The problem of verifying the integrity of embedded silicon (at the microcircuitry level) is one that hasn't really been solved yet. This has been a problem for the DoD since forever.
THEY solved it partially by using US-sourced parts and working with industry to make sure the designs weren't sabotaged or otherwise backdoored. It's still an active concern though.
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2014system/16990WedTrack1Shanahan.p...
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/05/backdoor_foun...
I personally think this is a good approach, as it allows hardware TRNG to increase the quality and quantity of entropy without being able to own the internal generator.
BoringSSL takes a similar approach with rdrand in that it mixes it using the chacha20 stream cipher. The operating system PRNG is used to generate the keys and rdrand is filtered on every call when you need a random number. I don't know what LibreSSL does (it uses chacha20 in some manner) and I'm pretty sure OpenSSL doesn't use rdrand at all unless you ask for it (in which case it will ONLY use rdrand).
If you randomly check, say, power usage and latency of the on-board RNG (ideally combined with high-resolution IR recordings of the CPU), it will, at least, be harder for the CPU manufacturer to install a backdoored RNG that is active most of the time (but one that only gets activated after receiving some trigger, say a specific instruction sequence would still be virtually undetectable)
This is an issue I've been thinking about quite a bit. Is there a way to somehow sign a circuit design on silicon and allow devs to check the circuit's integrity?
For example, in the case of a TRNG, the developer can add a "verify" instruction to ensure that the TRNG on the user's CPU is not compromised before executing the RAND instruction. Of course, that's what the dev does, but the signing itself is much more complex.
I've been looking through the literature and I haven't found much to go on. I know it's likely impossible to do given how many layers there are between silicon and machine code, but I'd like to at least give it a try.