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Re:The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) TLS... by tptacek on Tuesday August 30, 2016 @08:00AM (#12389217)
DANE does harm HPKP. Part of the point of HPKP is that when pins are broken, browsers can punish CAs. You can't punish the TLDs that way. HPKP assumes agility. DANE removes agility.

Equally importantly: DANE doesn't actually solve any problem we have today. HPKP does. Why would you spend a penny, let alone tens of millions of dollars, to deploy something that is a step backwards for our security? What's the point?

Regarding MX records: I think you need to re-read the post, its FAQ, or the comments on this thread, because it's been addressed ad nauseam.

Re:The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) TLS... by garaetjjte on Tuesday August 30, 2016 @11:39AM (#12391112)
With DANE there will be no CAs, so yes, there will be no CAs to punish. But owners of root zone can already change DNS records to buy certificate in any CA, and you cannot punish them for that because they aren't required to do any validation above checking DNS records for non-EV certs.

In worst case DANE is equally secure as current CA system (ok, except that weak RSA, but I hope it will be fixed soon). Why you want to keep CAs, when you have to waste resources on constantly monitoring and punishing them, while with DNSSEC you can ditch them? In both systems DNS root zones owners can buy/generate certificates for child zones. This was also addressed ad nauseam.

Re:The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) TLS... by tptacek on Tuesday August 30, 2016 @01:40PM (#12392161)
At this point we're just repeating ourselves, so I think we're done.