As opposed to all the other CAs, which are also controlled by governments. Every CA has some person or group of people who are able to cause certificates to be issued, and that person or people can be compelled to produce certificates at the whim of their government.
> CA certificates themselves are hurtling towards "free", especially now that we have Let's Encrypt
Not that Let's Encrypt's security model is … to trust unsecured DNS. So it's strictly worse than DNSSEC.
> * Major browsers are implementing HPKP and static key pinning, so that once you see a certificate for a pinned domain, your browser remembers and screams bloody murder if it changes unexpectedly. Someone who attempts to get a domain-validated certificate to hijack Google Mail will, in the best case, succeed only in getting the CA dumb enough to do that kicked out of the Chrome and Firefox root trust store.
I think pinning is orthogonal to DNSSEC: one might implement both DNSSEC and it.
> * Google and others are coordinating efforts to monitor certificate issuance, not just using certificate pins but also with initiatives like Certificate Transparency, which involves cooperation from CAs that Google has repeatedly shown willingness to require as a condition of being included in their trust store.
One might, of course, do the same thing with DNSSEC, and then come to understand which nation-states actually do break DNS and which refrain from doing so, rather than spreading FUD about them.
That's because it's not a solution. There isn't a non-political solution.
By making it explicit rather than implicit one is forced to confront the truth, and be honest about it. .com is owned by the United States; .ru is owned by Russia; .ly is owned by Libya; .io is owned by the United Kingdom.
If we got rid of non-DNS CAs (for host-verification purposes, anyway), it would, however, mean that only the U.S. may legally suborn .com, .org &c.; that only Russia may suborn *.ru, and so forth. That's a pretty big win over the present situation, in which every government who can lay its hands on a CA employee can get a certificate for any site in the world.
The USG's ownership of .COM does not in fact enable them to intercept Google Mail requests. The reason it doesn't is that if you get a CA to issue a bogus Google Mail request for surveillance purposes, Google will put your CA out of business.
Chrome has mid-high double digit market share. No matter what the DNS hierarchy says, and no matter what some random CA says, Chrome ships knowing what a valid certificate for Google Mail looks like. When you try to tell Chrome something is a Google property that isn't, Google finds out, and they take action.
It used to be they only did this for non-Google properties if you asked them nicely. But now there's a protocol that automates it, called HPKP.
HPKP does not give a fuck what government is currently in power in Libya. If a CA starts issuing bogus .LY certs, that CA probably isn't going to be issuing certificates for .LY --- or many anything else --- for much longer.
This helps everybody, not just the people running Chrome. IE doesn't support HPKP. But every single person running Chrome is participating in a certificate surveillance system that will light up if someone makes the mistake of feeding them a bogus cert.
Google is also getting the ball rolling on Certificate Transparency, which directly monitors all certificate issuances from participating CAs. Browser vendors have shown a willingness to force CAs to participate if they make any mistakes at all.
This is a problem that is in the process of being solved. DNSSEC is a MONUMENTAL STEP BACKWARDS. Thankfully, it isn't going to happen, but we can make that not-happening even clearer and faster by noticing when people talk positively about DNSSEC and then challenging them.
> Chrome has mid-high double digit market share. No matter what the DNS hierarchy says, and no matter what some random CA says, Chrome ships knowing what a valid certificate for Google Mail looks like. When you try to tell Chrome something is a Google property that isn't, Google finds out, and they take action.
And this situation won't change with DANA.
> HPKP does not give a fuck what government is currently in power in Libya. If a CA starts issuing bogus .LY certs, that CA probably isn't going to be issuing certificates for .LY --- or many anything else --- for much longer.
If they control DNS for domain, they can change MX records for verification and buy certificate in any legitimate CA.
Equally importantly: DANE doesn't actually solve any problem we have today. HPKP does. Why would you spend a penny, let alone tens of millions of dollars, to deploy something that is a step backwards for our security? What's the point?
Regarding MX records: I think you need to re-read the post, its FAQ, or the comments on this thread, because it's been addressed ad nauseam.
In worst case DANE is equally secure as current CA system (ok, except that weak RSA, but I hope it will be fixed soon). Why you want to keep CAs, when you have to waste resources on constantly monitoring and punishing them, while with DNSSEC you can ditch them? In both systems DNS root zones owners can buy/generate certificates for child zones. This was also addressed ad nauseam.
Will it? If the USG orders Symantec to issue a bogus certificate, will Microsoft, Apple, Google, Mozilla & Opera all refuse to accept Symantec certs? If the PRC orders CNNIC to issue a bogus certificate, will they all refuse to accept CNNIC certs?
I grant you that they could; I just don't think it's very likely. Sure, DigiNotar was put out of our misery, but it was small and marginal.
I agree with you on the crypto of DNSSEC. Where I disagree is that there is any meaningful ownership structure of DNS names other than … the DNS hierarchy. DNS is feudal: the holder of foo.bar holds it at the pleasure of the owner of bar; the holder of quux.foo.bar holds it at the pleasure of both foo.bar & bar. Ignoring those facts is IMHO silly, and forces sloppy thinking.
People want multiple things out of the CA system, which is part of why it's so terrible. One of those is tying hosts to real-life identities. DNSSEC is indeed terrible at that. Another is tying hosts to hostnames; DNSSEC at least attempts to do that (as you note, not terribly well, although maybe it's fixable).
DANE is a scheme whereby TLS certificates are stored in DNSSEC-signed DNS records.
The conventional nerd wisdom is: this is fantastic, because it's a step towards replacing the totally broken CA system with something that technical people can take direct control over. I like that story too.
Unfortunately, the conventional wisdom is totally wrong. DANE does not eliminate CAs. Even in a world where DANE is universally deployed in all browsers (no browser does it today --- and several tried, and then removed support), we will still have CAs. What DANE will give us is a bunch of new CAs: one for every TLD, and one at the root. Don't take my word for this: Adam Langley, TLS superhero of the Chromium team, wrote an excellent blog post explaining why.
But it gets worse. Those new CAs DANE deployed? They are controlled overwhelmingly by world governments. The most popular DNS TLDs are all legally bound to the governments of the FVEY IC. Here again you don't have to take my word for it: all you have to do is look at what the DOJ did to file sharing sites by asserting its control of the DNS.
Lots of things are happening behind the scenes to make the train wreck of Internet trust a little better:
* CA certificates themselves are hurtling towards "free", especially now that we have Let's Encrypt
* Major browsers are implementing HPKP and static key pinning, so that once you see a certificate for a pinned domain, your browser remembers and screams bloody murder if it changes unexpectedly. Someone who attempts to get a domain-validated certificate to hijack Google Mail will, in the best case, succeed only in getting the CA dumb enough to do that kicked out of the Chrome and Firefox root trust store.
* Google and others are coordinating efforts to monitor certificate issuance, not just using certificate pins but also with initiatives like Certificate Transparency, which involves cooperation from CAs that Google has repeatedly shown willingness to require as a condition of being included in their trust store.
DNSSEC is not one of those things. It's a broken protocol, an attempt to deploy decades-outmoded cryptography across the backbone of the Internet, and, in the very best case, a bit of security theater.
This, to me, is one of the rare cases where I think random end users who aren't in the unofficial cabal of TLS library maintainers, ISP operators, or standards committee members can make a real difference in Internet security.
Don't let people pretend that DNSSEC is a good thing just because the name ends in SEC. When you see people cheerleading DNSSEC deployments, challenge them. DNSSEC deployment is failing, and has been failing for something like 15 years now. Let's try to keep it that way!