News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by aappleby on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @03:24PM (#11956329)
Imagine that I visit a cloning facility that can flawlessly duplicate a human, memories and all. The techs there put me in a medical gown and sedate me, and a while later I wake up in an empty room.

Without any additional information, I have no way to determine if I am the clone or not. I know only that there is another me in the building somewhere, having the exact same thoughts as I am having right now.

In fact, I have no way to know if the cloning was even successful or not. There is no way for me to distinguish from this room if I am the clone, if the other copy was disintegrated, or if no copy was made at all. The room I'm in could be on Mars for all I know.

Does it make sense for me to worry about the fate of the other potential copy if I know absolutely that nothing of my essence has been lost either way?

Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by lhankbhl on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @03:29PM (#11956364)
Look at it like this:

You are placed in a box. Moments later, you are told, "We have successfully made a copy of you. We are sending it home now. You must be disposed of."

Will you allow them to dispose of you?

This is the question being posed, not whether a copy will have no idea if it is the original. The point is that it isn't relevant if one is a copy. No one was moved, it's only that a second person now exists and killing either is murder of a unique person.

(Again, uniqueness is not a question of whether these people will think or react to situations in the same way, but rather that there are two different conciousnesses at play.)

Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by cakoose on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @03:49PM (#11956484)
I think the fact that the original is kept around (and asked a question) might be complicating things.

For example, what if you were taken apart, your molecules were sent to Mars, and then you were reassembled exactly as they were? Would that be continuous consciousness?

If so, how is that different from the cloning option if your clone were assembled on Mars and the original were completely destroyed at the very same instant? (Or maybe the original were destroyed just an instant earlier.)

Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by lazzlazzlazz on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @03:52PM (#11956508)
The fact that the original is kept around is the entire point.

Let's say your molecules were taken apart... and that's it.

That's called "dying".

Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by mickeypi on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @04:34PM (#11956791)
Yes, and if we actually had a way to disassemble and reassemble humans, the reassembled beings would tell you that the experiment works and their consciousness goes back to their first memories as a child. But the disassembled person would have been destroyed and therefore unable to share their opinion on the matter.
Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by dietrichepp on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @09:52PM (#11958385)
This dodges the question. The question is not whether the original is destroyed, but whether it matters.
Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by mickeypi on Thursday June 23, 2016 @02:06AM (#11959157)
Sorry, that was intended to be implied. The original would say that it matters to them but to any observer it does not.
Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by gwright on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @08:30PM (#11958102)
And yet the atoms in your body are recycled over time. Your future self consists of an almost entirely different set of atoms as your current self.

I'm not sure how to reconcile this with the nature of consciousness, but it certainly makes for an interesting thought experiment.

https://www.quora.com/How-long-does-it-take-for-most-of-the-...

Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by fossuser on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @04:30PM (#11956753)
This reminds of some of the thought experiments in Sam Harris' book Waking Up.

This particular one reminds me of the teleporter example which is in this excerpt: https://www.getflashnotes.com/waking-up-by-sam-harris/ (just control-f for teleporter).

Basically our reasoning about identity is poorly evolved for duplicates. The closest we can come to feeling comfortable with it is going to sleep and waking back up. I think mostly because we're just used to doing that (since otherwise going to sleep and waking back up is similar to dying and coming back slightly different).

Was an interesting book overall - I'd recommend it.

Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by snom380 on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @04:47PM (#11956877)
Maybe I'm the odd one out, but if that was the original plan that I had intended, I wouldn't object to that (given that it was painless) - after all, minus that conversation the clone would be me "in spirit" if you will.

If I didn't consent to the cloning, that would complicate things. Likewise, my trust in the cloning process would proably affect my decision.

Or put it another way, let's say we live in a software simulation. Do you care whether our sysadmins live migrate our simulation over to a new Alien Web Services instance?

Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by exolymph on Thursday June 23, 2016 @04:41PM (#11964158)
This is exactly the question I was trying to pose. Thank you for expressing it so simply and elegantly.
Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by EGreg on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @03:38PM (#11956423)
This is all basic stuff. Think deeper.

You go to sleep every night. When you wake up the next day, how do you know you're the same person as yesterday? What does that mean?

Now consider if you didn't have memories of the past. What would make you "you"? The body would be the same but your amnesia would change things, eh?

Now what if you knew next week you would lose your memories for sure, but this week you can go on an amazing vacation. Does it matter where you go? It matters to your current self but to your future self.

Now think about sacrificing pleasure now so you can live a longer life. Or feel good about your life at 80.

Now think about the afterlife. What if you are reincarnated with no memories of the past? We already kind of established that "reincarnated you" wouldn't care about current you. But will current you care about reincarnated you?

