Wouldn't you say DJB (et al) did that themselves? https://tweetnacl.cr.yp.to/
Compare theirs: https://tweetnacl.cr.yp.to/20140427/tweetnacl.c
To mine:
https://gitlab.com/higan/higan/blob/master/nall/elliptic-cur...
https://gitlab.com/higan/higan/blob/master/nall/elliptic-cur...
https://gitlab.com/higan/higan/blob/master/nall/cipher/chach...
https://gitlab.com/higan/higan/blob/master/nall/mac/poly1305...
https://gitlab.com/higan/higan/blob/master/nall/hash/sha256....
Please note that like BearSSL, my implementations are alpha-quality. Further, I'm not suggesting anyone use these in production. If I do so myself and it blows up in my face, it'll only have harmed me, and I'll only have myself to blame.
(Also, I'm really bad when it comes to source code comments, sorry. The why really needs you to read the research papers; the how is mostly self-evident. The remaining one-letter variable names were used to match the papers, and because I couldn't think of more descriptive terms.)
[1] shameless plug: https://github.com/duneroadrunner/SaferCPlusPlus
It's just full with con-/de-structor noise and don't even get me started with virtual function calls.
I'm not advocating everyone and their mother implement their own crypto. But some software diversity is a good thing. These algorithms aren't quite as scary or fickle as the documentation and existing implementations make them seem. Especially if you stick to good software like DJB's stuff.
For instance, using montgomery/edwards curves instead of weierstrass curves eliminates a lot of the difficulty in writing a constant-time implementation of ECC. And the 25519 implementation comes with a fast, constant-time implementation of a prime field type.
Yet even DJB's stuff can be simplified. You can knock off a good 80% of the scary code at a cost of a mere 10% of performance. To Google or Facebook, that may be unacceptable. But to me, that's entirely worth it. Now you have a tiny library that is easy to understand, and easy to audit.