You are placed in a box. Moments later, you are told, "We have successfully made a copy of you. We are sending it home now. You must be disposed of."
Will you allow them to dispose of you?
This is the question being posed, not whether a copy will have no idea if it is the original. The point is that it isn't relevant if one is a copy. No one was moved, it's only that a second person now exists and killing either is murder of a unique person.
(Again, uniqueness is not a question of whether these people will think or react to situations in the same way, but rather that there are two different conciousnesses at play.)
For example, what if you were taken apart, your molecules were sent to Mars, and then you were reassembled exactly as they were? Would that be continuous consciousness?
If so, how is that different from the cloning option if your clone were assembled on Mars and the original were completely destroyed at the very same instant? (Or maybe the original were destroyed just an instant earlier.)
Let's say your molecules were taken apart... and that's it.
That's called "dying".
I'm not sure how to reconcile this with the nature of consciousness, but it certainly makes for an interesting thought experiment.
https://www.quora.com/How-long-does-it-take-for-most-of-the-...
This particular one reminds me of the teleporter example which is in this excerpt: https://www.getflashnotes.com/waking-up-by-sam-harris/ (just control-f for teleporter).
Basically our reasoning about identity is poorly evolved for duplicates. The closest we can come to feeling comfortable with it is going to sleep and waking back up. I think mostly because we're just used to doing that (since otherwise going to sleep and waking back up is similar to dying and coming back slightly different).
Was an interesting book overall - I'd recommend it.
If I didn't consent to the cloning, that would complicate things. Likewise, my trust in the cloning process would proably affect my decision.
Or put it another way, let's say we live in a software simulation. Do you care whether our sysadmins live migrate our simulation over to a new Alien Web Services instance?
You go to sleep every night. When you wake up the next day, how do you know you're the same person as yesterday? What does that mean?
Now consider if you didn't have memories of the past. What would make you "you"? The body would be the same but your amnesia would change things, eh?
Now what if you knew next week you would lose your memories for sure, but this week you can go on an amazing vacation. Does it matter where you go? It matters to your current self but to your future self.
Now think about sacrificing pleasure now so you can live a longer life. Or feel good about your life at 80.
Now think about the afterlife. What if you are reincarnated with no memories of the past? We already kind of established that "reincarnated you" wouldn't care about current you. But will current you care about reincarnated you?
Consider this: if a "future you" doesn't remember being "current you" how are they really different than a random person with a similar body who also has amnesia?
In short, long term, is it all about the memories?
What is the self preservation instinct about?
Finally the big one... if there were no conscious observers at all, in what sense would anything exist? That is, if I described to you a universe that you can never detect or deduce must exist from any observations in this one, how would saying "that universe EXISTS be different than saying it DOESN'T EXIST? It seems the word itself requires concious observers. Thus, the concept of consciousness and existence may be two sides of the same amazing conundrum.
I personally try to resolve this quandary in my head by defining my consciousness not as a single state at an instant in time, but rather a pattern over a time continuity - just as mass and matter occupies a continuum of space instead of a single point.
(Maybe this whole discussion is less interesting to Buddhists trained in not-self thinking. :)
(metaphysics is still an interesting and useful exercise, but the state of not having an answer to a particular question isn't much more of a real conundrum than not having asked the question in the first place. I mean, when you are hungry, eating feels pretty good regardless of whether the food exists or not.)
You know based on your ability to ask the question that you currently are you and not a clone of yourself, but you don't know that the person yesterday was you and not some other person that you were cloned from.
The parent did not say anything about this and neither did I. Of course you cannot know whether you are a clone or not. My point is that if a clone is made of you and you are killed, you will be dead, you won't be the clone.
> When you wake up the next day, how do you know you're the same person as yesterday?
> You know you're the same person as yesterday
What defines "you"? The matter you're made of?
Is it a particular arrangement of that matter? (Would you care if your neurons were replaced one by one, while keeping the same arrangement?)
Is it your memories, your thoughts, your inclinations?
Or is it something else?
The only thing you can really know for sure is that you're still alive. When you're dead, you know longer have the ability to know.
As for what happens to your body or anything else in the world? You can't ever get rid of those doubts. The only thing you can know without a doubt is that a doubter exists. Cogito ergo sum, as Descartes wrote.
Now, you could contrive a thought experiment where you clone me in such a way that neither I nor the clone know which one of us is the clone, but then, how is that any different in principle from babies switched at birth in a hospital?
Your memories don't define you, since they may be false. The only thing that defines you is your consciousness in the present. Everything else is I/O, and subject to interpretation and trust.
In fact, we do know that human memory is spectacularly unreliable, and, moreover, that it is a virtuoso liar, very accomplished at convincing us that we vividly remember things that never actually happened. It's proficient at rearranging memories and sensory impressions into ad hoc stories that we uncritically accept as true records of events.
From this point of view it seems a little over optimistic to me to say that we know ourselves, or to say that I know that the me of today is "the same person" (whatever I might mean by that) as the me of yesterday or last week or 1965.
I wouldn't use a facility that killed a stranger at random every time I used it, and I sure as hell wouldn't use a facility if it killed a living person who was identical to me.
Frankly, I don't see what your 'essence' has to do with it. Killing people is morally wrong.
What about it, though? For the sake of argument, I'm not taking a position on whether it is or isn't wrong, I'm just looking for the "why". Ending a consciousness without either a defense motive or the permission of that consciousness (as in, violating the consciousness's right to life)? Depriving the world of a unique being? Causing damage to the human race by needlessly ending a human life? Release and/or destruction of a soul (or some other supernatural-ish argument)?
"Killing people is morally wrong" works for all of those reasons right now (and others, depending on your favored philosophy), but some of them are invalidated if we assume that we can make an exact copy of a person at a given point in time.
Violating the consciousness's right to life. I could be missing something, of course, but whether we can make an exact duplicate of a person at a given point in time doesn't seem relevant to this.
I'm curious why the answers to questions of this genre usually seem obvious to me, but clearly aren't obvious for everyone. I'm not implying any value judgement either way - perhaps I'm just a dullard. But I do wonder what the difference in mindset is.
As third party observers in that situation we would know that one is a 'copy' and we (or at least I) would care (and even object) to the killing of either one. From my perspective I can see that there are two distinct unique individuals having different thoughts saying different things and doing different things. Its when the 'clones' are still alive that you can tell that you have two different people now. Since they occupy separate space they will have different perspectives and experiences and different lives.
Can you though? Assuming the cloning process works, and assuming they wake up in identical rooms, why would they think, say, or do anything differently?
Thinking about it more... I don't even think it is remotely possible to control the "initial conditions" perfectly enough (upon waking up), so they would diverge instantly. Sure, they might act very similarly, but it would quite clear that they are separate entities.
Without any additional information, I have no way to determine if I am the clone or not. I know only that there is another me in the building somewhere, having the exact same thoughts as I am having right now.
In fact, I have no way to know if the cloning was even successful or not. There is no way for me to distinguish from this room if I am the clone, if the other copy was disintegrated, or if no copy was made at all. The room I'm in could be on Mars for all I know.
Does it make sense for me to worry about the fate of the other potential copy if I know absolutely that nothing of my essence has been lost either way?