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Re:/dev/random – a new approach by tptacek on Sunday April 24, 2016 @08:46PM (#11561994)
Neither of your first two paragraphs are correct. I don't have an opinion about the last.

First: while I don't know what you mean by "teasing out differences with respect to various oracles", the fact that you have a kernel CSPRNG that your system relies on means that diversity in CSPRNGs is a bad thing. Simply: alternatives to the LRNG lead to multiple single points of failure.

Entropy is not "scarce". In fact, it's infinite and renewable. To generate a practically unbounded number of random bytes from just 16 bytes of starting state entropy, just use those 16 bytes as an AES key, and use it to encrypt an incrementing counter.

Re:/dev/random – a new approach by mindslight on Monday April 25, 2016 @12:31PM (#11565380)
I think my point is better made as such:

urandom only implements computational security, whereas random makes an attempt at information theoretic security (albeit an extremely poor one). Computational security is so practically useful that the difference between the two seems moot, but there still is a valid distinction.

Re:/dev/random – a new approach by tptacek on Monday April 25, 2016 @01:56PM (#11565985)
In the context of /dev/random, "information-theoretically secure" means "equivalent to a one-time pad". Anyone can look at the design of the LRNG and see that it's not that. So, no.
Re:/dev/random – a new approach by mindslight on Monday April 25, 2016 @02:40PM (#11566303)
Software engineering has a strong distinction between abstract model and concrete implementation, yes? The properties of the interface of /dev/random indicate an attempt at being information-theoretically secure. I've repeatedly disclaimed that I'm well aware the implementation falls well short of such.

To me, XOR using /dev/random should be usable for a true OTP [0] whereas XOR using /dev/urandom has the security of the effective stream cipher.

[0] (malleability disclaimer, lest you think I'm arguing for the practicalities of "OTP" or something)

Re:/dev/random – a new approach by mindslight on Sunday April 24, 2016 @08:57PM (#11562025)
A break of SHA1 (ie SHA1 preimage oracle) breaks u/random. This is less secure than something that is broken if SHA1 and SHA2 are broken. But since there are no known full breaks of either, this is "merely" hypothetical.

We can define our measure of entropy such that the output of AES (/SHA1) qualifies, or such that it does not. The way it is used in the random/urandom distinction, it's clearly not meant to include PRNG output.

Re:/dev/random – a new approach by tptacek on Sunday April 24, 2016 @09:49PM (#11562192)
random and urandom use the same cryptographic components, so if a break in SHA1 breaks urandom, it breaks /dev/random too.
Re:/dev/random – a new approach by mindslight on Sunday April 24, 2016 @09:58PM (#11562217)
Yes. As I said, the current implementation fails to live up to the distinction.

They should be completely partitioned pools, and collected entropy that goes out random should never be mixed into the urandom pool. Of course it's likely random still wants whitening, likely resulting in the use of a computationally-secure algorithm.

Practically since it's anyone's guess what the random clients expect, it's probably the right thing to `ln -f urandom random`. Bona fide hardware sources can come up with their own device/daemon to administer and/or stir into the kernel P/RNG. I'm just pointing out that there is a worthwhile distinction they were trying for, despite the engineering pitfalls of trying to make it available!

Re:/dev/random – a new approach by tptacek on Monday April 25, 2016 @01:56PM (#11565989)
I have no idea what you're trying to accomplished by these "partitioned pools". Sorry, you've lost me.