Fundamentally different than the TSA lines I referenced. In Istanbul they have two security checkpoints, one brief one at the entrance to the airport itself and another further in similar to the TSA. The attackers mostly pushed their way through the first one and it ended up being a choke point for them. They didn't get near where the bulk of the people were.

> The Lockerbie bomber used a small cassette player filled with Semtex to kill 243 people -- aided by 90,000kg of jet fuel and 31,000ft of gravity.

Hence why I didn't discount it. Attempting to brings explosives onto a plane and setting them off seems like a far more difficult task than doing it in an area with a similar people concentration and zero people checking your bags.

The US government's approach is pretty obvious is to attempt to prevent attacks through various means (reducing risks at airpoint checkpoints, keeping tabs on ammonium nitrate sales, etc), pursing investigations of people deemed vulnerable to terrorist manipulation, and blunting the impact of anything that does happen. When you watch the public coverage when something happens, there's a few common narratives, and they are always focused on portraying the offenders as loners who "aren't taking orders" from anyone.

The initial bomb damage was a 50cm (20in) hole. Disruption of control systems (steering and stabilizer cables) lead to a pitch of the aircraft, aerodynamic forces of a 500kph (313 kn) airstream tore off the nose of the aircraft, parts of which impacted with and initiated further disintegration of trailing portions.

Again: fuel did not contribute to the damage inflicted on the aircraft.