The USG's ownership of .COM does not in fact enable them to intercept Google Mail requests. The reason it doesn't is that if you get a CA to issue a bogus Google Mail request for surveillance purposes, Google will put your CA out of business.
Chrome has mid-high double digit market share. No matter what the DNS hierarchy says, and no matter what some random CA says, Chrome ships knowing what a valid certificate for Google Mail looks like. When you try to tell Chrome something is a Google property that isn't, Google finds out, and they take action.
It used to be they only did this for non-Google properties if you asked them nicely. But now there's a protocol that automates it, called HPKP.
HPKP does not give a fuck what government is currently in power in Libya. If a CA starts issuing bogus .LY certs, that CA probably isn't going to be issuing certificates for .LY --- or many anything else --- for much longer.
This helps everybody, not just the people running Chrome. IE doesn't support HPKP. But every single person running Chrome is participating in a certificate surveillance system that will light up if someone makes the mistake of feeding them a bogus cert.
Google is also getting the ball rolling on Certificate Transparency, which directly monitors all certificate issuances from participating CAs. Browser vendors have shown a willingness to force CAs to participate if they make any mistakes at all.
This is a problem that is in the process of being solved. DNSSEC is a MONUMENTAL STEP BACKWARDS. Thankfully, it isn't going to happen, but we can make that not-happening even clearer and faster by noticing when people talk positively about DNSSEC and then challenging them.
> Chrome has mid-high double digit market share. No matter what the DNS hierarchy says, and no matter what some random CA says, Chrome ships knowing what a valid certificate for Google Mail looks like. When you try to tell Chrome something is a Google property that isn't, Google finds out, and they take action.
And this situation won't change with DANA.
> HPKP does not give a fuck what government is currently in power in Libya. If a CA starts issuing bogus .LY certs, that CA probably isn't going to be issuing certificates for .LY --- or many anything else --- for much longer.
If they control DNS for domain, they can change MX records for verification and buy certificate in any legitimate CA.
Equally importantly: DANE doesn't actually solve any problem we have today. HPKP does. Why would you spend a penny, let alone tens of millions of dollars, to deploy something that is a step backwards for our security? What's the point?
Regarding MX records: I think you need to re-read the post, its FAQ, or the comments on this thread, because it's been addressed ad nauseam.
In worst case DANE is equally secure as current CA system (ok, except that weak RSA, but I hope it will be fixed soon). Why you want to keep CAs, when you have to waste resources on constantly monitoring and punishing them, while with DNSSEC you can ditch them? In both systems DNS root zones owners can buy/generate certificates for child zones. This was also addressed ad nauseam.
Will it? If the USG orders Symantec to issue a bogus certificate, will Microsoft, Apple, Google, Mozilla & Opera all refuse to accept Symantec certs? If the PRC orders CNNIC to issue a bogus certificate, will they all refuse to accept CNNIC certs?
I grant you that they could; I just don't think it's very likely. Sure, DigiNotar was put out of our misery, but it was small and marginal.
I agree with you on the crypto of DNSSEC. Where I disagree is that there is any meaningful ownership structure of DNS names other than … the DNS hierarchy. DNS is feudal: the holder of foo.bar holds it at the pleasure of the owner of bar; the holder of quux.foo.bar holds it at the pleasure of both foo.bar & bar. Ignoring those facts is IMHO silly, and forces sloppy thinking.
People want multiple things out of the CA system, which is part of why it's so terrible. One of those is tying hosts to real-life identities. DNSSEC is indeed terrible at that. Another is tying hosts to hostnames; DNSSEC at least attempts to do that (as you note, not terribly well, although maybe it's fixable).
That's because it's not a solution. There isn't a non-political solution.
By making it explicit rather than implicit one is forced to confront the truth, and be honest about it. .com is owned by the United States; .ru is owned by Russia; .ly is owned by Libya; .io is owned by the United Kingdom.
If we got rid of non-DNS CAs (for host-verification purposes, anyway), it would, however, mean that only the U.S. may legally suborn .com, .org &c.; that only Russia may suborn *.ru, and so forth. That's a pretty big win over the present situation, in which every government who can lay its hands on a CA employee can get a certificate for any site in the world.