They'll keep you in prison until you hand over the data. You'll hand over the data. They'll keep you in prison because they plausibly think you still have the real data.
the problem these guys are facing is not the encounter.
its that the images and video can incriminate and cause repercussions for people not at the scene but stored on the camera.
such as those guys with you ak47s you are complaining about who were helping the journalist get their story of governmental abuse of power.
or that police officer confessing his coworkers corruption.
I was just thinking of a slightly wider use case than 'I am Laura Poitras and am concerned about interference from US state actors'.
To but it differently - what would (possibly) help a poor PJ facing down a truckload of IS would also help Laura Poitras.
After all, some guys with AKs may help you get a story on the abuses of other guys with AKs - who may see things differently.
(Though I'll admit I think that is a moot point in many situations - say, reporting from Raqqa it isn't very likely that anyone you encounter would believe you if you showed them all the wonderful decoy photos you'd taken of the shot-out remains of all the touristy sights - and not a single photo showing anything which could be construed as aiding one side or the other in the conflict.)
bit strawman?
what they are asking for isn't technically difficult or even that expensive to develop.
Strawmen's got nothing to do with it; I just don't see why one should try to make a product with an unneccesarily limited set of use cases.
a) Encrypted storage would be a benefit for both Laura Poitras and just about anyone else; true.
b) Adding steganography does not put Laura Poitras at a disadvantage; however, it may provide a benefit to other users under other use cases. Also, it is not technically very difficult or even that expensive to develop.
c) To some users, the existence of encrypted, visible files could be just as bad - perhaps even worse - than unencrypted files; after all - you are basically showing the person challenging you that you've got something to hide.
So - I think adding the option of plausible deniability will add negligible complexity while making the potential user base larger, thus making a camera (or memory card) incorporating this technology more commercially viable - benefitting both the Laura Poitrases and the others. No strawman.
"This is too limited because it doesnt help people taking the camera"
when the whole problem has nothing to do with taking the camera and everything to do with what happens afterwards.
the equivelent to "there is no point in encrypting your banking transactions because it wont stop someone stealing your wallet on the street"
-> typical strawman.
A strawman would be me saying something like "This is a good idea, but it is obvious it needs quantum cryptography to succeed, and as we all know, that is hardly commercially available in a form factor you could incorporate in a digital camera, hence the idea will never fly." (Yes, this is taken almost ad absurdum - but, hey, this is the Internet, after all. :))
Me arguing that this is a good idea which could be even better at no disadvantage to Poitras et al and for negligible extra development, however, is hardly a strawman.
Then again, I may be misunderstanding you altogether; English is my third language and I am struggling to understand what you mean when you suggest that I (paraphrased) say "This is too limited because it doesn't help people taking the camera"
Even Poitras' suggestion is intended to help once someone has taken the camera; you do not need encryption or anything per se as long as the camera is in your possession. (Assuming it is offline!) - It is when someone - be it the US Govt, a competitor, your friendly neighbourhood grunt, some guerilla in a disagreeable part of the world has taken it that limiting access to the images/footage is necessary.
not a million miles from
->I think you'd still only have a solution which is workable against a very limited set of adversaries - namely, the ones who play by the rules, more or less.
which is exactly why i said "a bit strawman"
perhaps where we differ is you think encryption only keeps information safe from those who play by the rules?
-No, that is not what I think and neither is it what I've been trying to bring across.
Let's just put it on the account of poor communication skills (at either end).
You've been posting quite a few comments that break the site guidelines. We ban accounts that do this, so please read the rules and follow them:
In other words - not the kind of people you're likely to meet in many locations.
Simply _being_ in an area carrying camera gear is often enough to warrant suspicion. As concealing cameras and shooting often isn't a workable solution, plausible deniability -as to what is actually on your card, that is - you shooting can hardly be disputed- remains your best bet, IMHO.
If whoever challenging you can tell you've got photos/video but are unable to display them - well, if I were the grunt with the Kalashnikov, I'd just take that as admission of guilt, clobber you with the camera before taking the memory card and smiling my smuggest smile.
Better still if you have redundant storage so that you can give away a card while keeping your exposures.
(When younger, I practiced, practiced and practiced changing film in my SLR until I could do it in a few seconds, with the camera behind my back. Why? If I happened to attend a gig whose management had a less than enlightened photo policy, I'd just shoot a couple of quick bursts, lower my camera, change film and give the roll to my accomplice. If house security came and shook me down, I'd just shrug, sigh that they got me this time - and wait for them to ask for the film, then reluctantly rewind and hand it over.
Pretty good success rate.