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Re:/dev/random – a new approach by mindslight on Sunday April 24, 2016 @08:57PM (#11562025)
A break of SHA1 (ie SHA1 preimage oracle) breaks u/random. This is less secure than something that is broken if SHA1 and SHA2 are broken. But since there are no known full breaks of either, this is "merely" hypothetical.

We can define our measure of entropy such that the output of AES (/SHA1) qualifies, or such that it does not. The way it is used in the random/urandom distinction, it's clearly not meant to include PRNG output.

Re:/dev/random – a new approach by tptacek on Sunday April 24, 2016 @09:49PM (#11562192)
random and urandom use the same cryptographic components, so if a break in SHA1 breaks urandom, it breaks /dev/random too.
Re:/dev/random – a new approach by mindslight on Sunday April 24, 2016 @09:58PM (#11562217)
Yes. As I said, the current implementation fails to live up to the distinction.

They should be completely partitioned pools, and collected entropy that goes out random should never be mixed into the urandom pool. Of course it's likely random still wants whitening, likely resulting in the use of a computationally-secure algorithm.

Practically since it's anyone's guess what the random clients expect, it's probably the right thing to `ln -f urandom random`. Bona fide hardware sources can come up with their own device/daemon to administer and/or stir into the kernel P/RNG. I'm just pointing out that there is a worthwhile distinction they were trying for, despite the engineering pitfalls of trying to make it available!

Re:/dev/random – a new approach by tptacek on Monday April 25, 2016 @01:56PM (#11565989)
I have no idea what you're trying to accomplished by these "partitioned pools". Sorry, you've lost me.