It sounds like the only two mistakes that the guy made were to make a double press of the park button (which, as far as mistakes go, isn't the most unreasonable thing to do), and to assume that a car told to be in park would, well, be in park. He ignored warnings, yes, but he was likely worried about getting out of the car and doing other things by that point, which isn't wildly unreasonable either.
He enabled Summon mode through the menu, then either accidentally or on purpose triggered Summon mode, then stepped out of the car and the car drove off. He shouldn't have assumed the car was in park when he knew that hitting the park button twice would activate this beta software that he had to manually enable in the first place.
He used Summon mode on purpose and didn't pay attention to its limitations or the rules saying "only use this on private property". The only blame Tesla has is selling a car to an irresponsible driver.
I do think that the double-click Park feature could use an extra confirmation step. It already pops up a window asking whether you want to go forward or backward, and all they need to do is make it so you have to actively select one, not default it to forward as they currently do.
This is why I still use industrial PLCs for my installations over my Pic chip or Arduino creations. I will use them in non-safety related, temporary installations, but unless I have had the HW/SW third-party inspected, I'll stay with the certified combination. An industrial e-stop relay is more than just certified compared to a 5V relay you typically use with an Arduino or Pic chip project to control motors, or other actuators.
There are protocols, and there can be rules, such if WiFi signal is lost, e-stop, but I have personally tested such a system where the hydraulic lift continued to run when WiFi was lost even with a rule to prevent it. Good thing I was standing purposefully near a hard-wired e-stop.
Good work! I always have a hand on the e-stop when testing something that could kill someone. And I mean a hard wired e-stop system using a properly rated safety relay, too... never trust software (even on an industrial PLC).
It's the same reason I usually put in some kind of mechanical stop in the event of an errant bit-flip in a running program or piece of hardware. I put in steel flag that when struck turned 90 degrees locking the other piece of machinery, so it could not move until the other device returned. This was only as a redundancy to the software, and I slept better at night for it. Equipment ran for almost 10 years, 24 times a day, 355 days a year without incident.
This could mean, for example, the app could heartbeat the finger's presence multiple times per second. The car would be continuously checking, such that if 500 or 1000 msec had passed since the last end-to-end verification, the car stops.
You could even reduce the risk of API/digitizer errors and require the user to continuously tap/stroke/rub/swirl the deadman switch button, or perform some device movement captured by the accelerometer.
You cannot (well you can) install automation controls on any old laptop or notebook. Good luck trying to show your smartphone to the insurance investigator!Our maintenance tablet had to be ruggedized to mil-spec, and had to have a rated e-stop button on it per BSI standards. We never used wireless control without being near a 'hard' e-stop, and always just for maintenance mode, no real runs with people around.
If you can get frustrated when your finger's sweaty with your touchscreen, imagine a 15 metric ton lift continuing to move at 100mm/s, because the touch screen on your smartphone still thinks your finger is holding the 'deadman' icon! Not to mention WiFi dropping, or your battery going dead.
I can only say this, since I have seen some hairy situations in my day.
Tesla has a big target painted on its back moving as fast as it is, and people will take advantage of that. This smells of that sort of thing but one can never know without being there. It looks pretty clear this person isn't going to get any sympathy from Tesla.
Well actually this is like executing something as a sudo user. The question of safety precedence doesn't arise because you have explicitly asked for it to be disabled. Now complaining that safety features should have still taken precedence is naive, its actually more like trying to dump the blame on somebody else's for what is very clearly your mistake.
I guess now that Software is sneaking back into automobiles, we're going to shift back into "blame the user" mode?
"But he used the feature wrong!" - To which I say, why was he able to use the feature the wrong way in the first place? Why are there so many limitations (won't sense a bike; won't sense a partially opened garage door) on a feature designed and advertised as "hands off summoning of the vehicle"?
I think as more autonomous features get developed it's going to be complicated for some time regarding who is culpable for a given accident.
It shouldn't be possible to disable safety features. I can't press a button to disable the brakes on my car, for instance.
The brake is not a safety feature that you expect the car to activate automatically on your behalf. The driver has to explicitly step on the brake pedal to activate it.
With regards to Summon, disabling its safety limitations is like disabling traction control, stability control, automatic emergency braking, lane keeping/lane departure warning, etc., all of which can be disabled by pressing a button somewhere.
Here really it needs to be defined what qualifies as safety. The act of driving(in certain circumstances) in itself is unsafe by many a definition, by relinquishing control to the driver you open all the risks that likely to occur. Its hard to draw the boundary as to what is safe and what isn't. Please tell me should cars carry mandatory breath analyzers? and disable ignition in case the analyzer finds traces of alcohol in the breath? Should there be a detector to check if the driver at the wheel has been well rested a night before? A detector to check if the driver isn't in rage? These scenarios only increase exponentially, but remember when you relinquish control to the driver you now open door for all risks equally. Therefore you can't handle all the thousands of situations, instead what you do is remind the user of the responsibility, double check the user decision and then relinquish the control to the user.
Therefore in all seriousness, if you take control of the car regardless of the situation you are really responsible. Even if you control the car through your phone.
Buy you can press a button to disable the traction control...
I'm sure you don't mean that as absolutely as you're making it sound. For example, if I steal your car and run over somebody with it, surely that's my responsibility, not yours. Right?
It's like the user manual for a microwave oven saying it "must never be used unattended" and "the user is responsible for shutting off the oven if it fails to stop when the timer reaches zero".
Stoves don't advertise any degree of autonomy. You turn the tap, fire comes out. You put things in the fire, they get hot and/or they burn. It doesn't deliver any safeguards but it doesn't promise any.
The other end of the scale (if we're talking about gas-burning apparatus) would be your instant gas hot water system. It's got a series of belt-and-suspenders safety devices in it to stop it from overheating, exploding, or gassing you out if the pilot light goes out. It absolutely does advertise that it's an automated system which will do its thing without your intervention - and if it fails to do its thing, the results can be disastrous. So it's designed to be safe.
The problem lies when you have devices in the middle of the scale, with devices that are designed to have some degree of autonomy but lack the commitment to see it through. Take my drip coffee maker, for instance - the manual firmly admonishes you to "never run the machine unattended" on one page and then on the next, explains how the easy-to-use timer system allows you to have fresh coffee waiting for you when you wake up. The intent is clearly that the system be used without supervision, but instead of engineering in the appropriate protections (and tripling the price) the manufacturer just put some ass-covering lines in the manual in the hope that if there's a malfunction and a house burns down, that protects them from a lawsuit.
Driver assist vs auto pilot, although the same feature they have different meanings to the general public and drivers may have the wrong expectations.
Should it matter? This should be a safety critical operation. User error should mean it fails safely.
That said, sure it should be able to stop on it's own, but I think they couldn't have been more clear that this is beta and the driver is still always responsible.
In my view the driver is just as liable if the put on cruise control and don't pay attention. Is it the manufacturer's fault the car slammed into a vehicle in front of them while cruise control was on? No, I think any reasonable person will be saying it's the driver's fault.