Reason - we haven't solved basic issue of endpoint security yet!
There is always that aspect of it, it someone can get a hold of a box of ballots and somehow slip those into the process, it would be easy to circumvent any machine that relies on a paper audit trail.
A double entry system where you get your paper ballot optically scanned and you also place your vote into a independent system maybe even an electronic one could provide a better check against having just one system as a point of failure?
The larger the election, the more manual counters you will have. Which means the more people you would have to influence in order to rig an election.
Widespread vote manipulation of electronic systems much, much easier to keep a secret.
What do you mean? Doesn't it just requiere to perform a few divisions?
I don't understand what you mean. Why specifically can't we use the technology he describes?
> Have you ever tried to inpelement a modified d'hont method manually?
Where in the U.S. is that method used?
Is one threat greater than the other? I actually think the threat of vote payment is lower due to the the high risk of the illegal act being exposed. But this is strictly intuition and I have no actual knowledge of the matter.
Edit: in the article, they describe a receipt method that matches your description. But the voter doesn't retain it.
I like the type of machines we have in Connecticut. There is a paper ballot that is filled out and then scanned optically. We get a paper ballot that acts as an audit trail. There is always the possibility that the optical scanner contains a bug or something, but the 2000 election showed that even mechanical machines have flaws if not maintained.
I would not prefer the touch screen voting machines as there are always reports of the machines switching the vote. It just seems like more can go wrong with those machines.