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Re:/dev/random – a new approach by lvs on Sunday April 24, 2016 @05:37PM (#11561478)
A malicious module would only need to act like VW's defeat device to overcome that check. When it senses some integrity/signing routine, it simply isolates itself from a verifiable circuit.
Re:/dev/random – a new approach by readams on Sunday April 24, 2016 @06:05PM (#11561580)
There is no procedure you can run that would show that the RNG was compromised. They would still give you a stream that's indistinguishable from random noise, except it would be generated from a seed known to the attacker.
Re:/dev/random – a new approach by Someone on Sunday April 24, 2016 @06:01PM (#11561564)
For VW, that was easy because the test setup was known and very rigid.

If you randomly check, say, power usage and latency of the on-board RNG (ideally combined with high-resolution IR recordings of the CPU), it will, at least, be harder for the CPU manufacturer to install a backdoored RNG that is active most of the time (but one that only gets activated after receiving some trigger, say a specific instruction sequence would still be virtually undetectable)

Re:/dev/random – a new approach by Nrsolis on Sunday April 24, 2016 @11:47PM (#11562439)
The problem you are trying to solve is much closer to the "decidability problem" than you might suppose at first sight.