonymize votes in 5 minutes.

Tada!

Re:CHVote: Open-source e-voting system from Switzerland by smokeyj on Wednesday December 14, 2016 @07:41PM (#13181240)
Having a bad day? Just need a little attention? I'll talk to you, specialist :)
Re:CHVote: Open-source e-voting system from Switzerland by caspianm on Thursday December 15, 2016 @04:04AM (#13183363)
What about postal voting? Probably less of a threat because it's not that common I guess. But does it mean there are no countries complying with secret ballot demands?