I'm guessing the guy has a bank account, regular direct-deposit income, good credit, shops in places where they take credit cards, and has some financial literacy that helps him keep that all straight. Anyone missing any of these would prefer to have the cash option available to them at least some of the time. (All of which is in agreement with your 'classist' claim against the author.)
Do you have a source for this? In the US, transactions over a certain limit have a paper trail; many transactions adding up to over that limit raise tons of red flags.
The point is that you don't need an anonymous transaction when you payment or bribe is (technically) legal.
Deregulation of industries (say, electricity [0]) did not happen just to introduce creative or legal accounting fraud. Do you have any sources for your claims, or just hearsay/personal thoughts?
[0] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deregulation_of_the_Texas_el...
I'll assume you're already familiar with the legal, quasi-legal, and illegal ways money is moved into offshore accounts. The details change over time as regulators catch up, and I believe there has been some progress in recent years at stopping some of these practices.
> just to introduce
Of course not. There were many (profitable) reasons deregulation happened.
If you want a good critique of Rogoff (something that is easy to generate), Google [brad delong ken rogoff].
I believe you're missinterpreting my attempt to quote the title. I probably could have written that part better, maybe?
Which one was that?
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/divided-court-strikes-down...
That's one obvious example that specifically allows bribery as long as it is not directly a quid pro quo exchange. Buying access and influence, on the other hand, was “a central feature of democracy—that constituents support candidates who share their beliefs and interests, and candidates who are elected can be expected to be responsive to those concerns.”
> In a series of cases over the past 40 years, we have spelled out how to draw the constitutional line between the permissible goal of avoiding corruption in the political process and the impermissible desire simply to limit political speech. We have said that government regulation may not target the general gratitude a candidate may feel toward those who support him or his allies, or the political access such support may afford. “Ingratiation and access . . . are not corruption.” Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U. S. 310, 360 (2010). They embody a central feature of democracy—that constituents support candidates who share their beliefs and interests, and candidates who are elected can be expected to be responsive to those concerns.
I.e. it's not corruption if LGBT rights advocates donate heavily to get Hilary Clinton elected, and it is not corruption if she is responsive to their concerns once in office. Nor does it become corruption just because you replace a viewpoint you approve of with a viewpoint you do not approve of (i.e. when you substitute "farmers" for "LGBT rights advocates").
The case itself is also much narrower than you imply. McCutcheon v. FCC involved a challenge to the aggregate contribution limit. I.e. the law that said you couldn't contribute to a 10th candidate because you hit the aggregate limit, even if you stayed under the individual contribution limit (which is currently $2,700).
The Court started with the premise that Congress could not Constitutionally preclude people from trying to influence elections, or reduce the ability of one group to influence elections in order to increase the relative influence of other groups. It acknowledged that Congress can prevent bribery, or the appearance of bribery, but held that the aggregate limit did not achieve that purpose. If giving $2,700 to 9 candidates does not create the risk of corruption, the court reasoned, how does giving $2,700 to a tenth candidate do so?
What McCutcheon did not do is overturn the individual limit. Under the Court's reasoning, the result may well have been very different if the petitioner tried to contribute $10,000,000 to the same candidate.
That's a point of view of someone who has never lived near the poverty line or other economically problematic situations. If you deal in cash without a bank account, $100 bills, while not particularly common, are not rare either. Accusing these people of being lawbreakers simply because they have crappy jobs, are bankrupt, pay their rent in cash, etc is highly offensive (and classist).
> That suggests the bills are circulating mainly in the underground economy.
So what? Underground does not mean illegal.
> If the biggest bill were worth $10, rather than $100, delivering someone a million bucks under the table would require a 220-pound chest rather than a 22-pound briefcase.
No, it would require something like a check or money order, creative accounting, and possibly an offshore bank account or two. Bribery, laundering, and other financial crimes are not generally done with cash; they happen on the books, often through legal means. Did this "Harvard economist" miss the SCOTUS rulings that de facto legalized bribery?
> Forcing people to use smaller bills, Rogoff argues, might make crime more conspicuous and less convenient.
No, it merely moves many types of petty crime into barter and alternative economies. The higher-value crimes (usually) don't use cash.