I get 6.5 .. that seems kind of serious.
I strongly recommend people avoid CVSS. Pentesters with clients that require CVSS in reports spend an extra couple minutes on every vuln in that silly calculator trying to figure out how to make XSS come out to sev:med and logout CSRF to sev:info.
It's not great, but do you have something better?
If you browse the vulnerabilities listed by CVSS for random Linux utilities, for example, you'll find the same vulnerability listed several times with different ratings despite them apparently having the same exploitation requirements and final impact ("authentication not required, remote attacker, potential user data compromise", etc).
Then it will generally go on to give a vague explanation that is absent any real exploitation details and simply link to five different websites that all copy-pasted the same SecLists disclosure verbatim.
Basically, it's crap, and it exists because the information security industry is bifurcated into two different industries - the risk folks and scanner Rockies who don't have any real technical competency but who love to have things like the CISSP and those who actually know what they're doing in the trenches of technical penetration testing and security audits.
The industry unfortunately attracts two distinct crowds - people who can and do develop actual software, but who specialize in security, and people who can talk the talk and have a vested interest in the pomp that comes along with crappy guidelines.
If you asked a real vulnerability researcher like Tavis Ormandy to CVSS score any of his findings, he'd probably laugh. His disclosures are usually verbose precisely because this is an industry that should be nuanced.
Just because we have nothing better does not mean we should heed an abysmal system.
Part of my comment was directed at the fact that the mainstream standards of security for web developers (speaking as one myself) are too low.
Also: WordPress is far outside the mainstream of security practice; they are, and have been for coming up on a full decade, a running joke in the field.
Nobody says that about Google.
If you're saying that you meant the mainstream of security professionals specifically, I'd be interested in what a survey of security professionals had to say about open redirect. For me it's clearly a potential attack vector, and Google's specific implementation is obviously sloppy and lazy. I can't see any security professional worth their salt giving it a pass.
As far as Google not being a running joke, that's true and it's all the more reason it's surprising they are so dismissive of concerns about their way too broad whitelist.
(XSS is the canonical sev:medium, for what it's worth).
I'll sum it up as: "Google is not outside of the mainstream in their assessment."