Consider this: if a "future you" doesn't remember being "current you" how are they really different than a random person with a similar body who also has amnesia?

In short, long term, is it all about the memories?

What is the self preservation instinct about?

Finally the big one... if there were no conscious observers at all, in what sense would anything exist? That is, if I described to you a universe that you can never detect or deduce must exist from any observations in this one, how would saying "that universe EXISTS be different than saying it DOESN'T EXIST? It seems the word itself requires concious observers. Thus, the concept of consciousness and existence may be two sides of the same amazing conundrum.

Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by maldeh on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @04:33PM (#11956780)
Your comment made me recall this classic comic: http://existentialcomics.com/comic/1

I personally try to resolve this quandary in my head by defining my consciousness not as a single state at an instant in time, but rather a pattern over a time continuity - just as mass and matter occupies a continuum of space instead of a single point.

Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by snom380 on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @04:59PM (#11956985)
Going even deeper, from one moment to another - how do you know that you're you? After all, you're not _exactly_ the same, since each moment brings new experiences, ever so slightly changing your memories. Quantum entanglement, perhaps? If not, aren't we a collection of particles with a certain probability distribution that we're able to influence ourselves?

(Maybe this whole discussion is less interesting to Buddhists trained in not-self thinking. :)

Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by maxerickson on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @04:05PM (#11956579)
The classic question, if a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, do the air molecules still vibrate?
Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by jbattle on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @04:46PM (#11956866)
wait - didnt you just break the question? It's not about molecules vibrating, it's about whether the concept of "sound" has meaning without a hear-er
Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by maxerickson on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @05:12PM (#11957073)
It's just a throwaway snide remark about expecting metaphysics to have concrete answers for anything (It's not even coherent; if the air molecules don't vibrate without an observer, there probably isn't a tree or a forest either).

(metaphysics is still an interesting and useful exercise, but the state of not having an answer to a particular question isn't much more of a real conundrum than not having asked the question in the first place. I mean, when you are hungry, eating feels pretty good regardless of whether the food exists or not.)

Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by chongli on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @04:04PM (#11956576)
You know you're the same person as yesterday because without you, there is no knowing. A clone is no more you than an identical twin is you. What makes you you is the ability to ask the question in the first place. If you were dead, there would be no question.
Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by TheCoelacanth on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @04:24PM (#11956700)
I don't follow.

You know based on your ability to ask the question that you currently are you and not a clone of yourself, but you don't know that the person yesterday was you and not some other person that you were cloned from.

Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by chongli on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @05:00PM (#11956989)
but you don't know that the person yesterday was you and not some other person that you were cloned from.

The parent did not say anything about this and neither did I. Of course you cannot know whether you are a clone or not. My point is that if a clone is made of you and you are killed, you will be dead, you won't be the clone.

Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by TheCoelacanth on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @06:49PM (#11957662)
You both did.

> When you wake up the next day, how do you know you're the same person as yesterday?

> You know you're the same person as yesterday

Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by snom380 on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @05:04PM (#11957015)
Why is there no knowing without a you? Won't the clone know just as well as you that he's you?

What defines "you"? The matter you're made of?

Is it a particular arrangement of that matter? (Would you care if your neurons were replaced one by one, while keeping the same arrangement?)

Is it your memories, your thoughts, your inclinations?

Or is it something else?

Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by chongli on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @05:16PM (#11957092)
Because when I die (or anybody else dies), the universe ends for me (or them). The clone is just a different person who can't tell that he's not me. But he is him.

The only thing you can really know for sure is that you're still alive. When you're dead, you know longer have the ability to know.

Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by snom380 on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @05:19PM (#11957110)
I guess my question is, yes, you can know that you're still alive, but how can you know that you're still _you_?
Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by chongli on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @05:51PM (#11957315)
What a weird question. You're always you, until you die. Even if you became totally paralyzed, blind, deaf, etc. (total sensory deprivation) you'd still be you. All that is you is just the voice in your head, the ability to ask the question, and to think about an answer.

As for what happens to your body or anything else in the world? You can't ever get rid of those doubts. The only thing you can know without a doubt is that a doubter exists. Cogito ergo sum, as Descartes wrote.

Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by mikelevins on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @10:39PM (#11958520)
In context of the thought experiment there can be more than one person with equal claim to be the person that you believe yourself to be. For example, given the postulated copying technology there could be Two or ten or a hundred people with the same claim 91 you to be today's version of who you remember yourself to be. The only thing that makes one person's claim better than another's is a perceived continuity of physical substrate. But even that perceived continuity is at least partly a fiction, since the physical substrate isn't really the Same from one day to the next, or even from one moment to the next. Bits of it are always being swapped out, lost and replaced. It's a valid question to ask, in that context how do you know when you wake up that you're the same person who went to sleep? Why do you think you are the same person, as opposed to an entirely new person who happens to have inherited a particular batch of ingredients of memory for assembling a story about who you are?
Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by chongli on Thursday June 23, 2016 @05:37AM (#11959779)
My argument is that you don't really know other people, you only know yourself. Clones don't even have to be physical replicas of people, they need only be entities or systems which can pass the Turing test. The fact that a clone may think it is me makes zero difference to my friends who have no way of knowing and it makes zero difference to me because I can clearly see that it is a separate person from me.

Now, you could contrive a thought experiment where you clone me in such a way that neither I nor the clone know which one of us is the clone, but then, how is that any different in principle from babies switched at birth in a hospital?

Your memories don't define you, since they may be false. The only thing that defines you is your consciousness in the present. Everything else is I/O, and subject to interpretation and trust.

Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by mikelevins on Sunday July 03, 2016 @03:58PM (#12027367)
My point is that you don"t know yourself, either. You know in any given moment whatever self you have constructed from the sensations, emotions, inferences, and memories available to you. It "s conventional to assume that there is continuity with the selves that you remember, and that"s the default common sense position to take--a sort of pragmatic shorthand--but we don"t actually know that the continuity is real.

In fact, we do know that human memory is spectacularly unreliable, and, moreover, that it is a virtuoso liar, very accomplished at convincing us that we vividly remember things that never actually happened. It's proficient at rearranging memories and sensory impressions into ad hoc stories that we uncritically accept as true records of events.

From this point of view it seems a little over optimistic to me to say that we know ourselves, or to say that I know that the me of today is "the same person" (whatever I might mean by that) as the me of yesterday or last week or 1965.

Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by gyardley on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @03:32PM (#11956384)
Sure, as much as it makes sense to worry about the fate of any other independent human being - and perhaps even more so, if you feel more affinity with your copies than you do with random strangers.

I wouldn't use a facility that killed a stranger at random every time I used it, and I sure as hell wouldn't use a facility if it killed a living person who was identical to me.

Frankly, I don't see what your 'essence' has to do with it. Killing people is morally wrong.

Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by khedoros on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @04:52PM (#11956924)
> Killing people is morally wrong.

What about it, though? For the sake of argument, I'm not taking a position on whether it is or isn't wrong, I'm just looking for the "why". Ending a consciousness without either a defense motive or the permission of that consciousness (as in, violating the consciousness's right to life)? Depriving the world of a unique being? Causing damage to the human race by needlessly ending a human life? Release and/or destruction of a soul (or some other supernatural-ish argument)?

"Killing people is morally wrong" works for all of those reasons right now (and others, depending on your favored philosophy), but some of them are invalidated if we assume that we can make an exact copy of a person at a given point in time.

Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by gyardley on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @06:08PM (#11957417)
> What about it, though?

Violating the consciousness's right to life. I could be missing something, of course, but whether we can make an exact duplicate of a person at a given point in time doesn't seem relevant to this.

I'm curious why the answers to questions of this genre usually seem obvious to me, but clearly aren't obvious for everyone. I'm not implying any value judgement either way - perhaps I'm just a dullard. But I do wonder what the difference in mindset is.

Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by curioussavage on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @08:44PM (#11958151)
There are a few problems I see with this. Each individuals perspective is limited. That is only reason why your 'clone' might not know or care about those things.

As third party observers in that situation we would know that one is a 'copy' and we (or at least I) would care (and even object) to the killing of either one. From my perspective I can see that there are two distinct unique individuals having different thoughts saying different things and doing different things. Its when the 'clones' are still alive that you can tell that you have two different people now. Since they occupy separate space they will have different perspectives and experiences and different lives.

Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by unclenoriega on Wednesday June 22, 2016 @11:02PM (#11958594)
> From my perspective I can see that there are two distinct unique individuals having different thoughts saying different things and doing different things.

Can you though? Assuming the cloning process works, and assuming they wake up in identical rooms, why would they think, say, or do anything differently?

Re:The Cloned-Consciousness-as-Continuous-Consciousness Fallacy by dwaltrip on Thursday June 23, 2016 @01:33AM (#11959045)
Yes, because it wouldn't be possible to keep the environment "identical" for very long, so they would diverge.

Thinking about it more... I don't even think it is remotely possible to control the "initial conditions" perfectly enough (upon waking up), so they would diverge instantly. Sure, they might act very similarly, but it would quite clear that they are separate entities.