In the context of /dev/random, "information-theoretically secure" means "equivalent to a one-time pad". Anyone can look at the design of the LRNG and see that it's not that. So, no.
Re:/dev/random – a new approach
by mindslight on Monday April 25, 2016 @02:40PM
(#11566303)
Software engineering has a strong distinction between abstract model and concrete implementation, yes? The properties of the interface of /dev/random indicate an attempt at being information-theoretically secure. I've repeatedly disclaimed that I'm well aware the implementation falls well short of such.
To me, XOR using /dev/random should be usable for a true OTP [0] whereas XOR using /dev/urandom has the security of the effective stream cipher.
[0] (malleability disclaimer, lest you think I'm arguing for the practicalities of "OTP" or something)
urandom only implements computational security, whereas random makes an attempt at information theoretic security (albeit an extremely poor one). Computational security is so practically useful that the difference between the two seems moot, but there still is a valid distinction.