This reminds me of the PlayStation 3. It remained an un-hacked console for so long and the theory goes that the people who wanted to tinker with it could do so without being forced to fight on the same side as the bad guys, because Sony allowed 'Other OS'. When Sony closed off 'Other OS', this gave incentive for people to actually try and jailbreak the system [1].
Yet now the people that just wanted to tinker had to take the same route that people who just wanted to pirate would have to take. By locking the platform down further, Sony only succeeded in merging the two camps (benign tinkerers and pirates). I think there's a lot of validity in this theory.
It's a tough choice. As an iOS user I've long since come to the same acceptance as you - that the added security is worth the extra restrictions. Yet it doesn't have to be this way. Protecting your platform from hackers shouldn't be the same as protecting your platform from SNES emulators or games with adult themes.
[1] I believe it was this talk where this view was put forward, but I might be wrong (at work, can't really double-check): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PR9tFXz4Quc
- $1M Cash
- skilled working knowledge of Apple's software and hardware
- fast reflexes to quickly react and apply a newly-public exploit derived from any of the above
Together, the number of world-wide actors who fall into one of those categories is actually fairly large. Those all have the capability to have total 'access' to my device. Given the value (to me) and the amount of data on that device, that's a huge hole, even for the majority of people. Further, with these networked exploits, the distinction between having one individual targeted, and all individuals running that OS is actually fairly slight. It wouldn't take that much more work to spam a well-designed exploit against an entire class of (normal) users.
- a single person or committee with the authority to sign off on $1 million for this sort of thing.
- a willingness to risk the legal and PR consequences of being discovered.
Which cuts out a lot of potential corporate espionage
To mention a few ways: The buyer might want to recover the purchasing price by reselling. If its a government agency, they might want to establish credential with future sellers. Reverse engineers have a 1+ million dollars incentive, and they have a much smaller window to sell it before it becomes worthless.
Its like piracy. First its the group with so called FTP access. During that period of time, maybe a release is worth X amount of dollars, but whats the chance that it remains there and never reach a mass audience?
When you buy an iPhone, you don't own it. You are a sharecropper on Apple's OS license.
If you buy an Android with an unlockable bootloader, you own it. But if attacked, the adversary owns the device.
It's a shitty situation but it's hard not to recommend iOS to most users.
Signed boot has uses, but we need to be sure that the user does the signing.
Turns out, in Android 6, there's a Developer Option called "Allow OEM Unlock" which does enable the ability to unlock the bootloader through fastboot.
While I can't sign my own bootloader, having a developer option to enable the unlock that can only be triggered from inside the OS is an interesting trade off.
By jailbreak, you really mean "vulnerability" and unfortunately those are quite common in the Android hardware/software/bootloader realms.
Apple's walled garden and "moral" approach to guarding their garden is incredibly frustrating, but the sheer number of vulnerabilities affecting different levels of the Android stack is so disheartening. This is true of my PC/Mac as well, all it takes is someone to plug in a malicious USB stick and it'll infect the firmware on the USB host, and that's it, game over. Can spread from there to disk firmware, also growing increasingly complicated and opaque, and who knows where else.
It's reaching a point where I trust my iOS device more than any other, depressingly because of the walled garden. I can't build suitable fences around my kit myself to protect myself against every new vuln (now even monitors can have their firmware exploited and screenloggers installed), giving up trying and sacrificing some freedom for that sense of security is terrible, but feels like the only logical course of action at this point.
But empirically the iOS ecosystem is demonstrating that there is a close source ecosystem with better security properties than the open source one. Security advances the same virtues of user self determination as open source does.
On iPhone, user-mode exploits may remain sandboxed, unless they break from sandbox too. On jailbroken iPhones, that last step may be pre-made for them.
On Android, user-mode exploits may remain sandboxed too, unless they break from the sandbox - same as iPhone. On rooted Android devices, the last step may be pre-made for them.
You can not compare stock iPhone and rooted Androids - just like you can not compare jailbroken iPhone and stock Android.
So yes I feel safer now.
Edit: As for net effect on global society, I think having my phone be part of a botnet that sends spam is less impactful than disrupting democratic progress.
State actors usually have their own opinions about what's legal and what's not, and they tend to give themselves the benefit of the doubt because... the mission must succeed! So no, this "undergrounding" should not make you feel safer. You never know when you're going to cross paths with the next Snowden or any whistleblower or human rights activist.
If there is ever a point when you feel the need to rise up, but can't because you gave in to government and corporate surveillance and lock down in the first place, that would be a pity.
It is more and more clear that to accept Apple's security (which seems to be getting better, but obviously still insufficient) I must also accept Apple's commercial limitations to the use of a device I own. And I suppose that the dividing line between the ability to exploit a vulnerability and to 'have control' is a sliding scale for every user: one man's 'obvious' kernel exploit is another man's 'obvious' phishing scam.
It is not a new tension, but it does seem the stakes on both sides seem to be getting higher and higher - total submission to an onerous EULA vs total exploitable knowledge about me and my device. Both sides seem to have forced each other to introduce the concept of 'total' to those stakes, and that is frustrating. More-so when it's not yet clear which threat is greater.