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Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by JoachimSchipper on Monday October 17, 2016 @03:28PM (#12728549)
Those results do not really inspire confidence. Shipping an ancient version of zlib without patching, ever, is an avoidable mistake. The GOST 28147-89 cipher basically cannot be used with XTS due to the cipher's 64-bit block size, which should have been caught by a good crypto engineer.

Also, the most significant new work - the UEFI support - seems to have quite a few issues.

Note that, despite the color-coding, the list of fixed issues is not the list of critical (red) issues!

Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by FieryTransition on Monday October 17, 2016 @06:23PM (#12730350)
Valid points, though I would consider the requirements for writing really secure software quite high, so I do not think most open source projects could meet such standards. Maybe it could be compared to developing mission critical software, like Nasa for example. The amount of resources and rigor they use to get bugs out of the code is out of the scope of most free/donation software projects. There are probably a few open source projects which gets close to being considered secure though, mostly those which are very used and backed by big companies or foundations.

So we have Veracrypt as the 'good enough' option right now and ease of use, but you shouldn't happen to know any secure alternatives? You seem to know a bit about this.

Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by nickpsecurity on Monday October 17, 2016 @09:10PM (#12731233)
"though I would consider the requirements for writing really secure software quite high, so I do not think most open source projects could meet such standards. "

Data from prior work indicates it ranges considerably from significantly harder to extremely hard. The LOCK system with an Orange Book A1 development process was highly secure and gave cost breakdown. A1 assurance acyivities added around 37% or so on top of regular, labor cost. Altran/Praxis's Correct-by-Construction that does highly-assured systems with mix of Z specs, Ada, SPARK, reviews, and testing costs 50% premium on top of normal development. Just using SPARK automatically knocks out whole classes of bugs. Galois did and open-sourced CRYPTOL so people can specify algorithms in easy DSL then generate C from it. Also parser and protocol generators.

So, prior evidence shows it takes specialized skill and domain knowledge... at least two extra people unless one has both... but otherwise costs 30-50% more time. Like Cleanroom methodology, it partly achieved this by saving you time debugging and refactoring due to reduced bugs in general plus doing fixes earlier in lifecycle.

Most OSS projects dont do this stuff just because they dont know it's necessary, don't care, or don't have staff for both demanded features and assurance activities. Interestingly, there's more high-assurance products in proprietary than FOSS software despite the huge labor advantage FOSS has. That there's little of even medium-assurance work in majority of both says even worse things about IT's priorities or apathy given medium assurance cost little to nothing. Microsoft is the one exception of big, software houses via SDL and MS Research's work. For FOSS, DJB, OpenBSD, and SQLite come to mind.

Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by FieryTransition on Tuesday October 18, 2016 @11:18AM (#12735290)
Thanks for the info, did some searching based on your comment and I managed to find a report made by Altran/Praxis detailing the development process and technologies for a tokeneer ID station implementation they did for the NSA. Very interesting stuff. http://www.adacore.com/uploads/downloads/Tokeneer_Report.pdf

It really shows the amount of resources and knowledge required for actually having safe or secure systems.

Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by nickpsecurity on Tuesday October 18, 2016 @12:35PM (#12736142)
Glad you enjoyed it. Remember Praxis' method next time some fool says you can't engineer software. A few companies like them do. They're now just called Altran. The Tokeneer link was good since they published the source code on AdaCore website for people to learn from. However, the highest-security thing they did was the CA below under UK equivalent of EAL6/7. http://www.anthonyhall.org/c_by_c_secure_system.pdf

Example of new one for model-to-code-to-ASM verification https://www.umsec.umn.edu/sites/www.umsec.umn.edu/files/hard...

LOCK project was pretty landmark in all that it accomplished with Sidewinder firewall & SELinux being in its ripple effects http://www.cyberdefenseagency.com/publications/LOCK-An_Histo...

The B method is one of most successful in industry. You'll definitely see the engineering aspect in this one. http://www.methode-b.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2012/08/...

Cleanroom was early one in 1980's (start at p13) https://www.sei.cmu.edu/reports/96tr022.pdf

Note: Cleanroom had excellent results at low cost but disappeared for some reason. I saw someone recently combine Python with Cleanroom with good results. Cleanroom's compositional style means something like Haskell + QuickCheck could be great combo. If anyone tries it, let me know about the results.

Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by JoachimSchipper on Tuesday October 18, 2016 @03:52AM (#12732795)
Really secure software isn't easy to write. But we're not holding the VeraCrypt developers to a higher bar than the one they've set for themselves.

For disk encryption, use whatever comes with your system. If you have no preference, Microsoft's BitLocker is excellent - it can incorporate hardware security features such as a TPM, self-encrypting (OPAL) SSD, it's somewhat easy to administer, etc.

Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by GordonS on Tuesday October 18, 2016 @06:18AM (#12733237)
If you are on Windows 10, the Home edition doesn't come with BitLocker - so your choice is to upgrade to Pro or use something else, such as VeraCrypt.

I think it's probable that both can be broken/bypassed by state actors - I'd be happy to use either as a defence against everyone else though.

Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by krylon on Tuesday October 18, 2016 @07:55AM (#12733583)
> For disk encryption, use whatever comes with your system.

I acknowledge this is likely a super-niche problem, but if you want to use an encrypted thumb drive (or external HDD/SDD) to access data from Windows, Mac and Linux machines, there is almost no alternative. Is there any realistic alternative?

And BitLocker, even if you are on Windows is not completely trouble-free - on Windows 7, e.g. to my knowledge only the Ultimate/Enterprise editions support it. Windows 7 Pro does not.

Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by acqq on Tuesday October 18, 2016 @10:16AM (#12734518)
Regarding BitLocker, even on Windows 10 Pro, you can't encrypt the virtual disk and put it on the DVD or BlyRay and later read from there directly (why? because MSFT). That means it's not suitable at all for longer-term archiving.
Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by pjc50 on Tuesday October 18, 2016 @04:50AM (#12732967)
Bitlocker is excellent in a commercial environment, but the question some people are concerned about is how it might handle state-level threats. Although I suspect after Windows 10 techies would find that consideration moot, there are quite a lot of human rights people still using it for the usual reasons.
Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by hannob on Tuesday October 18, 2016 @06:16AM (#12733229)
If your threat model is that you assume your OS vendor is part of the attack then you can't use a proprietary OS.

There's probably no free OS either that can give you the confidence level you'd want, because you probably would want to have reproducible builds, a trustworthy update process (preferably with some kind of transparency log), a wide array of exploit mitigations (aslr/pie/pic, grsec kernel, maybe CFI). There's currently no free OS offering all of those.

Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by keithpeter on Tuesday October 18, 2016 @07:59AM (#12733597)
Just out of interest: is there any OS that offers all of those? Libre/Open Source/Free or proprietary (latter with source access I assume)?
Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by JoachimSchipper on Tuesday October 18, 2016 @05:41AM (#12733093)
If BitLocker seems riskier to you than VeraCrypt, might I suggest you recalibrate your threat model? See e.g. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8193364.
Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by Cthulhu_ on Tuesday October 18, 2016 @06:33AM (#12733292)
Open source or not shouldn't be a constraint for spending resources and effort on code; it'd just mean development would be a bit slower and more tedious. But we're dealing with encryption here; if there's anything that should be done slowly, tediously and with an enormous amount of OCD, it's encryption software.
Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by 2bitencryption on Monday October 17, 2016 @05:02PM (#12729728)
TrueCrypt inspired confidence in me because the way the dev team operated displayed true expertise and professionalism. Maybe I perceived that incorrectly, but that's how I felt.

VeraCrypt has always seemed like someone swooped down and forked TrueCrypt the moment it became abandoned, to grab all its faithful users.

Now, that's a bit dramatic, and probably not entirely true. But that's how it always felt to me -- ANYONE can just fork TrueCrypt. Why should I trust these guys in particular?

Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by mhogomchungu on Monday October 17, 2016 @05:16PM (#12729854)
TrueCrypt went belly up in May,2014[1]

VeraCrypt 1.0 was released in May,2013[2]. One year prior.

[1] http://truecrypt.sourceforge.net

[2] https://sourceforge.net/u/yanpas/veracrypt/ci/VeraCrypt_1.0b...

Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by bad_user on Monday October 17, 2016 @11:13PM (#12731741)
VeraCrypt is currently maintained by Mounir Idrassi, which is like a real person with a name. VeraCrypt is also actively developed, the big issue solved in version 1.8 being to add support for UEFI GPT drives, which is actually a big deal.

TrueCrypt was developed by an anonymous developer that vanished, abandoning the project. Funny how trust works.

Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by paavokoya on Monday October 17, 2016 @05:25PM (#12729924)
The way in which TrueCrypt "became abandoned" does not inspire confidence as well. Considering they left a cryptic and very strange exit note that many perceived as a notice of law enforcement activity.
Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by goatsi on Monday October 17, 2016 @06:38PM (#12730453)
The strongest evidence I have seen is that the developer was arrested by the DEA on unrelated charges.[0]

The full story about him is fascinating and well worth the read.[1]

[0] http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-strange-origins-...

[1] https://mastermind.atavist.com/

Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by acqq on Monday October 17, 2016 @08:41PM (#12731123)
It's not a developer of TrueCrypt but of E4M. At the time TrueCrypt was developed Le Roux was busy with doing crimes.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/E4M

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Le_Roux

Although TrueCrypt existed since 2004 he ordered his employees around 2007 to use E4M (which would be improbable if he really developed TrueCrypt). The developer (or developers) of TrueCrypt isn't publicly known.

Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by Nition on Monday October 17, 2016 @06:10PM (#12730256)
If anything that cryptic abandonment actually gave me more confidence in TrueCrypt. Was it so hard to crack that the government shut it down?
Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by paavokoya on Monday October 17, 2016 @06:24PM (#12730358)
I meant confidence in what came after it. Meaning the likelihood of a backdoored and/or weak software was likely.
Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by Nition on Monday October 17, 2016 @06:38PM (#12730454)
Ah I get what you meant now, I agree. If some entity already had their eye on TrueCrypt and had shut it down, you wouldn't expect them to let a copycat pop up unless it was less secure.
Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by tptacek on Monday October 17, 2016 @06:34PM (#12730431)
This is the "NSAKEY" of open source crypto conspiracy theories.
Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by quickben on Tuesday October 18, 2016 @01:03AM (#12732244)
As far as I recall, there are 8 bytes set to zero in the TC header at a very curious location.
Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by tptacek on Tuesday October 18, 2016 @08:05AM (#12733620)
That's always how these worst backdoors begin... with curious patterns of zeroes. How better to zero out a key than with actual zeroes. Nobody will ever suspect!
Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by leeoniya on Monday October 17, 2016 @07:22PM (#12730722)
> Note that, despite the color-coding, the list of fixed issues is not the list of critical (red) issues!

yikes, one hell of an oversight

Re:The VeraCrypt Audit Results by whamlastxmas on Monday October 17, 2016 @11:42PM (#12731876)
UEFI support is HUGE. So happy to see this. Finally we're nearing a feasible open-source solution for FDE on modern laptops running Windows.