CHVote: Open-source e-voting system from Switzerland

Re:CHVote: Open-source e-voting system from Switzerland by geofft on Wednesday December 14, 2016 @07:24PM (#13181118)

1. As others said, the private key proves how you voted. If you can verify it with the private key, you can show the proof to someone else. And if it's a single-use private key, there's no reason for me not to share the private key once I voted.

You need to have deniability; I need to be able to revoke my ability to prove how I voted, and moreover I need to be required to revoke it (otherwise I can be compelled not to revoke it). Right now, I am unable to leave the voting booth with any receipt of how I voted, even if I wanted to (i.e, even if someone else wanted me to). I can see my vote, and election monitors prevent anyone else from seeing it until it leaves my hands. In most places in the US, I can't even take a cell phone photo of my votes, and that's a good thing because nobody can ask me to take a cell phone photo of my votes.

2. If they're pre-known, anonymous, single-use keys, nothing prevents a corrupt election official from keeping a copy of the key and voting before the voter gets home. The voter has no way to prove that they didn't vote and that someone stole their key.

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Re:CHVote: Open-source e-voting system from Switzerland by patmorgan235 on Wednesday December 14, 2016 @09:23PM (#13181834)

a solution to 1 would be ring signatures as used by many crypto note base currency. They group unrelated input and outputs to give all the parties involved plausible deniability to who paid what to who. So your vote would be mixed with a group of others so no one can tell exactly who vote for just that the right number of votes were cast.

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