Second, this vulnerability cannot be used to compromise user accounts or data, let alone with or without their interaction. It is a social engineering attack that could work, yes, but the Google Vulnerability Rewards Program is specifically designed to reward researchers for reporting technical security vulnerabilities, not those leveraged through social engineering.
Third, this is a rabbit hole. Google's core functionality is redirecting users to third party websites. You can just as easily send someone a link to a Google redirector that occurs in the browser when you click on a search result. It's not feasible to prevent this, and it's not feasible to prevent social engineering in general.
Bug bounty programs require a hard line somewhere in order to function. In order for an attack to be acceptable, it must have a clearly demonstrable foundation in a software implementation failure. It must be clearly defined as a logic error, not an error in human reasoning. The only cases where open redirection and social engineering are eligible are those where they are simply peripheral - an actual technical vulnerability that allows these attacks to scale far beyond manual means (an example might be a technical failure in Facebook's linkshim service).
I am disappointed in seeing that this story has risen to the top of the HN front page, because I believe there isn't a single security engineer here that would agree this is a technical vulnerability that should be eligible for a reward.
I just meant "serious" in the general sense of the word, like the way that a bullet would in the stomach is serious, even though one in the head is more serious.
> Google's core functionality is redirecting users to third party websites
I'm pretty sure that Google's core functionality is ads, which don't require the user to actually be actually visiting pages Google.
Pertaining using Google for social auth, the user is actually expecting to go back to the site they just came from, whereas when they login to update their credit card they're logging in to stay on Google, which means that a page that looks exactly like Google...
How long this functionality remains on the site will be a better indicator. My guess is not long, esp after the publicity.
To continue your analogy more accurately, open redirection is not a gunshot wound, it's a cold.
You have got to be kidding me... So we're completely going to ignore that everyone is still using Google as a search engine, and not ads? You're making things up just to get your point across.
If you want to talk about Google search, it's obvious, as a user, that when you click a link in the results you're going to be going to the URL that the link points to (even if Google changes the URL when you click it for tracking purposes, there shouldn't be much room for confusion).
I 100% disagree.
There was a time when people didn't think XSS was a serious vulnerability too.
Most web developers in general are way too casual about a lot of attack vectors, and this is just one more example of that.
If every vulnerability is "serious", then none of them are, and the word loses its meaning and people stop responding to it.
If not every vulnerability is "serious" but open redirection is, what do you call something like command injection or SQL injection? "Double-plus serious"?
I understand that developers need to take security seriously, but that effort is undermined by being hyperbolic about vulnerability severity. No one is trying to say open redirection isn't a vulnerability, it's just not all that...well, serious. Fix it, but it's not a hair on fire problem.
Your statement implies there's an unlimited number of these but there aren't. SQL injection is worse than open direction, but storing your passwords and CC data in plaintext and leaving your root account SSH-able on port 22 with no password is worse than SQL injection. Just because there's something worse than X doesn't mean X is not bad.
The important thing here is open redirection is a stupid, optional behavior and there's no good reason for it. It shouldn't be there. Allowing it is just as stupid as allowing XSS. It's just lazy and sloppy and frankly inexcusable for a company like Google, which should be held to a much higher standard than a mom and pop web store that sells cat figurines.
So your stance is the first option, that basically any security vulnerability is serious. The grand majority of vulnerabilities are much simpler to fix than they are to find; once you find them, fixing them is generally straightforward. Given that we are using fundamentally different and incompatible definitions of the word "serious", we are obviously going to continue to disagree on this point. Perhaps it would help if I reframe this for you - there are vulnerabilities which warrant an on-call engineer being woken up at 4 am, and there are those which do not. Further, there are vulnerabilities which need to be fixed this week and those which can wait until the next feature release. If you don't like my use of the word "serious", hopefully you'll find that more agreeable. I don't think we are arguing over the same point anymore.
You continue on to attack Google for having this vulnerability, but I don't think you have spent much time doing vulnerability research if you react that way about a company of Google's size. The sheer codebase alone basically guarantees every type of vulnerability will be found. Furthermore, being antagonistic about it in the way that you are is not conducive to recognition or remediation. Attempting to shame companies or engineering teams is counterproductive to developer awareness and education. At the end of the day, this is just a specialization and your job is not to be mean to them for making mistakes, it's to try to improve their understanding and help them resolve the issue while avoiding it in the future.
Sometimes I wonder if I'm too much paranoid, but your carelessness just prove me right and I will keep NOT trusting your company.
I'll sum it up as: "Google is not outside of the mainstream in their assessment."
I get 6.5 .. that seems kind of serious.
I strongly recommend people avoid CVSS. Pentesters with clients that require CVSS in reports spend an extra couple minutes on every vuln in that silly calculator trying to figure out how to make XSS come out to sev:med and logout CSRF to sev:info.
It's not great, but do you have something better?
If you browse the vulnerabilities listed by CVSS for random Linux utilities, for example, you'll find the same vulnerability listed several times with different ratings despite them apparently having the same exploitation requirements and final impact ("authentication not required, remote attacker, potential user data compromise", etc).
Then it will generally go on to give a vague explanation that is absent any real exploitation details and simply link to five different websites that all copy-pasted the same SecLists disclosure verbatim.
Basically, it's crap, and it exists because the information security industry is bifurcated into two different industries - the risk folks and scanner Rockies who don't have any real technical competency but who love to have things like the CISSP and those who actually know what they're doing in the trenches of technical penetration testing and security audits.
The industry unfortunately attracts two distinct crowds - people who can and do develop actual software, but who specialize in security, and people who can talk the talk and have a vested interest in the pomp that comes along with crappy guidelines.
If you asked a real vulnerability researcher like Tavis Ormandy to CVSS score any of his findings, he'd probably laugh. His disclosures are usually verbose precisely because this is an industry that should be nuanced.
Just because we have nothing better does not mean we should heed an abysmal system.
Part of my comment was directed at the fact that the mainstream standards of security for web developers (speaking as one myself) are too low.
Also: WordPress is far outside the mainstream of security practice; they are, and have been for coming up on a full decade, a running joke in the field.
Nobody says that about Google.
If you're saying that you meant the mainstream of security professionals specifically, I'd be interested in what a survey of security professionals had to say about open redirect. For me it's clearly a potential attack vector, and Google's specific implementation is obviously sloppy and lazy. I can't see any security professional worth their salt giving it a pass.
As far as Google not being a running joke, that's true and it's all the more reason it's surprising they are so dismissive of concerns about their way too broad whitelist.
(XSS is the canonical sev:medium, for what it's worth).
Maybe it's functionality for Google to change to prevent social engineering for susceptible users, but it's not something that deserves a bug bounty.